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Abstract
Key exchange protocols, first introduced by Diffie and Hellman in 1976, are one of the most
widely-deployed cryptographic protocols. They allow two parties, that have never interacted
before, to establish shared secrets. These shared cryptographic keys may subsequently be used
to establish a secure communication channel. Use cases include the classic client-server setting
that is for example at play when browsing the internet, but also chats via end-to-end-encrypted
instant messaging applications.
Security-wise, we generally demand of key exchange protocols to achieve key secrecy and
authentication. While, informally, authentication ensures that the communicating parties have
confidence in the identity of their peers, key secrecy ensures that any shared cryptographic
key that is established via the key exchange protocol is only known to the participants in the
protocol and can be used securely in cryptographic protocols, i.e., is sufficiently random. In 1993,
Bellare and Rogaway gave a first formalization of key exchange protocol security that captures
these properties with respect to powerful adversaries with full control over the network. Their
model constitutes the basis of the many subsequent treatments of authenticated key exchange
security, including the models presented in this thesis.
The common methodological approach underlying all of these formalizations is the provable
security paradigm, which has become a standard tool in assessing the security of cryptographic
protocols and primitives. So-called security models specify the expected security guarantees of
the scheme in question with regards to a well-defined class of adversaries. Proofs that validate
these security claims do so by reducing the security of the overall scheme to the security of
the underlying cryptographic primitives and hardness assumptions. However, advances in
computational power and more sophisticated cryptanalytic capabilities often render exactly
these components insecure. Especially the advent of quantum computers will have a devastating
effect on much of today’s public key cryptography. This is especially true for key exchange
protocols since they rely crucially on public-key algorithms.
In this thesis, our focus in “future-proofing” key exchange protocols is two-fold. First, we
focus on extending security models for key exchange protocols to capture the (un)expected
break of cryptographic primitives and hardness assumptions. The aim is to gain assurances with
respect to future adversaries and to investigate the effects of primitive failures on key exchange
protocols. More specifically, we explore how key exchange protocols can be safely transitioned
to new, post-quantum secure algorithms with hybrid techniques. Hybrids combine classical
and post-quantum algorithms such that the overall key agreement scheme remains secure as
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Abstract
long as one of the two base schemes remains secure. For this, we introduce security notions
for key encapsulation mechanisms that account for adversaries with varying levels of quantum
capabilities and present three new constructions for hybrid key encapsulation mechanisms. Our
hybrid designs are practice-inspired and for example capture draft proposals for hybrid modes
in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, which is one of the most widely-deployed
cryptographic protocols that enables key agreement.
Furthermore, our notion of breakdown resilience for key exchange protocols allows to gauge
the security of past session keys in the event of a failure of a cryptographic component in the key
exchange. We exercise our model on variants of the post-quantum secure key exchange protocol
NewHope by Alkim et al. Thereby, we confirm the intuition that, in order to guard against
adversaries that only have access to quantum computing power in the (more distant) future, it
is sufficient to use classically-secure authentication mechanisms alongside post-quantum key
agreement to achieve authenticated key exchange.
As with any mathematical statement, theorems in the provable security paradigm are only
as valid as the underlying assumptions. A careful consideration of any newly made assumption
is thus essential to ensure the meaningfulness of the statement itself and make the assumption
a viable tool for future analyses. Thus, secondly, we systematically classify the PRF-ODH
assumption, a complexity-theoretic hardness assumption that has been used in key exchange
security analyses of such prominent protocols as TLS, Signal, and Wireguard. In particular,
we give a unified, parametrized definition of the assumption encompassing different variants
that are present in the literature. We relate the resulting parametrized notions in terms of
their strength and show where these assumptions fit in the collection of well-understood related
hardness assumptions. We finally sketch our result on the impossibility of instantiating this
assumption in the standard model, thereby disposing of the uncertainty in the community
whether PRF-ODH is in fact a standard model assumption, i.e., removes the usage of some
idealized assumptions in key exchange protocol proofs.
x
Zusammenfassung
Schlüsselaustauschverfahren wurden erstmals 1976 von Diffie und Hellman vorgestellt und
gehören zu den weitverbreitesten kryptografischen Protokollen. Sie ermöglichen zwei Proto-
kollteilnehmern, welche zuvor noch nicht miteinander in Kontakt standen, einen gemeinsamen
geheimen kryptografischen Schlüssel abzuleiten. Dieser kann anschließend dazu verwendet werden,
einen sicheren Kommunikationskanal zwischen ihnen aufzubauen. Zu den Hauptanwendungsfäl-
len für kryptographischen Schlüsselaustausch zählt die klassische Client-Server-Kommunikation,
wie sie beispielsweise beim Surfen im Internet auftritt. Aber auch Ende-zu-Ende-verschlüsselte
Chats werden etwa mit Schlüsselaustauschprotokollen abgesichert.
Die Sicherheitseigenschaften, die wir von Schlüsselaustauschverfahren im Allgemeinen er-
warten sind zum einen die Zufälligkeit und Vertraulichkeit der ausgehandelten Schlüssel, sodass
diese nur den legitimen Protokollteilnehmern bekannt sind und sich für den sicheren Einsatz in
kryptographischen Protokollen eignen. Andererseits soll auch die Identität (einzelner oder aller)
Protokollteilnehmer mittels Authentifizierung zweifelsfrei sichergestellt werden. Die erste formale
Betrachtung dieser zentralen Sicherheitseigenschaften für authentifizierten Schlüsselaustausch
geht auf Bellare und Rogaway aus dem Jahre 1993 zurück. Sie setzten damit den Grundstein für
viele weitere Sicherheitsdefinitionen für Schlüsselaustauschprotokolle in Gegenwart eines starken
Angreifers, der die Kontrolle über das gesamte Netzwerk verfügt. Auch die Arbeiten in dieser
Thesis stützen sich im Kern auf diese ursprüngliche Definition und erweitern diese.
Der zugrundeliegende wissenschaftliche Ansatz für all diese Betrachtungen ist das Konzept
der beweisbare Sicherheit, welches nicht mehr wegzudenken ist aus modernen kryptographischen
Sicherheitsanalysen. Sogenannte Sicherheitsmodelle spezifizieren die erwarteten Sicherheitseigen-
schaften des zu analysierenden Verfahrens gegenüber einer wohldefinierten Klasse von Angreifern.
Beweise, dass ein Verfahren tatsächlich die definierten Sicherheitsziele erreicht, reduzieren die
Sicherheit des Gesamtverfahrens auf die Sicherheit seiner kryptographischen Komponenten.
Unglücklicherweise ist jedoch genau die Sicherheit dieser Komponenten unentwegt durch
leistungsfähigere Rechner und neue Techniken in der Kryptanalyse gefährdet. Insbesondere die
erwartete technische Revolution durch rechenstarke Quantencomputer droht die moderne Kryp-
tographie stark zu erschüttern. Ein großer Teil der heutzutage verwendeten kryptographischen
Algorithmen, die sogenannte Public-Key-Kryptographie, die auch in Schlüsselaustauschverfahren
zum Einsatz kommt, wird durch die gesteigerte Rechenleistung von Quantencomputern gebrochen.
In dieser Arbeit beleuchten wir, wie Schlüsselaustauschverfahren und ihre Sicherheitsanalysen
dieser und weiteren Anforderungen der Zukunft gerecht werden können.
xi
Zusammenfassung
Zum einen zeigen wir, wie bestehende Sicherheitsmodelle für Schlüsselaustauschverfahren
so erweitert werden können, dass sie dem (un)erwarteten Bruch kryptographischer Primitive
und komplexitätstheoretischer Annahmen standhalten können. Ziel ist es hier, die gewünschten
Sicherheitsgarantien im Hinblick auf zukünftige Angreiferarten zu definieren und dann zu
untersuchen, wie sich der Bruch bestimmter kryptographischer Bausteine auf die Sicherheit von
der Protokolle auswirkt.
Konkreter untersuchen wir, wie man derzeit verwendete Algorithmen in Schlüsselaustausch-
verfahren mittels sogenannter Hybride durch quantencomputerresistente Algorithmen ersetzen
kann. Hybride kombinieren die heuzutage verwendeten klassischen Verfahren mit quantencom-
puterresistenten Verfahren, sodass der Schlüsselaustausch sicher bleibt, solange zumindest eines
der zugrundeliegenden Verfahren sicher bleibt. Zu diesem Zweck erweitern wir die bestehenden
Sicherheitsmodelle so, dass sie unterschieldich starke Quantenangreifer abbilden können. Zusätz-
lich präsentieren wir drei praxisnahe Hybridkonstruktionen, die sich an Designvorschlägen für
Hybride in einem der am weitesten verbreiteten kryptographischen Protokolle, dem Transport
Layer Security (TLS) Protokoll, orientieren.
Unser Breakdown Resilience Modell erlaubt uns weiterhin die Sicherheit von bereits eta-
blierten Schlüsseln zu untersuchen, falls kryptographische Komponenten im Schlüsselaustausch-
protokoll in der Zukunft unsicher werden. Wir wenden dieses Modell dann auf Varianten des
quantencomputerresistenten Schlüsselaustauschverfahrens NewHope von Alkim et al. an. Un-
sere Analyse unterstützt nun mit einem formalen Argument die weitherrschende Meinung,
dass Schlüsselaustauschverfahren gegen Quantenangreifer in der fernen Zukunft ausreichend
geschützt sind, wenn nur die Schlüsselerstellung quantencomputerresistent gestaltet ist, die
Authentifizierungmechanismen jedoch nicht.
Wie bei jedem mathematischen Theorem, sind auch Theoreme über die beweisbare Sicherheit
von kryptographischen Verfahren nur insofern gültig, als es die darin getroffenen Annahmen sind.
Eine strukturierte Untersuchung von bisher unbekannten komplexitätstheoretischen Annahmen
in Theoremen ist daher essentiell für deren Richtigkeit und Aussagekraft. Nur dies gewährleistet
die bedenkenlose künftige Anwendbarkeit der Annahme selbst, als auch des Theorems.
Dieser Argumentation folgend klassifizieren wir im zweiten Teil der Thesis die komplexitäts-
theoretische PRF-ODH Annahme, welche sich in Sicherheitsanalysen bedeutender Schlüsselaus-
tauschprotokolle wie TLS, Signal, und Wireguard wiederfindet. Zunächst geben wir hierzu eine
vereinheitlichende, parametrisierte Definition der Annahme wieder, welche verschiedene Varian-
ten von PRF-ODH aus der einschlägigen Literatur umfasst. Wir zeigen, wie sich die Annahmen je
nach Parameterwahl in ihrer Stärke unterscheiden und wie sie in das Spektrum bereits bekannter,
verwandter komplexitätsbasierter Annahmen einzuordnen sind. Seit Einführung von PRF-ODH
wurde diskutiert, ob die Verwendung von PRF-ODH es erlaubt, Beweise für Schlüsselaustausch-
protokolle ohne idealisierte Annahmen (im sogenannten Standardmodell) zu führen. Zu guter
Letzt skizzieren wir unser Unmöglichkeitsresultat, wonach diese Betrachtungsweise unplausibel
erscheint und es sich dementsprechend bei PRF-ODH um keine Annahme im Standardmodell
handelt.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Much of today’s digital communication is protected by cryptography - from our everyday web
browsing, to instant messaging chats or contactless payments with our banking cards. To
efficiently enable secure data transmission, the involved devices must encrypt the confidential
data with a so-called symmetric encryption scheme for which they need a shared secret key.
However, in many scenarios, the parties that wish to communicate securely have no prior
knowledge of each other and have, in particular, not communicated before. This is for example
the case when your web browser connects to a new website or when you wish to send an encrypted
message to a new contact in your messaging application. There is no common information from
which a shared secret key could be derived.
Authenticated key exchange protocols, or AKE protocols, for short, solve this issue. On
a high level, AKE protocols are run between parties whose goal it is to establish a secure
communication channel. To do this, the parties use an unprotected channel to exchange
public information from which they are then able to derive a shared secret key. This key can
subsequently be used to secure their communication.
Security for AKE protocols essentially consists of two components: key secrecy and au-
thentication. While, informally, authentication ensures that the two (or more) communicating
parties are aware of and agree on the identity of their peer(s), key secrecy ensures that any
shared cryptographic key (the session key) that is actually established in the interaction, is only
known to the parties in the protocol. This latter property is formally captured by demanding
that an adversary cannot distinguish an actual key established via the AKE protocol from a
random value. The first to formalize these security requirements into a comprehensive model
for authenticated key exchange with regards to an actively interfering malicious adversary were
Bellare and Rogaway [BR94]. Their model has formed the basis for many AKE security models
since, including the ones in this thesis. These models are used to analyse the security of concrete
AKE protocol designs.
The most prominent examples for real-world key exchange protocols that have secured the
internet and inter-server communications for decades are the Transport Layer Security protocol
TLS [Res18] (formerly known as the Secure Sockets Layer protocol SSL) and the Internet Key
Exchange protocol IKE [KHN+14] that is part of the IPsec protocol suite [KS05]. In recent
years, with the introduction of ever more powerful smartphones, a new application field for
key exchange protocols has emerged in the form of end-to-end encrypted instant messaging
applications such as Signal or WhatsApp.
Diffie–Hellman key exchange. The first key exchange protocol was introduced by Diffie
and Hellman in their 1976 seminal work New Directions in Cryptography [DH76], that laid
the ground stone of modern public key cryptography. The so-called Diffie–Hellman (DH) key
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exchange still forms the core of most modern key exchange protocols today. It relies on the
hardness of computing discrete logarithms in certain mathematical structures called cyclic groups.
Informally, assume we have some set G which we call the group and this group has “size” q (the
order), where q is a prime. In cyclic groups of order q, there exists an element g (the so-called
generator) such that every element X ∈ G can be uniquely written as gx, where x is an element
in Zq := {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. Furthermore, G is closed under multiplication and inversion, i.e., for
any two elements gx, gy ∈ G their multiplicative product gx · gy also lies in the group and there
exists an element gz ∈ G such that (gx)−1 = gz.
In the basic DH protocol depicted in Figure 1.1, two parties, here called Alice and Bob, each
sample a value from Zq (their secret key). Let a be the value sampled by Alice and b the value
sampled by Bob. They then exchange group elements of the form ga and gb (we call these their
respective public keys) over an untrusted channel. From these they can derive a common shared
secret K ← gab, computed by each party taking the other party’s public key and raising it to
the power of their secret key.
Alice Bob
a $←− Zq
A← ga A
b $←− Zq
B ← gbB
K ← Ba K ← Ab
Figure 1.1: Unauthenticated Diffie–Hellman key exchange. Alice and Bob exchange public values A
and B to compute the common shared secret Ab = gab = Ba.
This simple version of a key exchange protocol is unfortunately only secure against eaves-
dropping adversaries that remain passive during the execution of the protocol. Furthermore,
the protocol as such does not provide any form of authentication; neither Alice nor Bob have
any way of assuring that they are actually talking to each other.
However, modern key exchange protocols build on top of this key agreement scheme and
complement it with suitable mechanisms such that both authentication and key secrecy are
ensured even against actively interfering adversaries. Later in the thesis, we will discuss the
SigMA compiler [Kra03], a popular example of how the basic DH protocol can be lifted to one
that achieve security against active adversaries.
Ready for the Future?
Key exchange protocols employ a significant number of cryptographic algorithms and hardness
assumptions, to achieve strong security guarantees. At the same time, the steady increase
in computational power and advanced cryptanalytic capabilities often renders exactly those
cryptographic algorithms insecure.
Quantum computers and cryptography. Especially the advent of large-scale quantum
computers will have a devastating effect on many currently deployed cryptographic schemes and
entire protocols. This is especially relevant for key exchange protocols as the key-generating
backbone and thus source of security of many applications. We briefly describe the key concepts of
quantum computation in the following. For an in-depth treatment of quantum computation and
information we refer the interested reader to, e.g., the textbook by Nielsen and Chuang [NC00].
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As opposed to classical computers which are built using digital electronic circuits, quantum
computers take advantage of special quantum-mechanical properties of particles. The quantum
computer analogue of the bits “0” and “1”, that classical computers abstractly operate on, is a
qubit—a small quantum-mechanical system that can collapse into two so-called states, either 0
or 1, when measured.
What is special about quantum computing is that, until such a measurement occurs, a single
qubit is able to encode both classical bits simultaneously. For example, two qubits represent
all two-bit strings “00”,“01”,“10”, and “11”. This superposition property allows for a single
operation on n qubits to be applied to all n-bit strings in the same processing step.
The second outstanding property of quantum-mechanical systems is that of entanglement,
which Einstein rather appropriately referred to as “spooky action at a distance”. Informally,
entanglement describes the process of correlating the states of multiple single qubits such that if
the state of one of these qubits is altered (this happens, e.g., through measurement), the states
of the other entangled qubits also change—even if they are separated by long distances.
Lastly, quantum states are subject to the so-called no-cloning theorem which states that,
quite different from classical information, an unknown quantum state cannot be copied without
“destroying” it, i.e., causing it to collapse.
The theoretical model of quantum computation was first introduced by Feynman [Fey82] in
1982. By now, quantum computers are no longer hypothetical constructs since small versions
have been built successfully [Goo, IBM] and much research effort is invested into developing
more powerful and stable systems. As hinted at before, especially for cryptography this ongoing
progress in building large-scale quantum computers is rather bad news.
Over three decades ago, Shor [Sho94, Sho97] presented the first efficient algorithm to solve the
integer factorization (and discrete logarithm) problem using hypothetical quantum computing
power. He was able to transform the problem of integer factorization into a problem of finding
a period in a function, i.e., finding the interval at which sequences of function outputs repeat.
The above mentioned superposition property makes it possible to evaluate the function on all
points simultaneously, thus yielding an efficient means to determine the period.
Unfortunately, most of today’s public key cryptography is based on the intractability of either
integer factorization or computing discrete logarithms and due to Shor’s findings must thus be
considered entirely broken once quantum computers operate reliably on sufficiently many qubits.
For symmetric cryptography the situation is somewhat better, despite Grover [Gro96, Gro01]
presenting a quantum algorithm for search in an unstructured database with quadratic speed-up
over the best-known classical algorithms. From a cryptographic point of view this corresponds to
speeding up the brute-force computation of an n-bit secret key input of a symmetric cryptographic
primitive such as block cipher encryption from 2n to 2n2 operations. Simply doubling the key
sizes retains the current security levels of most schemes (assuming Grover’s algorithm is the
only viable quantum attack against those primitives).
Sadly, such an easy fix is not available for public key cryptography and the vulnerable
schemes must be replaced entirely by schemes that are secure even in the presence of quantum
computing power. These cryptographic schemes have become known as post-quantum cryp-
tography.1 These problems are mostly based on lattice theory, codes, multivariate polynomial
equations, or supersingular elliptic curves. Currently, the American National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) is heading the effort to standardize post-quantum cryptographic
schemes [Nat15], with 26 “Round 2” candidates (of 69 accepted submissions in the first round)
and standard documents expected in the early 2020s [Moo19].
1Note that post-quantum algorithms are merely classical algorithms (meaning they are implementable on
classical computers just like our schemes today) but rely on problems that are hard to solve even for quantum
computers. This stands in contrast to quantum cryptography that actively leverages the above mentioned
principles of quantum physics.
3
Chapter 1. Introduction
Cryptanalysis. But not only quantum computers threaten our cryptography. Increas-
ing classical computing power and advanced cryptanalysis render schemes insecure regu-
larly. Examples include weak ciphers like RC4 [GMPS14, ABP+13] or OCB2 [IIMP19]
and collisions in still widely-deployed hash functions like MD5 [dB94, WY05, SLdW07] or
SHA-1 [WYY05, Ste13, SKP16, SBK+17].
This degradation in security over time is often expected and safe alternatives are available
before the actual breakdown. Reality, however, sadly tells the story of very slow adoption rates
for new algorithms and protocol versions which leads to widespread deployment of insecure
algorithms long after they have been broken. The reasons for this are manifold but among the
most prominent are (a combination of) virtually un-updatable legacy systems, apprehensive
developers that must maintain backwards-compatibility, and security-illiterate decision-makers.
With their many employed primitives and complex ecosystems in which they are embedded, key
exchange protocols are especially prone to obsolete algorithms and protocol versions.
Provable security caveats. But even if key exchange protocols employ secure cryptographic
algorithms as building blocks, this still does not mean that the protocol as a whole is secure.
Especially modern key exchange protocols that aim for fine-grained security guarantees use
intricate patterns to achieve both security and high efficiency with respect to communication
and computation. This makes their security analysis—i.e., the rigorous argumentation that the
protocol actually provides key secrecy and authentication—often complex and necessitates the
usage of what is often referred to as non-standard cryptographic assumptions.
It has become common to subject (newly proposed) cryptographic schemes and protocols to
a rigorous analysis in the provable security paradigm, which we will discuss in Chapter 2. While
an indispensable tool in the development of new cryptographic schemes and algorithms, the
resulting theorems about the security of a scheme inherit the caveat of any proven mathematical
statement: the claim is only as viable as the underlying assumptions.
To capture complex protocols designs in the provable security framework, it often becomes
necessary to deviate from what has become standard and is considered to be well-understood.
While this is not problematic in itself, any new assumption requires a careful categorization
into the realm of existing assumptions that have been deemed reasonable. Without relating the
new hardness assumptions to tenable intractabilities, the entire security statement is at risk
of becoming void if the validity of the new assumptions cannot be upheld. Furthermore it is
beneficial to show that known cryptographic primitives do actually achieve this new assumption.
Organization of the Thesis and Contributions
The research efforts that constitute the basis of this thesis focus on the “future-proof” design
and analysis of key exchange protocols that takes into account the above mentioned challenges
and scenarios.
On the one hand, this includes advanced security models for the analysis of key exchange
protocols that can capture future adversaries with increased computational and cryptanalytic
power. In particular, we examine how key exchange protocols can be safely transitioned into a
post-quantum setting and which security guarantees can be maintained for secret keys that were
established before one (or more) of the cryptographic primitives employed in the KE was broken
in the meantime. On the other hand, we consider a relatively novel non-standard intractability
assumption that has founds its way into numerous security analyses of widely-deployed key
exchange protocols. We strengthen these existing (and future) analyses by the systematic and
careful categorization of this assumption.
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In the following, we briefly outline the thesis and the main motivations and contributions.
Each of the main chapters (Chapters 5, 6, and 7), contains more precise pointers to my own
personal contributions, as well as an extensive discussion of related work, so we defer the
discussion of these. Note that the joint paper with Denise Demirel on the unrelated topic of
efficient proactive secret sharing [BD16], as well as the work on a provably-secure zero round-trip
time extension to the Extended Access Control protocol with Marc Fischlin [BF17] have not
entered this thesis.
Background. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 give the necessary background for the rest of the thesis.
In Chapter 2 we introduce the methodological principle of provable security that builds the basis
of many areas of cryptological research. We discuss how security of a cryptographic scheme can
be defined in terms of the inability of a computationally-bounded adversary to win a so-called
security game with greater than vanishingly small probability. We further introduce one of the
most commonly used idealized models in cryptography, the random oracle model, which allows
to prove security of schemes that otherwise escape analysis.
In Chapter 3 we specify the definitions and security games for the most relevant basic
cryptographic building blocks that are used within this thesis. These include public key encryp-
tion and the related concept of key encapsulation mechanisms, as well as signatures, message
authentication codes, hash functions, and pseudorandom functions. We furthermore introduce
a class of complexity-theoretic hardness assumptions that are often applied to prove security
of Diffie–Hellman-based key exchanges. These well-established assumptions will especially
be relevant as reference points for the categorization of the interactive Diffie-Hellman-based
PRF-ODH assumption in Chapter 7.
In Chapter 4, we finally introduce the Bellare-Rogaway model [BR94], which is one of the
(if not the) most utilized models for analyzing security of authenticated key exchange protocols.
It will form the core security model for our more advanced security notions of authenticated key
exchange in the hybrid setting in Chapter 5, as well as for the breakdown resilience framework
in Chapter 6.
Hybrid key exchange. In Chapter 5, we turn towards the question of how a smooth transition
to key exchange protocols that are secure against quantum adversaries can be ensured without
introducing unnecessary risks or even vulnerabilities. The circumstances that make such a
transition challenging (apart from the previously mentioned slow adoption rates that typically
come with new algorithms and protocol versions) are two-fold:
On the one hand, today’s communication is already vulnerable to so-called future-quantum
adversaries. These adversaries may record encrypted communications along with the preceding
key exchanges today and will break confidentiality once quantum computers become available
which allows them to extract the key from the stored (now broken) key exchange. On the
other hand, with the NIST standardization process for post-quantum cryptography [Nat15]
still ongoing, we are not yet confident in the appropriate choice of post-quantum schemes, and
especially for lattice-based approaches, adequate parameter selection is unresolved [ACD+18].
So-called hybrid schemes offer a way out of this dilemma. These schemes combine today’s
classically-secure key exchange with experimental post-quantum secure schemes such that
security is maintained even if one of these two base schemes breaks down completely. We model
hybrid KE in the two-stage adversary setting introduced by Bindel et al. [BHMS17] and are
thus able to achieve a fine-grained security analysis wrt. adversaries of varying quantum powers.
We propose three new hybrid key encapsulation mechanisms which are especially suitable for
practice since they are either highly efficient or capture proposals for hybrid modes in TLS 1.3.
Finally, we present a model for hybrid AKE based on the Bellare-Rogaway model and show how
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to generically build hybrid AKE from hybrid key encapsulation mechanisms.
Breakdown resilience of key exchange protocols. In Chapter 6 we introduce the notion
of breakdown resilience for key exchange protocols. As already mentioned before, key exchange
protocols rely on a significant number of cryptographic primitives and hardness assumptions.
Unfortunately, failures of actively deployed primitives and hardness assumptions are common;
be it weak ciphers, collisions in hash functions, or poor Diffie-Hellman parameter choices.
While the notions of forward secrecy [Gün90, DVOW92, CK01] and post-compromise secu-
rity [CCG16] give security guarantees for key exchanges when (some of the) secret material of
the participants is exposed, so far there has been no formal tool to analyze the security of a
key exchange protocol in the face of the failure of an entire cryptographic component—neither
retrospectively, nor in the anticipation of a future breakdown.
The breakdown resilience model closes this gap and presents an extension to the Bellare-
Rogaway model which allows to generically model breakdowns and their effect on the security
of past key exchanges. We furthermore present a stronger version which is able to argue about
the (in)security of even ongoing and future sessions. While in general every component of a key
exchange scheme is necessary for its security, the aforementioned hybrid designs have built-in
redundancy to account for breakdowns.
To exercise our model we present an analysis of the post-quantum secure unauthenticated key
exchange protocol NewHope [ADPS16b, AAB+19] combined with classical authentication in
the breakdown resilience framework. The analysis confirms the intuition that for key exchanges
to remain secure against future-quantum adversaries, it is sufficient to replace the key exchange
part with a post-quantum secure solution and rely on classical authentication mechanisms only.
To show that the stronger notion of breakdown resilience can capture hybrid AKE, we analyze
the security of a generic key exchange from hybrid KEMs and achieve results comparable to
those presented in Chapter 5.
The PRF-ODH assumption. In Chapter 7 we turn our attention from key exchange security
models to the underlying complexity-theoretic hardness assumptions. More specifically, we
investigate the PRF-ODH assumption, which has found its way into many DH-based key exchange
analyses since its usage in the TLS 1.2 security analysis by Jager et al. [JKSS12]. Informally,
PRF-ODH guarantees pseudorandomness of a function value PRF(guv, x?) even if the DH shares
gu and gv, as well as related values PRF(Su, x) and/or PRF(T v, x) are known to the adversary.
Despite its widespread usage in different variations, a consolidating definition and a com-
prehensive classification of PRF-ODH into the realm of well-understood DH-type assumptions
had been lacking. We closed this gap by providing a unifying definition, yielding nine different
notions of the PRF-ODH assumption. We related these assumptions with respect to their
strength and, perhaps most importantly, showed to which well-established DH problem they
relate to.
We then show that HMAC [BCK96, KBC97, NIS08], the main building block of the popular
key derivation function HKDF [Kra10, KE10], achieves the strongest form of PRF-ODH security
that supports multiple related PRF values on both key shares.
We close the chapter by disposing of the uncertainty whether PRF-ODH is a standard model
assumption. For a while it seemed like the usage of PRF-ODH might enable standard model
proofs without random oracles for key exchange protocols that had previously necessitated them.
Perhaps sadly, we were able to show via the meta-reduction technique (the proof of which we
only sketch in this thesis) that even the mildest notions –where the adversary is allowed to learn
only a single related PRF value– may not be based on general hard cryptographic problems
without random oracles using standard techniques.
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Methodology
In this chapter we introduce our foundational method, the paradigm of provable security.
We mostly focus on the notions and arguments most relevant to this thesis. For a more in-
depth discussion of the paradigm itself (and its potential controversies) we refer the interested
reader to, e.g., the technical overview by Alexander Dent [Den06a], on which this part of the
chapter is loosely based, and the works of Koblitz and Menezes [KM04, KM06, KM19] and
Goldreich [Gol06]. The introduction to the game-hopping technique at the end of this chapter
is mostly based on the tutorial by Shoup [Sho04], which also contains many reference examples.
2.1 Notation
We start by fixing some notation. Let λ denote the security parameter. We assume that the
security parameter is always known to the adversary A and will thus omit it as explicit input to
A. For algorithms we give the security parameter in its unary representation 1λ as input. This
allows to compute the complexity of the algorithm as a function of the input length and thus
aids the definition of efficiency of algorithms.
For a bit string x ∈ {0, 1}?, we denote the length of x by |x|. Furthermore, x‖y denotes
the concatenation of strings x and y. By x ← y we describe the assignment of value y to
some variable x and by s $←− D we denote the sampling of an element s from the probability
distribution D. Note that for a set S we denote the sampling from the uniform distribution on
S simply by s $←− S.
For algorithms Alg, we denote by y $←− Alg(x) the probabilistic execution of algorithm Alg
on input x with output y. If we want to stress that Alg is a deterministic algorithm, we write
y ← Alg(x) instead. Furthermore, AlgO(x) denotes that algorithm Alg has access to oracle O
during its execution on input x.
For a security game Gsec-propΠ,A (λ) capturing the security property sec-prop of a cryptographic
scheme Π against an adversary A, we write Gsec-propΠ,A (λ) = 1 to denote the event in which A has
won the game. By JstatementK we denote the Boolean evaluation of statement, i.e., it corresponds
to 1 if the statement is true and 0 otherwise.
2.2 Overview
In a nutshell, the aim of provable security is to show the security of cryptographic schemes in a
mathematically rigorous way. The first formal definition of security of a cryptosystem has been
given by Shannon [Sha49] in his 1949 Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems, where he
specified what it means for a symmetric encryption scheme to be perfectly secure. The definition
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was inspired by his previous observations on information theory and entropy, published the year
before [Sha48]. Unfortunately, information theory gives rise to a very strong notion of secrecy
that is hard to fulfill for practical cryptographic schemes: security must be achieved against an
unbounded adversary that has access to unlimited computational power and storage.
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman published the idea of public key cryptography [DH76] which was
not based on the principles of information theory, but on computationally-intractable problems,
i.e., problems that are hard to solve when given only limited resources. Their invention gave rise
to a new conceptualization of security, where adversaries are not all-powerful as in Shannon’s
interpretation. Rabin gave a first security proof in this setting [Rab79], showing that their
proposed schemes were as hard as the problem of factorization. The formal framework was
then established by Goldwasser and Micali [GM82, GM84] when they introduced probabilistic
encryption and thus broadened the concept from the deterministic to the probabilistic setting.
A lot of cryptographic schemes at that time and in the following years were built in an
ad-hoc fashion. This resulted in an unsatisfactory cycle of a scheme being first attacked, finally
broken, and then fixed, just to be attacked, broken, and fixed again. The provable security
paradigm provided some relief to this situation, as the well-defined security goals and (somewhat)
mathematical proofs in the very least offered some assurance about the basic soundness of the
designs.
Let us look at how security analyses in this paradigm proceed. The statements that provable
security analyses provide are essentially of the following form:
If some cryptographic scheme Π can be broken by an efficient algorithm A with
non-negligible advantage, then there exists an efficient reduction B, that can break
some computationally-intractable problem also with non-negligible advantage.
Thus, given an adequate description of the cryptographic scheme Π in question, we need the
following basic ingredients to show that Π is indeed “provably secure”:
• a well-defined class A of adversaries A that we aim to guard against.
• a definition of the security property sec-prop that shall be achieved by Π against A. In
particular, this includes a clear winning condition, i.e., what it means for an adversary
A ∈ A to break sec-prop.
• a proof that no adversary A ∈ A can achieve the winning condition for Π unless A can solve
some cryptographic problem(s) that is assumed to be hard from a complexity-theoretic
viewpoint.
2.3 Classes of Adversaries
Following what has just been discussed, adversaries can roughly be divided into two subclasses,
depending on whether the adversary is assumed to be computationally bounded or not. Schemes
proven secure in the latter setting, i.e., for information-theoretic security as introduced by
Shannon, are not prone to advances in cryptanalysis or computational power. However, as
mentioned before, only very little (practical) schemes are able to achieve information-theoretic
security.
Most security definitions today are thus computational, i.e., based on complexity-theoretic
hardness assumptions that are intractable to solve for efficient adversaries. Efficiency is defined
with respect to probabilistic polynomial time algorithms, and we will later, in Section 2.4, define
what it means for a problem to be intractable for a given algorithm. But first, let us clarify the
notions of algorithms and their efficiency.
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2.3.1 Mathematical Models of Computation
In cryptography, there are two mathematical models of computation which are considered most
relevant: Turing machines and circuits. We will focus our attention on these in accordance with
the scope of the thesis, but note that further, equally powerful models exist.
Turing machines. Turing machines are an abstract mathematical model of machines that
was introduced by Alan Turing in 1936. They consist of an infinitely long memory tape, that
is subdivided into cells. Each cell can hold a symbol σ from an alphabet Σ. In our setting,
we consider the alphabet Σ = {0, 1}, i.e., each symbol is either a bit 0 or 1. The cells can be
written or read by a head that can pass over the tape by moving one position to the left or
the right. The instructions, i.e., the movements and actions of the head are given by a finite
program. In the beginning, a Turing machineM receives some finite input x ∈ Σ?, where Σ?
commonly denotes the set of all strings over the alphabet Σ. In caseM is deterministic, the
actions and thus the output y ←M(x) on input x are uniquely determined by the program.
Probabilistic programs, where the output and actions not only depend on the input, but also on
randomness, are modeled by introducing an additional, infinitely-long tape that is filled with
random bits prior to the start of the execution.
Circuits. Turing machines are a so-called uniform algorithmic model, i.e., the machine
executes the same instructions irrespective of the input length. Circuits on the other hand can
be non-uniform, i.e., their computations may vary with the length of the input. This is why
formally, we do not speak of a single circuit, but rather a family C of circuits {Cλ}λ over the
input length λ. We say that a family of circuits C = {Cλ}λ is uniform, if there exists a Turing
machine M that on input 1λ outputs a description of the circuit Cλ, i.e., Cλ ← M(1λ). A
circuit consists of a finite sequence of gates, which are operations on two input bits (with one of
them potentially fixed) and one output bit. Typical examples of such gates are NOT, AND,
OR, NAND, or XOR operations.
In the following discussions, we use the model of Turing machines (unless stated otherwise).
Note that every family of circuits can be represented by a Turing machine that gets an additional
input z = z(|x|) that only depends on the length of the input x.
2.3.2 Efficient Algorithms
It must still be clarified, what it means for an algorithm (for example our adversary A) to be
efficient. Informally, an algorithm or a function is efficient if it only consumes a “reasonable”
amount of resources. For Turing machines this is typically measured in run time, i.e., the
number of operations untilM stops with output y on input x. A reasonable run time is then
specified with the help of upper-bounding polynomials in the input length. More formally:
Definition 2.1 (Efficient algorithm). We call a (probabilistic) Turing machineM efficient or
(probabilistic) polynomial time (PPT), if the run time ofM on input x is upper-bounded by a
polynomial p in the input length |x|.
This gives us the opportunity to define what an efficiently computable function is:
Definition 2.2 (Efficiently computable function). We call a deterministic function f : {0, 1}? →
{0, 1}? efficiently computable, if there exists an efficient deterministic Turing machineM such
that f(x) =M(x) for all x ∈ {0, 1}?.
For probabilistic functions such as random variables we demand the existence of a probabilistic
Turing machine whose output distribution is identical to the output distribution of the function.
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2.4 Security Models
We are now ready to concretely define the security of a cryptographic scheme Π. In the realm
of manual, computational proofs there are again two main approaches to formalize security:
game-based and simulation-based definitions.
In the game-based setting, which we consider in this thesis, security is defined via a game
that is played between two PPT algorithms, an adversary A and a challenger C. After the
parameters of the game are set up by the challenger, the adversary receives inputs and may
then interact further with the game via so-called oracles (thereby capturing executions of the
scheme and possible interferences of the adversary). At some point, the adversary stops with
some output. Along with the game description, there is a well-defined winning condition, which
captures the cases where the adversary has (non-trivially) won the game.
In the simulation-based approach, the adversary A gets to interact with an environment E
(to which for example other users belong) and through that accesses either the real scheme or an
idealized version of the scheme that is per definition unbreakable. The adversary then needs to
decide, which of the two it was interacting with. An example of this is the universal composability
(UC) framework by Canetti [Can01]. This approach yields generally stronger security guarantees
as it takes into account the larger picture of the environment of the scheme. However, as
for example Canetti and Fischlin [CF01] showed for the UC framework, there exist classes of
cryptographic functions (in more detail, two-party universally composable commitments) that
cannot be proven secure in the UC framework without further assumptions.
Negligible success probability. In both versions, game-based and simulation-based, the
security of a scheme is defined as the inability of the adversary to successfully either win the
game or distinguish the two worlds, except with some vanishingly small probability, respectively.
We define this vanishingly small probability via so-called negligible functions, which are functions
that approach zero faster than the inverse of any polynomial. More formally:
Definition 2.3 (Negligible function). We call a function  : N → R negligible, if for every
polynomial p : N→ R+ there exists an N ∈ N, such that for all n ≥ N we have (n) ≤ 1p(n) .
For cryptographic discussions we consider polynomials in the security parameter λ. In
our proofs, we will implicitly make use of the fact that the sum of negligible functions is still
negligible. We note that furthermore subtracting a negligible function from a non-negligible
function still yields a non-negligible function, as summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.4 (Properties of negligible functions). Let (n) and i(n) be negligible functions
and δ(n) be non-negligible. Let further q, qi : N → R+ be polynomials for i ∈ N. Then the
following holds:
1. The sum
k∑
i=1
qi(n)i(n) is negligible for constant k ∈ N.
2. The function δ(n)− (n) is non-negligible.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward application of the definitions of (non-)negligibility.
2.5 Security Proofs
Lastly, given the adversarial model (PPT adversaries) as well as a definition of security (game-
based), we want to show that a given scheme Π actually accomplishes this notion. Security is
shown via reductions, which reduce the security of the scheme in question to some underlying
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hard cryptographic problem(s). The goal is to compute the success probability of the adversary
in winning the game in relation to some target probability. For example, in a game that requires
distinguishing two cases, the adversary can always win this game with probability 12 by simply
guessing. We are interested in how much better the adversary can do than guessing. We call
this the adversary’s advantage.
Usually, it is hard to accurately determine the adversary’s advantage in a given security
game due to its complexity. This is where the so-called game-hopping technique comes into
play (cf., e.g., [Sho04, Den06b]). The idea is to gradually modify the security game that the
adversary is playing until we arrive at a situation where the adversary can do no better than
the target probability, i.e., where its advantage is essentially zero. For each modification of the
game we upper-bound the adversary’s advantage in detecting this change.
This technique is the key tool for most of the computational proofs presented in this thesis.
There are multiple different ways to “hop” from one game to the next:
Based on indistinguishability. In this transition, we replace some value x that is given to
the adversary A (either as initial input or as some oracle response) by a value x˜ which is drawn
from a different distribution that can however not be distinguished by either computationally-
bounded or unbounded adversaries.2
It is then shown that if the adversary A could efficiently distinguish these two games, then
this would imply the existence of a distinguisher D between the two probability distributions,
thus contradicting the assumption.
Based on negligible failure events. Here, the two games proceed identically, unless a
certain failure event E occurs. This means in particular, that the success probability of the
adversary in both cases is the same if E does not occur and the difference between them is
upper-bounded by the probability of the event E. It is then shown that this probability is in
fact negligible. This is either done via an information-theoretic argument or by reduction to
some hard complexity-theoretic problem.
Based on large failure events. This transition, pointed out by Dent [Den06b] can come up
both in settings where the security notion is based on indistinguishability or on computational
notions. Here, some event E may occur in Game Gi, but the probability of the adversary in
succeeding in Gi is independent of the occurrence of it. The probability of E not occurring
is non-negligible (in contrast to the previous game hop transition). In computational notions,
we abort Game Gi+1 if E occurs (otherwise the game proceeds as game Gi), thus causing the
adversary to lose. For indistinguishability-based notions of security, we do not abort Gi+1
whenever E occurs, but instead sample a random bit as the output of the adversary (thereby
diminishing its advantage in distinguishing to zero). In both cases, the difference in advantage
of the adversary is upper bounded by the probability of E not happening.
Bridging steps. These transitions are of a mere syntactical nature where some steps are
replaced by equivalent computations. In particular, the success probability of the adversary
remains the same in both games. These changes are mostly done to prepare for one of the
aforementioned transitions.
2For the latter case of adversaries we then speak of statistical indistinguishability, whereas computationally-
bounded adversaries give rise to the notion of computational indistinguishability.
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2.6 The Random Oracle Model
Lastly, we introduce the random oracle model. Many constructions that could be proven with
the above discussed method had one significant shortage: they were inefficient, which led to the
unsatisfactory situation that schemes in practice had no security arguments whatsoever. By
introducing idealized versions of primitives with additional features it became possible to give
security arguments for efficient constructions that had so far eluded provable security analysis.
When the schemes were implemented in practice, the random oracle would be instantiated by a
“sufficiently good” hash function.
The random oracle model was introduced by Bellare and Rogaway in 1993 [BR93]. Intuitively,
a random oracle RO implements a truly random function. It constitutes an idealized version of
a hash function, in that it is a public object that is accessible to everybody. The outputs of
random oracles are consistent (i.e., repeated queries elicit the same response) and the responses
are uniformly distributed and independent of one another.
Random oracles can be modeled either through iterative filling of the input-output table
(lazy sampling), i.e., on every new input x sample a new output value y, or by choosing a random
function up front and thereby determining the entire input-output behavior at once. Some of
the resulting properties of the random oracle make it especially useful for proofs via reductions,
where a reduction algorithm has to simulate some game environment for the adversary, that it
runs as sub-routine. These properties are the following:
• Indistinguishability: if some value x has not been queried to the random oracle, then
RO(x) is indistinguishable from random.
• Extractability: the reduction sees all queries that the adversary poses to the random
oracle.
• Programmability: the reduction may choose specific answers to the adversary’s queries
as long as they are correctly (i.e., uniformly) distributed.
In [CGH98], Canetti, Goldreich, and Halevi showed that there exist signature and encryption
schemes that are secure in the random oracle model but for which any practical instantiation of
the random oracle results in insecure schemes. Despite this impossibility result, the random
oracle model has become a success story and is by now a standard tool in achieving security
proofs for practical schemes.
Proofs that do not employ random oracles are referred to as standard model proofs, if the
distinction is to be made explicit. As for any strong assumption it is preferable to not employ
them if not absolutely necessary, i.e., standard model proofs are what should be aimed for.
However, it is widely acknowledged that proofs in the ROM are still preferable to having no
argument about the soundness of a design at all.
It is no wonder that over the years, security models and proofs have become essential in the
design and analysis of cryptographic primitives, schemes, and entire protocols. As a word of
caution, one may add that provable security only offer security assurances when the schemes in
question are used as analyzed, i.e., unmodified, in the considered environment, and against the
specified class of adversaries.
It is an ongoing quest to push these mathematical security models and assumptions as close
to what is happening in reality as possible and thus to arrive at increasingly insightful and
relevant statements for practically deployed schemes and their users. The works presented in
this thesis aim to contribute to this effort.
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In the next section we will introduce the relevant cryptographic building blocks and Diffie–
Hellman-type assumptions for our thesis. The security of the cryptographic primitives is defined
in terms of games with respect to probabilistic polynomial time algorithms.
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Chapter 3
Cryptographic Building Blocks
This chapter is dedicated to the collection of definitions for the basic cryptographic building
blocks that we will be using throughout the thesis, mostly following the introductory textbook
to cryptography by Katz and Lindell [KL14]. This chapter serves as a reference point mostly
and can be skipped on first reading.
3.1 Public Key Encryption and Key Encapsulation
Definition 3.1 ((Public key) encryption (PKE)). A public key encryption scheme E defined over
some finite message spaceM and ciphertext space C is a triple of algorithms (KGen,Enc,Dec)
such that
• key generation KGen takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs a public/secret-
key pair (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ),
• encryption Enc takes as input a public key pk and a message m ∈ M and outputs a
ciphertext c ∈ C, i.e., c $←− Enc(pk,m),
• decryption Dec takes a secret key sk and ciphertext c ∈ C and outputs either the decrypted
message m← Dec(sk, c) inM or the dedicated symbol ⊥, in case of decryption failure.
We say that a public key encryption scheme E = (KGen,Enc,Dec) is -correct, if
Pr
[
m′ 6= m : (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ), c $←− Enc(pk,m),m′ ← Dec(sk, c)
]
≤ .
If  = 0, we call E (perfectly) correct.
Security of public key encryption schemes E is based on the indistinguishability of ciphertexts
under either passive chosen plaintext adversaries (IND-CPA security) or active chosen ciphertext
adversaries (IND-CCA security):
Definition 3.2 (Security of (public key) encryption). Let E = (KGen,Enc,Dec) be a public key
encryption scheme and let A be a PPT algorithm. Consider the games Gind-atkE,A (λ) described in
Figure 3.1, where atk ∈ {cpa, cca}.
We define the advantage function of an adversary A against game Gind-atkE,A as
Advind-atkE,A (λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr [Gind-atkE,A (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
We say that a public key encryption scheme E is IND-ATK secure for ATK ∈ {CPA,CCA},
if for any PPT adversary A this advantage function is negligible in the security parameter λ.
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Gind-cpaE,A (λ):
1 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ)
2 m0,m1, st $←− A(pk)
3 b $←− {0, 1}
4 c? $←− Enc(pk,mb)
5 b′ $←− A(st, c?)
6 return Jb′ = bK
Gind-ccaE,A (λ):
1 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ)
2 m0,m1, st $←− AODec(pk)
3 b $←− {0, 1}
4 c? $←− Enc(pk,mb)
5 b′ $←− AO⊥Dec(st, c?)
6 return Jb′ = bK
ODec(c):
7 return Dec(sk, c)
O⊥Dec(c):
8 if c = c?
9 return ⊥
10 else
11 return Dec(sk, c)
Figure 3.1: IND-CPA and IND-CCA security of E = (KGen,Enc,Dec) over message space M and
ciphertext space C for m0,m1 ∈M with |m0| = |m1|.
Definition 3.3 (Key encapsulation mechanism (KEM)). A key encapsulation mechanism K
with ciphertext space C and key space K is a tuple of algorithms K = (KGen,Encaps,Decaps)
such that
• key generation KGen takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs a public/secret-
key pair, i.e., (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ),
• encapsulation Encaps takes as input a public key pk and outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C and
the therein encapsulated key K ∈ K i.e., (c,K) $←− Encaps(pk),
• decapsulation Decaps takes a ciphertext c and secret key sk and outputs either the
decapsulated key K ← Decaps(sk, c) or the dedicated symbol ⊥, in case of decapsulation
failure.
We say that a key encapsulation mechanism K = (KGen,Encaps,Decaps) is -correct if
Pr
[
K ′ 6= K : (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ), (c,K) $←− Encaps(pk),K ′ ← Decaps(sk, c)
]
≤ .
We call K (perfectly) correct if  = 0.
Definition 3.4 (Security of key encapsulation mechanisms). The security of a key encapsulation
mechanism K = (KGen,Encaps,Decaps) with key space K is defined in terms of indistinguisha-
bility of encapsulated keys from random with respect to either passive chosen plaintext adversaries
(IND-CPA security) or active chosen ciphertext adversaries (IND-CCA security). The respective
security games are depicted in Figure 3.2.
We say that K is IND-ATK secure with ATK ∈ {CPA,CCA}, if for every PPT adversary A
the advantage function in winning the game Gind-atkK,A (λ) with atk ∈ {cpa, cca} defined as
Advind-atkK,A (λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr [Gind-atkK,A (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Remark 3.5. In the proofs in this thesis, we will often encounter games, where the bit is not
chosen randomly by the challenger during the game execution but fixed up front. This is
an equivalent way of defining security by measuring the difference in adversarial behaviour
depending whether the bit is 0 or 1. In the following, we exemplify this on the definition
for IND-ATK security of key encapsulation mechanisms, but the same applies to all kinds of
cryptographic experiments where the game execution is the same from the view of the adversary
in both experiments, whereas the challenger behaves differently depending on the bit b. We will
see that when transitioning between the two notions of security, we lose a factor of 2, which will
be the case in many of our security proofs.
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Gind-cpaK,A (λ):
1 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ)
2 (c?,K?0 ) $←− Encaps(pk)
3 K?1
$←− K
4 b $←− {0, 1}
5 b′ $←− A(pk, c?,K?b )
6 return Jb′ = bK
Gind-ccaK,A (λ):
1 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ)
2 (c?,K?0 ) $←− Encaps(pk)
3 K?1
$←− K
4 b $←− {0, 1}
5 b′ $←− AODecaps(pk, c?,K?b )
6 return Jb′ = bK
ODecaps(c):
7 if c = c?
8 return ⊥
9 else
10 return Decaps(sk, c)
Figure 3.2: IND-CPA and IND-CCA security of K = (KGen,Encaps,Decaps) with key space K .
The security games with fixed bits are depicted in Figure 3.3. We then say that K is IND-ATK
secure with ATK ∈ {CPA,CCA}, if for every PPT adversary A the advantage function, denoted
by Advind-atk-fixedK,A (λ), is defined as
Advind-atk-fixedK,A (λ) :=
∣∣∣Pr [Gind-atk-0K,A (λ) = 1]− Pr [Gind-atk-1K,A (λ) = 1]∣∣∣
is negligible in the security parameter λ, where Gind-atk-bK,A (λ) = 1 denotes that the adversary’s
output and thus the output of the game is 1.
Gind-cpa-bK,A (λ):
1 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ)
2 (c?,K?0 ) $←− Encaps(pk)
3 K?1
$←− K
4 b′ $←− A(pk, c?,K?b )
5 return b′
Gind-cca-bK,A (λ):
1 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ)
2 (c?,K?0 ) $←− Encaps(pk)
3 K?1
$←− K
4 b′ $←− AODecaps(pk, c?,K?b )
5 return b′
ODecaps(c):
6 if c = c?
7 return ⊥
8 else
9 return Decaps(sk, c)
Figure 3.3: Alternative definition with fixed-bit games of IND-CPA and IND-CCA security of K =
(KGen,Encaps,Decaps) with key space K .
Proposition 3.6. Let K = (KGen,Encaps,Decaps) be a key encapsulation mechanism with key
space K . For every adversary A it holds that
Advind-atk-fixedK,A (λ) = 2 · Advind-atkK,A (λ).
Proof. To show this, we first note that if we condition the event that A wins Game Gind-atkK,A (λ)
on the events that b = 0 and b = 1, respectively, we have
Pr
[
b′ = 1
∣∣∣b = 0] = Pr [Gind-atk-0K,A (λ) = 1]
and
Pr
[
b′ = 1
∣∣∣b = 1] = Pr [Gind-atk-1K,A (λ) = 1].
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So we have
Pr
[
Gind-atkK,A (λ) = 1
]
= Pr
[
b′ = b
]
= Pr
[
b = 0
]
· Pr
[
b′ = b
∣∣∣b = 0]+ Pr [b = 1] · Pr [b′ = b∣∣∣b = 1]
= 12 · Pr
[
b′ = 0
∣∣∣b = 0]+ 12 · Pr
[
b′ = 1
∣∣∣b = 1]
= 12 ·
(
1− Pr
[
b′ = 1
∣∣∣b = 0])+ 12 · Pr
[
b′ = 1
∣∣∣b = 1]
= 12 ·
(
1− Pr
[
Gind-atk-0K,A (λ) = 1
]
+ Pr
[
Gind-atk-1K,A (λ) = 1
])
.
To summarize with advantages, we have
Advind-atkK,A (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [Gind-atkK,A (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣12 ·
(
1− Pr
[
Gind-atk-0K,A (λ) = 1
]
+ Pr
[
Gind-atk-1K,A (λ) = 1
])
− 12
∣∣∣∣
= 12 ·
∣∣∣Pr [Gind-atk-1K,A (λ) = 1]− Pr [Gind-atk-0K,A (λ) = 1]∣∣∣
= 12 · Adv
ind-atk-fixed
K,A (λ),
which completes the proof.
3.2 Signatures and Message Authentication Codes
Definition 3.7 (Signature scheme). A (digital) signature scheme S consists of three algorithms
(KGen,Sign,Vfy) such that
• key generation KGen takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs a public/secret-
key pair (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ),
• signing Sign takes as input a secret key sk as well as a message m ∈ {0, 1}? that is to be
signed and outputs a signature σ $←− Sign(sk,m),
• verification Vfy takes as input a public key pk, signature σ, and message m. It outputs
1, if σ is a valid signature over m wrt. pk else it outputs 0, indicating failure to verify.
We say that a signature scheme S = (KGen, Sign,Vfy) is correct if
Pr
[
0← Vfy(pk, σ,m) : (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ), σ $←− Sign(sk,m)
]
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
The security of signature schemes is defined as existential unforgeability of signatures under
chosen message attacks:
Definition 3.8 (Security of signatures). Let S = (KGen,Sign,Vfy) be a signature scheme and
let A be a PPT algorithm. Consider the security game Geuf-cmaS,A (λ) as defined in Figure 3.4
We say that a signature scheme S is EUF-CMA secure or existentially unforgeable under
chosen message attacks, if for any PPT adversary A the advantage function defined as
Adveuf-cmaS,A (λ) := Pr
[
Geuf-cmaS,A (λ) = 1
]
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
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Geuf-cmaS,A (λ):
1 LOSign ← ∅
2 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ)
3 (σ′,m′) $←− AOSign(pk)
4 return JVfy(pk, σ′,m′) ∧m′ 6∈ LOSignK
OSign(m):
5 LOSign ← LOSign ∪ {m}
6 return Sign(sk,m)
Figure 3.4: Existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks of S = (KGen, Sign,Vfy).
Definition 3.9 (Message authentication code (MAC)). A message authentication code scheme
M with key space K consists of three algorithms KGen,MAC, and Vfy such that
• key generation KGen(1λ) takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs a key
K ∈ K ,
• tag computation MAC(K,m) takes as input a key K ∈ K and message m ∈ {0, 1}?
and outputs a MAC (tag) τ $←− MAC(K,m),
• verification Vfy(K, τ,m), takes as input a key K ∈ K , tag τ , and message m. It outputs
1 if τ is a valid MAC over m, else it outputs 0, indicating failure to verify.
The unforgeability of a message authentication schemeM = (KGen,MAC,Vfy) is defined
analogously to the unforgeability of signature schemes and is depicted in Figure 3.5.
Geuf-cmaM,A (λ):
1 LOMAC ← ∅
2 K $←− KGen(1λ)
3 (m′, τ ′) $←− AOMAC(·)
4 return JVfy(K, τ ′,m′) ∧m′ 6∈ LOMACK
OMAC(m):
5 τ $←− MAC(m)
6 LOMAC ← LOMAC ∪ {m}
7 return τ
Figure 3.5: Existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks ofM = (KGen,MAC,Vfy).
3.3 Hash Functions
Definition 3.10 ((Cryptographic) hash function). A keyed (cryptographic) hash funcion H
with key space K and output length l consists of a pair of algorithms (KGen,H) such that
• key generation KGen(1λ) takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs a key
K ∈ K , and
• the hash function H(K,x) takes as input a key K, string x ∈ {0, 1}? and outputs a
string y ∈ {0, 1}l, i.e., y ← H(K,x).
Definition 3.11 (Collision resistance). Let H = (KGen,H) be a keyed hash function and let
A be a PPT algorithm. Let Gcoll-resH,A (λ) be the game defined in Figure 3.6. We say that a hash
function H is collision resistant, if for any PPT adversary A the advantage function defined as
Advcoll-resH,A (λ) := Pr
[
Gcoll-resH,A (λ) = 1
]
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
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Gcoll-resH,A (λ):
1 K $←− KGen(1λ)
2 (x, x′) $←− A(K)
3 return Jx 6= x′ ∧ H(K,x) = H(K,x′)K
Figure 3.6: Collision resistance of a hash function H = (KGen,H).
Remark 3.12. In the rest of the thesis we will mostly omit the key generation and keying of the
hash function since many hash functions in practice are unkeyed. We simply identify the hash
function H with H unless stated otherwise, i.e., we will for example write H(x) for the hash
function evaluation at x instead of H(K,x), or talk about the collision resistance of H.
3.4 Pseudorandom Functions
Definition 3.13 (Pseudorandom function (PRF)). Let F : {0, 1}κ(λ) × {0, 1}ι(λ) → {0, 1}ω(λ)
be an efficient keyed function with key length κ(λ), input length ι(λ) and output length ω(λ).
Let Gprf-secF,A (λ) be defined as in Figure 3.7. We call F a pseudorandom function if for any PPT
adversary the advantage function defined as
Advprf-secF,A (λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr [Gprf-secF,A (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Gprf-secF,A (λ):
1 K $←− {0, 1}κ(λ)
2 g $←− {functions f : {0, 1}ι(λ) → {0, 1}ω(λ)}
3 b $←− {0, 1}
4 b′ $←− AOPRF
5 return Jb′ = bK
OPRF(x):
6 if b = 0
7 return F(K,x)
8 else
9 return g(x)
Figure 3.7: Pseudorandomness of a function F.
3.5 Diffie–Hellman Assumptions
In the course of the thesis, we will make use of various number-theoretic assumptions called
Diffie–Hellman assumptions. These problems, underlying many of today’s DH-based protocols,
will prove especially relevant for categorizing the PRF-ODH assumption in Chapter 7. In the
following, let p and q be large primes such that q divides p− 1. Let G be a cyclic group of order
q, i.e., there exists a generator g such that G = {gn : n ∈ Zq}, where Zq = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}.
Roughly speaking, hard problems that we base security on, can be divided into three
categories:
• Computational problems: given some problem instance P and a relation R, find a
solution S such that R(P, S) = 1. An example of this is the computational DH problem
(CDH) that asks to compute guv, given gu and gv.
• Decisional problems: given a pair (P, S) decide if R(P, S) = 1 or not. An example
of this is the decisional DH problem (DDH), where given gu, gv, gz it must be decided if
gz = guv or gz $←− G.
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• Gap problems: this class of problems was first introduced by Okamoto and Pointcheval
[OP01] and is useful in analyzing schemes whose underlying hardness relies on a computa-
tional problem in the presence of a decisional oracle, that can leak one bit of information,
i.e., that may leak whether a certain relation is fulfilled or not.
In this thesis, we make use of two DH-based Gap assumptions. The first is the Gap
Diffie–Hellman problem (GapDH) that asks to compute guv given gu, gv and an oracle
DDH(·, ·, ·) that on input gx, gy, gz returns 1 if gz = gxy, and 0 otherwise. A slightly weaker
version is the strong Diffie–Hellman problem (StDH), where the computational problem
is the same as for GapDH, but the oracle is restricted by a fixed first input DDH(gx, ·, ·),
such that an adversary may only learn whether gz = (gy)x .
The game-based descriptions for all the DH problems mentioned above are depicted in
Figure 3.8. As usual, these problems are said to be hard if there exists no PPT adversary A
that can solve them with non-negligible advantage.
GCDHG,A(λ):
1 x, y $←− Zq
2 Z $←− A(gx, gy)
3 JZ = gxyK
GDDHG,A (λ):
1 x, y, z $←− Zq
2 y?0 ← gxy
3 y?1 ← gz
4 b $←− {0, 1}
5 b′ $←− A(gx, gy, y?b )
6 return Jb′ = bK
GStDHG,A (λ):
1 x, y $←− Zq
2 Z $←− ADDH(gx,·,·)(gx, gy)
3 return JZ = gxyK
DDH(gx, gy, gz):
4 return Jgxy = gzK
GGapDHG,A (λ):
1 x, y $←− Zq
2 Z $←− ADDH(·,·,·)(gx, gy)
3 return JZ = gxyK
DDH(gx, gy, gz)):
4 return Jgxy = gzK
Figure 3.8: Diffie-Hellman problems: computational DH, decisional DH, strong DH, and Gap DH.
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Chapter 4
Key Exchange Security
The theoretical foundation for the study of key exchange security was laid by Bellare and
Rogaway in 1993 in their seminal work Entity Authentication and Key Distribution [BR94].
After this first formalization of security for key exchange, many more models for key exchange
followed: from the asymmetric setting [BWM98, BWJM97], over three-party protocols [BR95]
and password-based key exchanges [BPR00, BMP00], to models capturing yet stronger classes
of adversaries [BCK96, Sho99, CK02, LLM07]. Countless further refinements and extensions
for more sophisticated security assurances in special settings have been proposed, e.g., [JKSS12,
FG14, BBF+16]. In this chapter, we focus on the presentation of the (variant of the) Bellare–
Rogaway model for authenticated key exchange [BR94] (or BR model for short) that constitutes
the basis for all AKE security models proposed in this thesis.
4.1 Security Requirements
As already mentioned, the two main requirements for authenticated key exchange protocols
are key secrecy and authentication. Key secrecy (or sometimes indistinguishability) captures
the notion that an adversary cannot efficiently distinguish a key which has been established
between honest parties from a random key if it is still fresh (i.e., the key has not become trivially
known to the adversary). Authentication, on the other hand, can come in multiple flavors: key
exchanges can be anonymous (with no party authenticated), unilaterally authenticated (one
party authenticated), or mutually authenticated (both authenticated).
The results in this thesis focus on the case of mutually authenticated key exchange protocols
between two parties with pre-specified peers as introduced by Canetti and Krawczyk [CK02],
i.e., the identity of the intended partner of a session is specified upon session creation.
We furthermore distinguish between protocols providing and not providing forward se-
crecy [Gün90, DVOW92]. Protocols that achieve forward secrecy guarantee security for sessions
that have been established before the compromise of a party’s long-term secrets. Forward secrecy
has become a standard design goal of modern key exchange protocols and can be achieved by,
e.g., not solely relying on long-term secrets to establish the session key but by mixing ephemeral
secrets that are generated freshly for each session into the key derivation.
The spiritually related notion of post-compromise security (PCS) has recently been put
forward by Cohn-Gordon, Cremers, and Garratt [CCG16]. PCS describes the ability of a key
exchange protocol to recover from a party’s compromise, i.e., security of session keys can be
regained. We do not incorporate post-compromise security in our models here, but note that
PCS is gaining recognition as an important feature in fine-grained key exchange security. For
example, it has been stated as an explicit design goal in the development of a standard for
secure (group) messaging by the IETF working group on Message Layer Security [BBM+19]
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(albeit achieving strong PCS guarantees presents some difficulties in the group messaging setting
as pointed out by Cremers, Hale, and Kohbrok [CHK19]).
4.2 The Bellare–Rogaway Model for Authenticated Key
Exchange
The BR security model [BR94] (and its variants) provide strong security guarantees for authen-
ticated key exchange in the presence of an active adversary. As formalized in the following,
the adversary interacts with protocol instances via oracle queries. The goal is to distinguish
the real session key established in a so-called test session from a randomly chosen one; the
test session is chosen by the adversary via the Test oracle and must fulfill certain criteria such
that it is not trivial for the adversary to distinguish the respective key (more on this freshness
criteria later). The adversary is considered to have full control over the network, in particular it
may inject, drop, and alter messages. This is modeled via a Send oracle that delivers messages
specified by the adversary from and to key exchange sessions. The adversary is furthermore
able to corrupt some of the parties’ long-term secrets (via a Corrupt oracle) and to reveal some
of the established session keys (via a Reveal oracle). The following model description here is
largely taken verbatim from Brendel, Fischlin, and Günther [BFG17].
Notation and overview. The participants in a key exchange protocol KE are given by
elements U from the set of users U , each of whom holds a long-term public key pkU with
corresponding secret key skU . Each participant can act as initiator or responder of a protocol
execution and may run multiple instances (sessions) of the key exchange protocol in parallel. To
uniquely refer to the k-th session owned by user U ∈ U with intended communication partner
V ∈ U on an administrative level, we use the notation pikU,V . Each such session is associated
with the following set of variables:
• role ∈ {initiator, responder} indicates the session owner’s role in this session.
• stexec ∈ {running, accepted, rejected} indicates the current state of execution. The default
value upon creation of the session is running.
• sid ∈ {0, 1}? ∪ {⊥} indicates the session identifier. The default value is ⊥.
• stkey ∈ {fresh, revealed} indicates the state of the session key K. The default value is fresh.
• K ∈ {0, 1}? ∪ {⊥} denotes the established session key. The default value is ⊥.
• tested ∈ {true, false} indicates whether the session key K has been tested or not. The
default value for each key is false.
To be able to refer to a specific entry for a session pikU,V , we use the notation pikU,V .entry.
For example, pikU,V .role specifies the session owner U ’s role in session pikU,V . For simplicity, we
sometimes simply write pi and pi′ to refer to sessions in a general context where the specific
indices do not matter.
Partnering of Sessions. The partnering of sessions is defined via session identifiers [BPR00].
More precisely, we call the session pikU,V owned by U partnered with the session pik
′
V ′,U ′ owned by
V ′ (and vice versa), if the sessions share the same session identifier, i.e., whenever
pikU,V .sid = pik
′
V ′,U ′ .sid 6= ⊥.
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We require that any execution between honest instances that has not been tampered with by
the adversary is partnered.
4.2.1 Adversary Model
As usual, we model the adversary as a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine denoted
by A. The adversary is active and in full control over the network. This implies in particular
that—additional to the interception of messages—the adversary can schedule when (and if)
message delivery occurs. Furthermore, the adversary may alter and inject messages. We assume
the adversary learns if a participant in the protocol has terminated and/or accepted.
Adversarial Queries. Recall that in order to break key secrecy, the goal of the adversary is
to distinguish real from random session keys. However, not all interactions of the adversary
with the protocol are admissible at any given point in time. In particular, there are conditions
under which the adversary trivially loses the game, e.g., when both revealing and testing session
keys of partnered sessions as mentioned before. To keep track if one of these special cases has
occurred, we introduce a flag lost, which is initialized to false. The adversary interacts with the
protocol via the following oracle queries:
NewSession(U, V, role): Establishes a new session pikU,V for U (with k being the next counter
value for sessions owned by U with intended partner V ), stores the given role role ∈
{initiator, responder} in pikU,V .role← role, and returns the identifier pikU,V .
Send(pikU,V ,m): Causes the message m to be sent to the session with label pikU,V . If there exists no
session pikU,V , the query outputs ⊥. Else the response of the session owner U upon receipt
of message m is returned, and the state of execution stexec is updated. If stexec changes to
accepted with an intended communication partner V that was previously corrupted, then
set stkey ← revealed.
Reveal(pikU,V ): Returns the session key K of session pikU,V . If there exists no session pikU,V or if
pikU,V .stexec 6= accepted, then return ⊥. Otherwise, stkey is set to revealed and K is returned
to the adversary.
Corrupt(U): Returns the long-term secret key skU of U to the adversary. No further queries
may be issued to sessions owned by U . If forward secrecy is not considered, stkey is set to
revealed in all sessions pikV,W where V = U or W = U .
Test(pikU,V ): Tests the session key K of session pikU,V . The oracle uses a test bit btest $←− {0, 1}
chosen at the outset and then fixed during the game execution.
For simplicity, we restrict the adversary to ask a single Test query only. If there exists
no session pikU,V or if pikU,V .stexec 6= accepted, the query returns ⊥. Otherwise, pikU,V .tested
is set to true. If btest = 0, Ktest is set to the actual session key pikU,V .K. If btest = 1, a key
Ktest
$←− D is sampled at random from the session key space D. Finally Ktest is returned.
4.2.2 Bellare–Rogaway AKE Security Games
We adopt the approach of Brzuska et al. [BFWW11, Brz13] and separate the overall BR security
properties into the notions of BR-Match security and BR key secrecy. The conditions of BR-Match
security guarantee that
• partnered sessions hold the same key,
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• the session identifiers sid ensure an appropriate identification of partnered sessions,
• and that at most two sessions are partnered.
BR key secrecy then ensures that the protocol in question establishes session keys that are
indistinguishable from random keys and (implicitly) mutually authenticated. The definition
excludes trivial attacks of the adversary such as distinguishing revealed session keys from random
keys.
Definition 4.1 (BR-Match security). Let KE be a key exchange protocol, and A be a PPT adver-
sary interacting with KE via the queries defined in Section 4.2.1 in the following game GBR-MatchKE,A (λ):
Setup. The challenger generates long-term public/secret-key pairs for each participant U ∈ U .
Query. The adversary A receives the generated public keys and has access to the oracle queries
NewSession, Send, Reveal, Corrupt, and Test.
Stop. At some point, the adversary stops with no output.
We say that A wins the game GBR-MatchKE,A (λ) if at least one of the following conditions holds:
1. Different session keys in partnered sessions:
There exist two distinct sessions pi and pi′ with pi.sid = pi′.sid 6= ⊥, and pi.stexec, pi′.stexec 6=
rejected, but pi.K 6= pi′.K.
2. Different intended partner in partnered sessions:
There exist two sessions pi := pikU,V and pi′ := pik
′
V ′,U ′ such that pi.sid = pi′.sid 6= ⊥,
pi.role = initiator, and pi′.role = responder, but U 6= U ′ or V 6= V ′.
3. More than two sessions share the same session identifier:
There exist at least three sessions pi, pi′, and pi′′ such that pi, pi′, pi′′ are pairwise distinct,
but pi.sid = pi′.sid′ = pi′′.sid 6= ⊥.
We say KE is BR-Match secure if for all PPT adversaries A the advantage function defined as
AdvBR-MatchKE,A (λ) := Pr
[
GBR-MatchKE,A (λ) = 1
]
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Definition 4.2 (BR key secrecy). Let KE be a key exchange protocol with key distribution D,
and A be a PPT adversary interacting with KE via the queries defined in Section 4.2.1 in the
following game GBR,DKE,A(λ):
Setup. The challenger generates long-term public/secret-key pairs for each participant U ∈ U ,
chooses the test bit btest $←− {0, 1} at random, and sets lost← false.
Query. The adversary A receives the generated public keys and has access to the oracle queries
NewSession, Send, Reveal, Corrupt, and Test.
Guess. At some point, A stops and outputs a guess bguess.
Finalize. The challenger sets lost← true if the following condition holds:
Adversary has tested and revealed the key in a single session or in two partnered sessions:
There exist two (not necessarily distinct) sessions pi, pi′ such that pi.sid = pi′.sid, pi.stkey =
revealed, and pi′.tested = true.
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A wins the game GBR,DKE,A(λ) if bguess = btest and lost = false.
We say that KE provides BR key secrecy with/without forward secrecy if for all PPT
adversaries A the advantage function defined as
AdvBR,DKE,A(λ) := Pr
[
GBR,DKE,A(λ) = 1
]
− 12
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Definition 4.3 (BR security). We finally say a key exchange protocol KE is BR-secure (with/without
forward secrecy) if KE provides BR-Match security and BR key secrecy (with/without forward
secrecy), according to Definitions 4.1 and 4.2.
Remark 4.4. Note that forward secrecy (if modeled) is incorporated into the Corrupt query and
need thus not be stated in the Finalize step of Definition 4.2.
In the following, we come to the main contributions of the thesis and begin with the treatment
of so-called hybrid key exchange protocols that promise a safe transition to a post-quantum
world. Enjoy.
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Hybrid Key Exchange
By now, the fact that quantum computers will have serious implications on the security of the
currently deployed cryptographic primitives is widely acknowledged and research into developing
quantum-resistant solutions is well under way. However, history shows that the biggest hurdle is
often not in the development of new, more secure algorithms, but in the widespread deployment of
these algorithms. Backwards compatibility must be ensured while, at the same time, downgrade-
attacks must be avoided at all costs. This makes the transition to new cryptographic primitives
or protocol versions a highly non-trivial and daunting task, leading to slow adoption rates; even
if some of the deployed building blocks are fundamentally broken. For post-quantum solutions
yet another obstacle stands in the way of widespread immediate deployment. Due to their
relative novelty, there exists a non-negligible chance that currently proposed schemes are, in fact,
not quantum resistant and may not even withstand advanced classical cryptanalysis. Especially
appropriate parameter selection for post-quantum schemes is not yet reliable: Albrecht et al.
showed that for LWE- and NTRU-based schemes in the “Round 1” submissions to the NIST
Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization process [Nat15], the differences in bit hardness
can measure up to several hundred bits [ACD+18] and Bernstein [Ber19] conducted a survey,
comparing proofs and finding weaknesses in the lattice-based submissions to the NIST process.
Hence, the current situation presents as follows: On the one hand, with the expected long
transition period, quantum-resistant schemes should be deployed as soon as possible to protect
today’s communication from the potential threat posed by quantum computing; on the other
hand we are not sufficiently confident in the concrete security of post-quantum schemes for
immediate deployment. Both industry experts and academics explore ways how to best transition
existing applications in light of this predicament. A promising approach to preserve today’s
common security guarantees while still mitigating the risk of (future-)quantum attacks, is the
use of so-called hybrid schemes. These schemes combine classically-secure and quantum-resistant
cryptographic schemes in such a manner that the overall scheme remains secure as long as at
least one of the two base schemes remains secure.
There have already been experimental deployments and multiple draft standards related
to the Transport Layer Security and Internet Key Exchange protocol that propose some form
of hybrid key exchange [Bra16, Lan18, CEL+16, CC19, SS17, WFZGM17, KK18, TTB+19].
However, despite the strong interest by industry in hybrid key exchange, there has been limited
academic treatment of how to actually design and prove such schemes, especially with regards
to quantum adversaries.
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Our Contributions
Since early prototypes often become de facto standards, it is crucial to establish solid theoretical
foundations for hybrid key exchange and KEMs at an early stage. Our work complements
the existing work on classically-secure hybrid KEMs (a.k.a. KEM combiners3) to achieve
provably-secure constructions in the post-quantum setting. Furthermore, it extends the founda-
tions of authenticated key exchange security to allow treatment of hybrid constructions. Our
contributions are three-fold:
• In Section 5.2 and Section 5.4, we introduce security models for KEMs and AKE protocols
that account for adversaries with different levels of quantum capabilities. We start from
the two-stage adversarial model of Bindel et al. [BHMS17] that was introduced in the
context of hybrid signatures and transfer it to the relevant notions for hybrid key exchange.
• In Section 5.3, we present several KEM combiners and rigorously show their robustness
with respect to the aforementioned security models, achieving the preservation of post-
quantum security. These include a combiner, called XOR-then-MAC combiner, which
is based on minimal cryptographic assumptions. We also discuss two combiners, the
dual-PRF combiner and the nested dual-PRF combiner, that are closely related to the
key schedule used in TLS 1.3 [Res18]. All proofs are in the standard model and do not
rely on classical (or therefore quantum) random oracles.
• Lastly, in Section 5.5, we show how to generically build provably-secure hybrid au-
thenticated key exchange from hybrid KEMs. Our construction relies on Krawczyk’s
SigMA-compiler [Kra03] using signatures and MACs to authenticate and lift the protocol
to one that is secure in the strong adversarial model of authenticated key exchange.
Personal scientific contribution in this chapter. All the material from this section
appeared in [BBF+19]. The full version of the paper can be found on ePrint [BBF+18]. While
Nina, Douglas, and Brian mostly focused on the aspects of the paper involving quantum (two-
stage) adversaries, Marc’s and my focus lay on the transfer of security notions both for KEM
combiners and AKE, as well as the proofs of these constructions. To reflect this, the following
discussion of the work omits fully-quantum adversaries as they are outside of the scope of hybrid
key exchange.
My main contribution lies in the development of the two-stage security notions for AKE and
the proof of the generic hybrid AKE construction. Furthermore, I have considerably contributed
to the construction and proofs of the dual-PRF and nested dual-PRF combiner in the standard
model and have aided the transfer of security notions to the two-stage adversarial setting.
Note that, for completeness, this chapter will include the two-stage adversary framework
and the proofs of the KEM combiners in the two-stage adversary model (cf. Section 5.3) which
were also included in the Ph.D. thesis by Nina Bindel [Bin18]. The presentation of the proofs
was at times slightly modified for clarity. For novelty, we will however re-prove the hybrid
AKE construction with the dual-PRF combiner dualPRF in the alternative framework of strong
breakdown resilience in Chapter 6.
5.1 Related Work
Before coming to the main contributions, we would like to pause and briefly review the current
state of the art in related areas of research:
3We will use the terms “hybrid” and “combiner” interchangeably.
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Robust combiners. In the existing literature, hybrid schemes have commonly been referred
to as (robust) combiners. The study of such schemes in the symmetric setting dates back to
the 80s to work by Asmuth and Blakely [AB81] and Even and Goldreich [EG85]. In the public
key setting, Zhang et al. [ZHSI04], Herzberg [Her05], and Dodis and Katz [DK05] examined
the security of combining multiple IND-CCA-secure public key encryption schemes. Harnik et
al. [HKN+05] defined the term robust combiner and treated combiners for oblivious transfer,
with a sketch of a combiner for key agreement. Combiners for other primitives have since
followed, including Bindel et al. [BHMS17] on hybrid digital signatures. Most relevant to our
setting of key exchange and KEMs is the recent work by Giacon, Heuer, and Poettering [GHP18]
which considers various KEM combiners. Their combiner constructions show how hybrid KEMs
can be built in the presence of solely classical adversaries.
Since the advent of quantum computing, and thus the introduction of more powerful
adversaries, security analyses in the quantum setting are however not to be neglected. This
is especially relevant for the constructions in [GHP18], as most of their proofs use idealized
assumptions such as random oracles or ideal ciphers that are not guaranteed to transfer to the
quantum setting (cf., e.g., [BDF+11]). Moreover, the (quantum) security of hybrid authenticated
key exchange remains unresolved in [GHP18]. An alternative recent approach to model security
of protocols in which a component fails is the breakdown resilience model of Brendel, Fischlin,
and Günther [BFG17, BFG19] which in its stronger formulation can be used to analyze hybrid
key exchanges. This model does not treat quantum adversaries explicitly but we demonstrate
the applicability of this model to hybrid key exchanges in Section 6.4 by an exemplary proof
of the dualPRF KEM combiner presented in this chapter as key agreement component in an
authenticated key exchange protocol.
Real-world hybrid key exchange. The interest in hybrid key exchange has foremost been
driven by industry players. Already in 2016, Google temporarily tested a hybrid key exchange
cipher suite named CECPQ1 which combined elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) and the
Ring-Learning-with-Errors-based key exchange scheme NewHope [ADPS16b] in the TLS stack
on an experimental build of their Chrome browser [Bra16, Lan16]. Recently, Adam Langley
announced the follow-up project CECPQ2 on his blog Imperial Violet [Lan18]. Experiments with
this modification to TLS 1.3 have not only been run in Google’s Chrome browser but also at
Cloudflare [Kwi19, KSL+19]. Microsoft Research [CEL+16], Amazon [CC19], Mozilla [KK18],
and Cloudflare [dV17] have gotten involved in developing further hybrid key exchange schemes,
with a focus on supersingular isogeny-based schemes. Furthermore, along general outlines on
how to transition to post-quantum secure cryptography (cf., e.g., [ETS15, Hof19]), Crockett,
Paquin, and Stebila [CPS19] have put forward a survey on case studies for post-quantum and
hybrid integration in TLS and SSH. Stebila, Fluhrer, and Gueron [SFG19] gave a detailed
report on the expected challenges in incorporating hybrid modes in TLS 1.3, specifically.
Several “Internet-Drafts” for concrete hybrid modes in TLS [SS17, WFZGM17, KK18] and
IKE [TTB+19] have already been submitted to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
Drucker and Gueron [DG19] have proposed a hybrid scheme for continuous key agreement that
may be applicable to secure messaging applications.
5.2 Modeling Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
In this section, we present the security model that we use in the rest of the chapter to analyze
hybrid key encapsulation mechanisms. We first review the two-stage notion of (partially)
quantum adversaries from Bindel et al. [BHMS17]. In a next step, we then apply this hierarchy
of adversaries to the indistinguishability-based security notions of key encapsulation mechanisms.
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5.2.1 Two-stage Adversaries for KEM Security
When analyzing the security of KEMs with respect to quantum adversaries we opt for the
approach taken in [BHMS17] to analyze hybrid signature schemes. In contrast to previous
works considering quantum adversaries, their notion allows to model adversaries whose quantum
capabilities evolve over time. In particular, this fine-grained adversary model captures the
difference between the following two settings:
Future-quantum adversaries. In this scenario, we assume that during the deployment of the
scheme in question no sufficiently powerful quantum computers exist and it is expected to
be decades before a full-fledged quantum computer is built. However, we want to protect
today’s communications against attacks in which the (currently classical) attacker records
encrypted communications. Once a quantum computer becomes available, the adversary is
then able to extract the session keys used for encryption from the corresponding collected
key exchange transcripts.
Post-quantum adversaries. Alternatively, one might not feel comfortable excluding the possibil-
ity that powerful quantum computers exist already today or in the nearer future. In this
case, stronger security guarantees are needed, as a locally quantum adversary may already
interfere with the deployed protocols and may break employed primitives and hardness
assumptions.
In the following, we adapt the two-stage notion from [BHMS17] to the indistinguishability-
based security notions of key encapsulation mechanisms. The main difference when formally
modeling the aforementioned scenarios is in how and when the oracles within the game description
are accessed by the adversary. Thus, security notions that allow for no oracle access beyond
the (quantum) random oracle, as, e.g., IND-CPA security, do not require the full formalism of
two-stage adversaries A = (A1,A2). They can be modeled by the usual (single stage) adversary
notion, solely indicating whether the adversary is classical or quantum. Consequently, we will
limit the following motivation of two-stage adversaries for KEMs to the active IND-CCA setting.
Analogously to the notion of unforgeability of signature schemes in [BHMS17], the first
stage of the adversary may interact with the oracles in the game, while the second stage does
not. This stipulation ties back to the distinction between future-quantum and post-quantum
adversaries mentioned before. We identify three different aspects in the two-stage adversary’s
capabilities during the IND-CCA game with decapsulation oracle access:
• While the adversary has access to the decapsulation oracle, the adversary may locally
have access to either classical or quantum computing power.
• The adversary’s interaction with the decapsulation oracle in that phase can either be
classical or quantum (i.e., queries may be in superposition).
• After access to the decapsulation oracle has been revoked, the adversary may again either
have classical or quantum computing power available for local computations.
To model this, a two-stage adversary A = (A1,A2) is introduced, where A1 has access to the
decapsulation oracle. A1 then terminates and passes a state st to the second-stage adversary A2,
which does no longer have access to the decapsulation oracle and may run local computations
on st before terminating with its guess.
As in [BHMS17], we say that the adversary is of type XyZ or an XyZ adversary, where
X,Z ∈ {C,Q} and y ∈ {c, q}. The X indicates whether the local computing power of the
adversary in its first stage is classical (X = C) or quantum (X = Q). Analogously, Z indicates
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the available local computing power in the second stage. Lastly, y gives information about the
way the first-stage adversary accesses the decapsulation oracle. Note that the random oracle is
not influenced by the value of y. The adversary may query the random oracle in superposition
(i.e., the quantum random oracle), whenever it is quantum, i.e., whenever X = Q and/or Z = Q.
Not all combinations of classical and quantum adversaries in the two-stage setting are
meaningful in a real-world context. We consider the following configurations of two-stage XyZ
adversaries to be relevant:
• CcC security models a purely classical adversary with classical access to all oracles. This
corresponds to the usual IND-CCA security notion for KEMs (cf. Def. 3.3).
• CcQ security models a classical adversary at time of execution, that may however become
quantum at a later point in time. In particular, that means that the adversary is classical
as long as it has access to the decapsulation oracle. Eventually, the adversary gains local
quantum computing power, but by this time, the ability to interact with the system and
decapsulate are no longer available. We refer to these kind of adversaries as future-
quantum adversaries.
• QcQ security models an adversary that has local quantum computing power at every
stage, but interacts with the decapsulation oracle via classical queries. This is commonly
referred to as the post-quantum setting and is subject of most works considering quantum
adversaries in the context of key encapsulation mechanisms, e.g., [HHK17, SXY18, JZC+18,
HKSU18, JZM19].
• QqQ security corresponds to fully-quantum adversaries. This adversary is quantum at
every stage and queries the available decapsulation oracle in superposition.
It is notation-wise convenient to define an order for the notions, to reflect the relative
strength of the adversary, where C < Q and c < q. This implies a partial order XyZ ≤ UvW if
X ≤ U, y ≤ v, and Z ≤W, i.e.,
CcC ≤ CcQ ≤ QcQ ≤ QqQ.
Let maxS (resp., minS) denote the set of maximal (resp., minimal) elements of some set S
according to this partial order. Since in our case S ⊆ {CcC,CcQ,QcQ,QqQ} with the order on
XyZ notions as above, we often then speak of the maximal element; for example it holds that
QcQ = max{CcQ,QcQ}.
Remark 5.1. Note, that in the rest of this chapter, we concentrate on providing security against
at most post-quantum, i.e., QcQ adversaries, omitting fully-quantum QqQ adversaries. This
“limitation” is natural as hybrid solutions are solely intended to secure the transition to the
post-quantum setting.
Finally, we are ready to define the notions for two-stage KEM security that we will be using
throughout this chapter:
Definition 5.2 (Two-stage security of key encapsulation mechanisms). Analogously to the solely
classical setting, the two-stage security of a key encapsulation mechanism K = (KGen,Encaps,
Decaps) with key space K is defined in terms of indistinguishability of encapsulated keys from
random with respect to either passive chosen plaintext adversaries (IND-CPA security) or active
chosen ciphertext adversaries (IND-CCA security). The respective security games are depicted
in Figure 5.1.
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We say that K is Z-IND-CPA secure, if for every quantum polynomial time4 (QPT) adversary
A of type Z the advantage function in winning the game GZ-ind-cpaK,A (λ) defined as
AdvZ-ind-cpaK,A (λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr [GZ-ind-cpaK,A (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
is negligible in the security parameter λ. We further say that K is XcZ-IND-CCA secure, if for
every QPT XcZ adversary A the advantage function in winning the game GXcZ-ind-ccaK,A (λ) defined
as
AdvXcZ-ind-ccaK,A (λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr [GXcZ-ind-ccaK,A (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
GZ-ind-cpaK,A (λ):
1 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ)
2 (c?,K?0 ) $←− Encaps(pk)
3 K?1
$←− K
4 b $←− {0, 1}
5 b′ $←− A(pk, c?,K?b )
6 return Jb′ = bK
GXcZ-ind-ccaK,A (λ):
1 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ)
2 (c?,K?0 ) $←− Encaps(pk)
3 K?1
$←− K
4 b $←− {0, 1}
5 st $←− AODecaps1 (pk, c?,K?b )
6 b′ $←− A2(st)
7 return Jb′ = bK
ODecaps(c):
8 if c = c?
9 return ⊥
10 else
11 return Decaps(sk, c)
Figure 5.1: IND-CPA and IND-CCA security of K = (KGen,Encaps,Decaps) with key space K with
respect to two-stage adversaries A = (A1,A2).
Remark 5.3. For consistency with the IND-CCA case, where we need to distinguish in which stage
the adversary has quantum power, we occasionally also use the notation XcZ-IND-CPA instead
of Z-IND-CPA in the IND-CPA case. In such cases we sometimes refer to both as XcZ-IND-ATK
security with ATK ∈ {CPA,CCA}. We stress, however, that X and c in the CPA case are
superfluous, and are stated solely for notational uniformity.
5.2.2 Relations Between Indistinguishability Security Notions
The various indistinguishability notions for KEMs are related to each other through a series
of implications and separations which are depicted in Figure 5.2 and proven in the following
section.
Proposition 5.4 (Implications). Let K be a key encapsulation mechanism. Then the following
implications hold:
If K is QcQ-IND-CCA secure, then K is also CcQ-IND-CCA secure.
If K is CcQ-IND-CCA secure, then K is also CcC-IND-CCA secure and Q-IND-CPA secure.
If K is Q-IND-CPA secure or CcC-IND-CCA secure, then K is also C-IND-CPA secure.
Proof. Let A = (A1,A2) be a two-stage adversary. The proof is straightforward since every
classical adversary can be seen as a quantum adversary that forgoes its additional quantum
power. It thus holds that
AdvQcQ-ind-ccaK,A (λ) ≥ AdvC
cQ-ind-cca
K,A (λ) ≥ AdvC
cC-ind-cca
K,A (λ)
4We say a quantum algorithm runs in quantum polynomial time, if it is a uniform family of quantum circuits
of size polynomial in the security parameter.
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C-IND-CPA Q-IND-CPA
CcC-IND-CCA CcQ-IND-CCA QcQ-IND-CCA
(5.4)
(5.4) (5.4)
(5.4) (5.4)(5.8)
(5.5)
(5.5)
(5.7)
Figure 5.2: Implications (→) and separations ( 6→) between indistinguishability-based security notions
for KEMs wrt. two-stage adversaries.
and
AdvQ-ind-cpaK,A (λ) ≥ AdvC-ind-cpaK,A (λ).
Similarly, active security implies passive security, i.e., AdvCcC-ind-ccaK,A (λ) ≥ AdvC-ind-cpaK,A (λ).
In fact, these implications are strict. In the following, we show separations between the
different notions. We start with Proposition 5.5 which essentially states that there exist KEMs
that are secure against classical CcC adversaries, but that become insecure once adversaries gain
quantum power, i.e., are of type CcQ or Q:
Proposition 5.5 (CcC-IND-CCA 6=⇒ Q-IND-CPA,CcQ-IND-CCA). Let E = (E .KGen,Enc,Dec)
be a public key encryption scheme that is C-IND-CPA secure. Then there exists a CcC-IND-CCA
secure KEM K in the random oracle model that is neither Q-IND-CPA secure nor CcQ-IND-CCA
secure.
Proof. We construct K = (KGen,Encaps,Decaps) from E via the Fujisaki-Okamoto trans-
form [FO99, FO13, HHK17] which turns a weakly-secure public key encryption scheme into an
IND-CCA-secure key encapsulation mechanism when modeling the hash functions G and H as
random oracles. The resulting KEM is depicted in Figure 5.3.
KGen(1λ):
1 (pk, sk) $←− E .KGen(1λ)
2 return (pk, sk)
Encaps(pk):
3 m $←−M
4 c $←− Enc(pk,m;G(m))
5 K ← H(c,m)
6 return c,K
Decaps(sk, c):
7 m′ ← Dec(sk, c)
8 if c 6= Enc(pk,m′;G(m′)) or if
m′ = ⊥
9 return ⊥
10 else
11 return H(c,m′)
Figure 5.3: Description of KEM K that separates CcC-IND-CCA from Q-IND-CPA and CcQ-IND-CCA.
(Prop. 5.5).
While K is secure against classical CcC-IND-CCA adversaries by construction, it is not secure
against an adversary that has local quantum capabilities, i.e., Q-IND-CPA or CcQ-IND-CCA
adversaries. The adversary then simply breaks the encryption scheme E (which is not resistant to
quantum algorithms) to retrieve m from the ciphertext c. With this, the key can be re-computed
as H(c,m) and indistinguishability can no longer be guaranteed.
35
Chapter 5. Hybrid Key Exchange
Next, we show that there exist KEMs that are secure as long as only classical adversaries
interact with the decapsulation oracle (CcQ adversaries), but that become insecure in the
post-quantum setting (QcQ adversaries). For this, we need the two-stage notion of OW-CPA
security:
Definition 5.6 (Two-stage one-way security of key encapsulation mechanisms). The two-stage
security of a key encapsulation mechanism K = (KGen,Encaps,Decaps) with key space K can
also be defined in terms of one-wayness with respect to either passive chosen plaintext adversaries
(OW-CPA security) or active chosen ciphertext adversaries (OW-CCA security). The respective
security games are depicted in Figure 5.1.
We say that K is Z-OW-CPA secure, if for every quantum polynomial time (QPT) adversary
A of type Z the advantage function in winning the game GZ-ow-cpaK,A (λ) defined as
AdvZ-ow-cpaK,A (λ) := Pr
[
GZ-ow-cpaK,A (λ) = 1
]
is negligible in the security parameter λ.We further say that K is XcZ-OW-CCA secure, if for
every QPT XcZ adversary A the advantage function in winning the game GXcZ-ow-ccaK,A (λ) defined
as
AdvXcZ-ow-ccaK,A (λ) := Pr
[
GXcZ-ow-ccaK,A (λ) = 1
]
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
GZ-ow-cpaK,A (λ):
1 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ)
2 (c?,K?) $←− Encaps(pk)
3 K′ $←− A(pk, c?)
4 return JK′ = K?K
GXcZ-ow-ccaK,A (λ):
1 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ)
2 (c?,K?) $←− Encaps(pk)
3 st $←− AODecaps1 (pk, c?)
4 K′ $←− A2(st)
5 return JK′ = K?K
ODecaps(c):
6 if c = c?
7 return ⊥
8 else
9 return Decaps(sk, c)
Figure 5.4: OW-CPA and OW-CCA security of K = (KGen,Encaps,Decaps) with key space K wrt.
two-stage adversaries A = (A1,A2).
Proposition 5.7 (CcQ-IND-CCA 6=⇒ QcQ-IND-CCA). Let K = (KGen,Encaps,Decaps) be a
CcQ-IND-CCA-secure KEM and K′ = (KGen′,Encaps′,Decaps′) be a C-OW-CPA-secure KEM for
which there is an efficient quantum algorithm that recovers the session key from the cipher-
texts, i.e., it is not Q-OW-CPA. Then there exists a key encapsulation mechanism K that is
CcQ-IND-CCA secure, but not QcQ-IND-CCA secure.
Proof. The construction of the separating KEM K = (KGen,Encaps,Decaps), which is secure
against future-quantum adversaries but not against post-quantum adversaries, can be found
in Figure 5.5. The idea is to insert a backdoor in the decapsulation oracle that requires local
quantum computing power to be exploited.
K is CcQ-IND-CCA secure. Assume it is not, i.e., there exists an efficient future-quantum
adversary A = (A1,A2) that can break the CcQ-IND-CCA security of K. However, this
immediately yields an efficient adversary B that can break the CcQ-IND-CCA security of
K. This adversary is defined as follows:
The reduction B receives its challenge (pk, c?,K?b ) for KEM K. It then runs lines 2 and
3 of KGen by itself to create the backdoor (c′,K ′). It sends (pk ← (pk, c′), c?,K?b ) as
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KGen(1λ):
1 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ)
2 (pk′, sk′) $←− KGen′(1λ)
3 (c′,K′) $←− Encaps′(pk′)
4 pk ← (pk, c′)
5 sk ← sk
6 return (pk, sk)
Encaps(pk):
7 (c,K)← Encaps(pk)
8 return (c,K)
Decaps(sk, c):
9 if c = K′
10 return sk
11 else
12 return Decaps(sk, c)
Figure 5.5: Description of KEM K that separates CcQ-IND-CCA from QcQ-IND-CCA (Prop. 5.7).
input to A. Whenever A1 queries the decapsulation oracle Decaps on some ciphertext
c 6= K ′, the reduction B forwards the query to its own decapsulation oracle Decaps. If the
adversary queries the oracle on K ′, then B returns ⊥. Note that this only occurs with
negligible probability, as this would immediately contradict the one-wayness of K′ against
classical adversaries.
Once A2 outputs its guess b′, B outputs the same guess. It is easy to see, that if A wins
GCcQ-ind-ccaK,A (λ) with non-negligible advantage, then B also wins its game G
CcQ-ind-cca
K,B (λ)
with the same advantage.
K is not QcQ-IND-CCA secure. Contrary to before, the first stage adversary A1 now has access
to local quantum computing power. This means in particular, that it can obtain K ′ from
c′, which is part of its public key pk. By construction of K, the decapsulation oracle
queried on c = K ′ returns the secret key sk of K. This can then be used to recover the key
K? encapsulated in the challenge c? and therefore distinguish the corresponding challenge
key K?b from random.
Lastly, we observe that passive security in the quantum setting (Q-IND-CPA) is not necessarily
enough to show classical security against active adversaries (CcC-IND-CCA).
Proposition 5.8 (Q-IND-CPA 6=⇒ CcC-IND-CCA). Assume there exists a Q-IND-CPA-secure
KEM K. Then there exists a KEM K′ that is Q-IND-CPA secure but not CcC-IND-CCA secure.
Proof. Let K = (KGen,Encaps,Decaps) be a Q-IND-CPA-secure KEM. Then K′ = (KGen′,
Encaps′,Decaps′) as constructed in Figure 5.6 is passively secure against quantum adversaries
but not actively secure against classical adversaries.
KGen′(1λ):
1 (pk, sk)← KGen(1λ)
2 return (pk, sk)
Encaps′(pk):
3 (c,K) $←− Encaps(pk)
4 return (c,K)
Decaps′(sk, c):
5 if c = pk
6 return sk
7 else
8 return Decaps(sk, c)
Figure 5.6: Description of KEM K′ that separates Q-IND-CPA from CcC-IND-CCA (Prop. 5.8).
Clearly K′ is not CcC-IND-CCA secure: when the public key is asked to the decapsulation
oracle, the secret key for decapsulation is returned. Recall that for honest executions in secure
encryption schemes the probability that a ciphertext c equals the public key pk “accidentally”
is negligible. However, as long as no queries to the decapsulation oracle are allowed, K′ is as
secure as K.
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5.3 Practical Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
We now turn towards the question of how to construct robust combiners for key encapsulation
mechanisms with respect to (partially) quantum adversaries. The three combiners proposed
in this section aim at applicability, either through their optimality with regards to employed
cryptographic hardness assumptions and primitives (XOR-then-MAC combiner XtM), or by
their applicability to drafts of real-world hybrid protocols (dual-PRF combiner dualPRF and
nested dual-PRF combiner N).
In the following constructions, let K1 = (KGen1,Encaps1,Decaps1) and K2 = (KGen2,
Encaps2,Decaps2) be two KEMs with key space K1 and K2, respectively. We write C[K1,K2] =
(KGenC ,EncapsC ,DecapsC) for the hybrid KEM constructed by one of the three proposals
C ∈ {XtM, dualPRF,N}. Its key space will be denoted by K .
We start with the XOR-then-MAC combiner. After a brief introduction to hybrid modes
in TLS, we present the remaining two combiners, the dual-PRF and the nested dual-PRF
combiners
5.3.1 XtM: XOR-then-MAC Combiner
Ideally, we would like to build a KEM combiner which can do without further cryptographic
operations than those already employed in the two underlying schemes. One of the most
natural combiners that is conceivable is a plain XOR-combiner, where the ciphertext consists of
the concatenation of the two ciphertexts and the encapsulated key is simply the XOR of the
individual keys.
Unfortunately, it is well-known that such a combiner does not preserve IND-CCA security
for encryption. Giacon et al. [GHP18] reiterated this result in the context of KEM combiners.
We additionally note that this even holds, if both KEMs are IND-CCA secure: Given a challenge
ciphertext c? = (c?1, c?2) the adversary can make two decapsulation requests for c′ = (c?1, c2) and
c′′ = (c1, c?2) with fresh ciphertexts c1 6= c?1, c2 6= c?2, for which it knows the encapsulated keys.
This allows the adversary to easily recover the challenge key from the responses of the oracle.
Combiner description. To prevent the adversary from these “mix-and-match attacks”, we
augment the combined ciphertext by adding a MAC tag over the individual ciphertexts c1, c2.
The combined KEM key as well as the key for the MAC scheme are derived as the XOR of
the two encapsulated keys K1 and K2. Note that the underlying KEMs must thus potentially
stretch their key output pseudorandomly to allow for two keys of sufficient length to be derived.
For the ease of the discussion of the XOR-then-MAC combiner, let K1 denotes the key space of
K1 and let it be such that K1 = {0, 1}2·l(λ) where the l(λ) most significant bits constitute the
actual KEM key K1 and the other l(λ) bits the MAC key k1; analogously for K2 of K2. The
resulting hybrid KEM with key space K = {0, 1}l(λ) is depicted in Figure 5.7.
Security of the MAC scheme. The MAC scheme must be robust such that it provides
unforgeability, even if one of the keys is chosen adversarially. I.e., the adversary A tries to win
for a key k = (k1, k2), where either k1 or k2 is chosen by itself. We allow A to specify one of the
two keys for computing the challenge, as well as for each verification query and in the forgery
attempt.
It suffices to use one-time unforgeable MACs with multiple verification queries, where the
adversary can initially choose a message, receives the MAC tag, and can then make multiple
verification attempts for other messages. We require strong unforgeability, meaning the adversary
wins if it is able to output a valid message-tag pair, which may even be for the same initial message.
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KGenXtM(1λ):
1 (pk1, sk1) $←− KGen(1λ)
2 (pk2, sk2) $←− KGen2(1λ)
3 pk ← (pk1, pk2)
4 sk ← (sk1, sk2)
5 return (pk, sk)
EncapsXtM(pk):
6 (c1,K1‖k1) $←− Encaps1(pk1)
7 (c2,K2‖k2) $←− Encaps2(pk2)
8 k ← (k1, k2)
9 c′ ← (c1, c2)
10 τ ← MAC(k, c′)
11 c← (c′, τ)
12 K ← K1 ⊕K2
13 return (c,K)
DecapsXtM(sk, c):
14 K′1‖k′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1),
15 K′2‖k′2 ← Decaps2(sk2, c2)
16 k′ ← (k′1, k′2)
17 if Vfy(k′, τ, (c1, c2)) = 0
18 return ⊥
19 else
20 return K′1 ⊕K′2
Figure 5.7: Hybrid KEM constructed by the XOR-then-MAC combiner XtM[K1,K2,M].
The security game GXcZ-ot-s-eufM,A (λ) for two-stage one-time strong existential unforgeability of such
MACs with two keys is given in Figure 5.8.
Definition 5.9 (Two-stage one-time strong existential unforgeability). LetM = (KGen,MAC,Vfy)
be a message authentication scheme, where the key generation algorithm KGen outputs a key k
that is comprised of two keys k1, k2.
We say that M is two-stage one-time strong existential unforgeable or XcZ-OT-s-EUF-
secure if for every QPT adversary A of type XcZ the advantage function in winning the game
GXcZ-ot-s-eufM,A (λ) defined as
AdvXcZ-ot-s-eufM,A (λ) := Pr
[
GXcZ-ot-s-eufM,A (λ) = 1
]
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
GXcZ-ot-s-eufM,A (λ):
1 (k1, k2) $←− KGen(1λ)
2 (b, k,m?, st) $←− A1
3 if b = 1
4 k? ← (k, k2)
5 else
6 k? ← (k1, k)
7 τ? ← MAC(k?,m?)
8 st $←− AOVfy1 (τ?)
9 (k′, τ ′,m′) $←− A2(st)
10 if b = 1
11 k′′ ← (k′, k2)
12 else
13 k′′ ← (k1, k′)
14 if (Vfy(k′′, τ ′,m′) = 1) ∧ ((m′, τ ′) 6= (m∗, τ∗))
15 return 1
16 else
17 return 0
OVfy(k, τ,m):
18 if b = 1
19 k˜ ← (k, k2)
20 else
21 k˜ ← (k1, k)
22 return Vfy(k˜, τ,m)
Figure 5.8: Security game for one-time strong existential unforgeability with multiple verifications of a
two-key MACM = (KGen,MAC,Vfy) with respect to two-stage adversaries A = (A1,A2).
The simplest ways to build secure MAC combiners of this type is to concatenate two
MACs, where each one is computed under one of the keys. For specific constructions various
improvements may apply. For instance, for deterministic MACs, one may aggregate the two
MACs via XOR [KL08] to reduce the communication overhead. Post-quantum secure MACs
that satisfy the QcQ-OT-s-EUF notion can be constructed from universal hash functions based
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on the Carter-Wegman paradigm [WC81]. This construction does not rely on cryptographic
assumptions and thus makes the XOR-then-MAC combiner optimal with respect to needed
cryptographic assumptions.
Security of the XOR-then-MAC combiner. We can now show that the XOR-then-MAC
combiner constitutes a hybrid KEM: the combined KEM K = XtM[K1,K2,M] preserves the
security offered by the strongest of the input KEMs K1,K2, ifM offers the same level of security.
In fact, the security of the MAC scheme is only required in case of IND-CCA attacks when the
adversary has access to the decapsulation oracle, yielding an even better bound for the IND-CPA
case.
Theorem 5.10 (XOR-then-MAC is robust). Let K1 be an XcZ-IND-ATK-secure KEM or K2 be
a UcW-IND-ATK-secure KEM. Furthermore, letM be an RcT-OT-s-EUF-secure MAC scheme,
where RcT = max{XcZ,UcW}.
Then XtM[K1,K2,M] as defined in Figure 5.7 is also RcT-IND-ATK secure. More precisely,
for any efficient QPT adversary A of type RcT against the combined KEM K := XtM[K1,K2,M],
there exist efficient adversaries B1, B2, and B3 such that
AdvRcT-ind-atkK,A (λ) ≤ 2 ·min
{
AdvRcT-ind-atkK2,B1 (λ),Adv
RcT-ind-atk
K1,B2 (λ)
}
+ AdvRcT-ot-s-eufM,B3 (λ).
Proof. We consider the scenario where K1 becomes insecure; the case for K2 breaking proceeds
analogously. Furthermore, we focus on the stronger IND-CCA case here as this immediately
implies IND-CPA security.
In the proof, we show that the existence of an efficient adversary A against the RcT-IND-CCA
security of the combiner K = XtM[K1,K2,M] necessarily implies that there exist efficient
adversaries against the RcT-IND-CCA security of either of the two KEMs or the RcT-OT-s-EUF
security ofM, respectively. The game hops are depicted in Figure 5.9.
Game0(λ): The original RcT-IND-CCA game GR
cT-ind-cca
K,A (λ) against the combiner K.
Game1(λ): First, we replace the part of the real challenge key corresponding to K2, i.e., K2
and k2, with uniformly random and independent values K˜2 and k˜2, each of length l(λ).
We use these randomly generated values from then onwards in all computations involving
the respective keys, such as the establishment of the final MAC key k? and the decapsulation
of ciphertext parts c?2.
We show that if A can efficiently distinguish Game0(λ) from Game1(λ), then there exists
an efficient adversary B1 against the RcT-IND-CCA security of K2. The reduction works
as follows:
Algorithm B1 receives as input (pk2, c?2, κ?b′), where pk2 is the public key, c?2 the challenge
ciphertext, and κ?b′ = Kb′‖kb′ the real or random challenge key.
To initialize the environment for A, the reduction B1 generates the key pair (pk1, sk1)
for K1 and sets pk ← (pk1, pk2). Furthermore, it computes the first challenge ciphertext
portion c?1 as well as the key share K1‖k1 itself by running Encaps1(pk1).
B1 then sets K?0 ← K1 ⊕Kb′ and k ← (k1, kb′). The challenge ciphertext for A is set as
c? ← ((c?1, c?2), τ?), where τ? ← MAC(k, (c?1, c?2)). The reduction then initializes A on input
(pk, c?,K?).
Decapsulation queries by A of the form c = c? are immediately answered with ⊥. For
any decapsulation query c = ((c1, c2), τ) with c2 6= c?2, the reduction first computes
K ′1‖k′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1) by itself. B1 then queries c2 to its own decapsulation oracle for
40
5.3. Practical Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
Game0(λ):
1 (pk1, sk1) $←− KGen1(1λ)
2 (pk2, sk2) $←− KGen2(1λ)
3 pk ← (pk1, pk2)
4 sk ← (sk1, sk2)
5 (c?1 , K1‖k1) $←− Encaps1(pk1)
6 (c?2 , K2‖k2) $←− Encaps2(pk2)
7 k ← (k1, k2)
8 c′ ← (c?1 , c?2)
9 τ ← MAC(k, c′)
10 c? ← (c′, τ)
11 K?0 ← K1 ⊕K2
12 K?1 $←− K
13 b $←− {0, 1}
14 st $←− AODecaps1 (pk, c?, K?b )
15 b′ $←− A2(st)
16 return Jb′ = bK
Game1(λ):
1 (pk1, sk1) $←− KGen1(1λ)
2 (pk2, sk2) $←− KGen2(1λ)
3 pk ← (pk1, pk2)
4 sk ← (sk1, sk2)
5 (c?1 , K1‖k1) $←− Encaps1(pk1)
6 (c?2 , K2‖k2) $←− Encaps2(pk2)
7 K˜2, k˜2 $←− {0, 1}l(λ)
8 k ← (k1, k˜2 )
9 c′ ← (c?1 , c?2)
10 τ ← MAC(k, c′)
11 c? ← (c′, τ)
12 K?0 ← K1⊕ K˜2
13 K?1 $←− K
14 b $←− {0, 1}
15 st $←− AODecaps1 (pk, c?, K?b )
16 b′ $←− A2(st)
17 return Jb′ = bK
Game2(λ):
1 (pk1, sk1) $←− KGen1(1λ)
2 (pk2, sk2) $←− KGen2(1λ)
3 pk ← (pk1, pk2)
4 sk ← (sk1, sk2)
5 (c?1 , K1‖k1) $←− Encaps1(pk1)
6 (c?2 , K2‖k2) $←− Encaps2(pk2)
7 K˜2, k˜2 $←− {0, 1}l(λ)
8 k ← (k1, k˜2)
9 c′ ← (c?1 , c?2)
10 τ ← MAC(k, c′)
11 c? ← (c′, τ)
12 K?0 ← K1⊕ K1 ⊕ K˜2
13 K?1 $←− K
14 b $←− {0, 1}
15 st $←− AODecaps1 (pk, c?, K?b )
16 b′ $←− A2(st)
17 return Jb′ = bK
Game3(λ):
1 (pk1, sk1) $←− KGen1(1λ)
2 (pk2, sk2) $←− KGen2(1λ)
3 pk ← (pk1, pk2)
4 sk ← (sk1, sk2)
5 (c?1 , K1‖k1) $←− Encaps1(pk1)
6 (c?2 , K2‖k2) $←− Encaps2(pk2)
7 K˜2, k˜2 $←− {0, 1}l(λ)
8 k ← (k1, k˜2)
9 c′ ← (c?1 , c?2)
10 τ ← MAC(k, c′)
11 c? ← (c′, τ)
12 K?0 ← K˜2
13 K?1 $←− K
14 b $←− {0, 1}
15 st $←− AODecaps1 (pk, c?, K?b )
16 b′ $←− A2(st)
17 return Jb′ = bK
ODecaps(c = ((c1, c2), τ)):
17 if c = c?
18 return ⊥
19 else
20 K′1‖k′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1)
21 K′2‖k′2 ← Decaps2(sk2, c2)
22 k′ ← (k′1, k′2)
23 if Vfy(k′, τ, (c1, c2)) = 0
24 return ⊥
25 else
26 return K′1 ⊕K′2
ODecaps(c = ((c1, c2), τ)):
18 if c = c?
19 return ⊥
20 elseif c2 = c?2
21 K′1‖k′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1)
22 k′ ← (k′1, k˜2 )
23 if Vfy(k′, τ, (c1, c2)) = 0
24 return ⊥
25 else
26 return K′1⊕ K˜2
27 else
28 K′1‖k′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1)
29 K′2‖k′2 ← Decaps2(sk2, c2)
30 k′ ← (k′1, k′2)
31 if Vfy(k′, τ, (c1, c2)) = 0
32 return ⊥
33 else
34 return K′1 ⊕K′2
ODecaps(c = ((c1, c2), τ)):
18 if c = c?
19 return ⊥
20 elseif c2 = c?2
21 K′1‖k′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1)
22 k′ ← (k′1, k˜2)
23 if Vfy(k′, τ, (c1, c2)) = 0
24 return ⊥
25 else
26 return K′1⊕ K1 ⊕ K˜2
27 else
28 K′1‖k′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1)
29 K′2‖k′2 ← Decaps2(sk2, c2)
30 k′ ← (k′1, k′2)
31 if Vfy(k′, τ, (c1, c2)) = 0
32 return ⊥
33 else
34 return K′1 ⊕K′2
ODecaps(c = ((c1, c2), τ)):
18 if c = c?
19 return ⊥
20 elseif c2 = c?2
21 return ⊥
22 else
23 K′1‖k′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1)
24 K′2‖k′2 ← Decaps2(sk2, c2)
25 k′ ← (k′1, k′2)
26 if Vfy(k′, τ, (c1, c2)) = 0
27 return ⊥
28 else
29 return K′1 ⊕K′2
Figure 5.9: Game hops for proof of Theorem 5.10.
K2 to receive the answer K ′2‖k′2. Set k′ ← (k′1, k′2). If Vfy(k′, τ, (c1, c2)) = 0, B1 returns ⊥
to the adversary. Otherwise it returns K ′1 ⊕K ′2.
If the decapsulation query is such that c = ((c1, c?2), τ), then B1 uses Kb′ as the decap-
sulation of c?2, kb′ as the corresponding MAC key, and then continues as in the previous
case.
At some point, A terminates and outputs a guess bit bguess. The reduction B1 outputs the
same bit bguess.
Clearly, B1 perfectly simulates the environment for A, corresponding to Game0(λ) if the
challenge key κ?b′ is the actual key (b′ = 0), and corresponding to Game1(λ) if κ?b′ is random
(b′ = 1).
Furthermore, B1 is of the same two-stage type as A. Hence, we have
AdvG0K,A(λ) ≤ AdvG1K,A(λ) + 2 · AdvR
cT-ind-cca
K2,B1 (λ).
The game hop works completely analogous for K1 being secure and K2 insecure, yielding
an adversary B2.
Game2(λ): In a syntactical change, we replace the now random value K˜2 by K1 ⊕ K˜2, where
K1 is the encapsulated key contributed from K1 in the challenge generation. We leave k˜2
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unaltered. Effectively, the modification means that the encapsulated key in the challenge
ciphertext is now K˜2 = K1 ⊕ (K1 ⊕ K˜2).
Since K˜2 and K1 are independent, the distributions of K˜2 and K1 ⊕ K˜2 are identical, so
the adversary’s advantage does not change and we have:
AdvG1K,A(λ) = Adv
G2
K,A(λ).
In Game2(λ) the adversary now receives a random value as the challenge key and the
MAC is also computed independently of the challenge bit b over a random key part k˜2.
To finalize the proof, we need to argue that the adversary cannot gain any advantage via
queries to the decapsulation oracle of the form c = ((·, c?2), ·).
However, we show in the next game hop that the difference in advantage that can be
gained by such queries is negligible, as this could only be exploited if the adversary were
able to forge a MAC.
Game3(λ): Thus, lastly, we modify the decapsulation oracle such that it rejects all ciphertexts
of the form c = ((·, c?2), ·) by outputting ⊥.
We argue that any efficient distinguisher A between Game2(λ) and Game3(λ) immediately
implies an efficient adversary B3 against the one-time strong unforgeability of the MAC
scheme M. This is due to the fact that, in order to enforce decapsulation of such
ciphertexts, the adversary will have to provide a ciphertext c = ((c1, c?2), τ) with c1 6= c?1
and τ a valid MAC tag. The reduction B3 works as follows:
In order to initialize A, the reduction B3 first generates the key pairs (pk1, sk1) and
(pk2, sk2), as well as encapsulations (c?1,K1‖k1) and (c?2,K2‖k2) under the respective
public keys itself. It then outputs 1, k1, (c?1, c?2) as input to its challenger to then receive a
MAC tag τ?. The reduction then runs A on input (c?,K?), where c? ← ((c?1, c?2), τ) and
K? $←− {0, 1}l(λ) is a uniformly random key.
For all of A’s decapsulation queries that are not identical to the challenge ciphertext
and where c2 6= c?2, the reduction B3 computes the appropriate responses itself, using its
knowledge of the corresponding secrets. Whenever A queries the challenge ciphertext, B3
returns ⊥. For decapsulation queries of the form c = ((c1, c?2), τ), B3 records these queries
in a list L and returns ⊥ to the adversary.
B3 runs all queries ((c1, c?2), τ) ∈ L by its verification oracle on input (k1, τ, (c1, c?2)), where
K1‖k1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1). If for some query, say, ((c′1, c?2), τ ′) the response of OVfy is 1,
B3 outputs (k′1, τ ′, (c′1, c?2)) with K ′1||k′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c′1) as its forgery.
At some point A terminates, potentially outputting a bit bguess.
In Game2(λ), both the challenge key as well as the internal MAC keys are each uniformly
random strings of length l(λ), independent of the actual bit b in the game. This is also the
case in B3’s simulation for A. In particular, the second part of the MAC key is provided
as a uniformly random value by the challenger in the OT-sEUF game. The only way B3’s
simulation could be detected by A is if A made a query for a fresh ciphertext (c1, c?2) with
a valid MAC tag that would require a response different from ⊥. But then, B3 has already
found its forgery and can abort the simulation.
Since B3 is of the same type RcT as A, we have that
AdvG2K,A(λ) ≤ AdvG3K,A(λ) + AdvR
cT-ot-s-euf
M,B3 (λ).
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At this point, the secret bit b is perfectly hidden from A. Both the challenge key as well as the
keys used within ODecaps are uniformly random strings, independent of b. Thus, the adversary
can do no better than guessing and we have:
AdvG3K,A(λ) ≤ 0,
which yields the final bound.
Application of XOR-then-MAC in protocols. Another viable approach to protect against
“mix-and-match” attacks against the combined key would be to make the key derivation depend
on both keys and both ciphertexts. However, many real-world protocols already include a MAC
over the transcript to provide integrity and authenticity. The key for this MAC is often derived
from the session key and the transcript includes the information exchanged for key agreement
such as the KEM ciphertexts. This already present MAC may then be leveraged to forgo the
additional MAC over the ciphertext in the XOR-then-MAC combiner. An example of this can
be found in the Finished message in the Transport Layer Security protocol [Res18].
5.3.2 Hybrid Modes in TLS 1.3
The last two combiners, the dual-PRF combiner and the nested dual-PRF combiner, are inspired
by drafts by Whyte et al. [WFZGM17] and Schank and Stebila [SS17] that were put forward to
enable hybrid modes in TLS 1.3 [Res18].
In TLS 1.3, HKDF [Kra10, KE10] is used as the key derivation function. HKDF can be
split into an extraction and an expansion step. In TLS 1.3 extraction is applied to the raw
(EC)DH shared secret. The output is then expanded, where the (hashed) transcript is included
within the label. In the presence of a second key share, at least two approaches are feasible:
one is to extract from the concatenation of the two secrets (this is the approach taken by
Whyte et al. [WFZGM17] and [KK18, OQS18]). The second approach is to insert an additional
extract-then-expand step (this is the approach taken by Schank and Stebila [SS17]). Both
abstracted key schedules are depicted in Figure 5.10 and are treated in more detail in the
following sections.
5.3.3 dualPRF: Dual-PRF Combiner
Our second combiner is based on the primitive of dual pseudorandom functions [BCK96, Bel06,
BL15] and is motivated by Whyte et al.’s proposal for enabling a hybrid key exchange mode in
TLS 1.3 [WFZGM17]. The dualPRF combiner captures their proposal by modeling the HKDF
extraction as a dual PRF dPRF and the HKDF expansion step as a pseudorandom function F.
We will define dual PRFs shortly in the two-stage setting, but for now we want to give an
informal intuition: a dual PRF dPRF(K,x) is a PRF, whenever either the key material K is
random (i.e., dPRF(K, ·) is a PRF), or alternatively when the input label x is random (i.e.,
dPRF(·, x) is a PRF). This means, that pseudorandomness can be extracted if either of the two
inputs carries sufficient entropy. In the standard PRF scenario this applies only to the first
input component.
It has been shown that HMAC is a secure MAC if its compression function satisfies the
dual-PRF property. Bellare and Lysyanskaya [BL15] gave a confirmation of this dual-PRF
assumption for HMAC and therefore also HKDF.
Combiner description. Unfortunately, to achieve robustness, it is not enough to simply use
the dual PRF on the two input keys, i.e., to compute the combined KEM key as dPRF(K1,K2).
To see this, assume K1 is broken such that an adversary may be able to maul the challenge
43
Chapter 5. Hybrid Key Exchange
0
Ext
Exp
Pre-shared keys PSK
Ext K1||K2 (e.g., K1 (EC)DHE and K2 PQ)
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Exp handshake messages
Figure 5.10: Excerpt from altered TLS 1.3 key schedule as proposed in [WFZGM17] (left) and as
proposed in [SS17] (right) to enable a hybrid mode.
ciphertext (c?1, c?2) into (c1, c?2), where c1 6= c?1 but they both encapsulate the same key K1. Even
if K2 remains completely secure, an adversary then only needs a single decapsulation query
(with the mauled ciphertext) to the decapsulation oracle to recover the key dPRF(K1,K2) and
thus distinguish the challenge key from random.
To avoid this, our dual-PRF combiner, depicted in Figure 5.11, runs the output of dPRF
through a pseudorandom function, where it acts as the PRF key and the ciphertext pairs
constitute the label, i.e., the combined key is given as F(dPRF(K1,K2), (c1, c2)).
KGendualPRF(1λ):
1 (pk1, sk1) $←− KGen1(1λ)
2 (pk2, sk2) $←− KGen2(1λ)
3 pk ← (pk1, pk2)
4 sk ← (sk1, sk2)
5 return (pk, sk)
EncapsdualPRF(pk):
6 (c1,K1) $←− Encaps1(pk1)
7 (c2,K2) $←− Encaps2(pk2)
8 c← (c1, c2)
9 K′ ← dPRF(K1,K2)
10 K ← F(K′, c)
11 return (c,K)
DecapsdualPRF(sk, c):
12 K′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1)
13 K′2 ← Decaps2(sk2, c2)
14 K′′ ← dPRF(K′1,K′2)
15 return F(K′′, c)
Figure 5.11: KEM constructed by the dual-PRF combiner dualPRF[K1,K2, dPRF,F].
Dual-PRF security. In the following, we give the two-stage equivalents of the security
definitions for PRF and dual-PRF security:
44
5.3. Practical Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
Definition 5.11 (Two-stage PRF security). Let F : {0, 1}κ(λ) × {0, 1}ι(λ) → {0, 1}ω(λ) be an
efficient keyed function with key length κ(λ), input length ι(λ) and output length ω(λ). Let
GX
cZ-prf-sec
F,A be defined as in Figure 5.12. We call F an XcZ-secure pseudorandom function if for
all QPT adversaries A of type XcZ the advantage function defined as
AdvX
cZ-prf-sec
F,A (λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr [GXcZ-prf-secF,A (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
GX
cZ-prf-sec
F,A (λ):
1 K $←− {0, 1}κ(λ)
2 g $←− {functions f : {0, 1}ι(λ) → {0, 1}ω(λ)}
3 b $←− {0, 1}
4 st $←− AOPRF1
5 b′ $←− A2(st)
6 return Jb′ = bK
OPRF(x):
7 if b = 0
8 return F(K,x)
9 else
10 return g(x)
Figure 5.12: Definition of pseudorandom function F with respect to two-stage adversaries A = (A1,A2).
The two-stage definition of dual-PRF security follows easily from this. Recall that a function
F is said to be a dual PRF if it is a pseudorandom function when keyed with either of its two
inputs. More formally:
Definition 5.12 (Two-stage dual-PRF security). Let F : {0, 1}κ(λ) × {0, 1}ι(λ) → {0, 1}ω(λ) be
an efficient keyed function key length κ(λ), input length ι(λ) and output length ω(λ). Define
F′ : {0, 1}ι(λ) × {0, 1}κ(λ) → {0, 1}ω(λ) such that F′(x,K) := F(K,x). Let A = (A1,A2) be a
two-stage QPT adversary of type XcZ interacting with F,F′ in the Game GX
cZ-dprf-sec
F,A (λ) given in
Figure 5.13.
We say that F is an XcZ-secure dual pseudorandom function if both F and F′ are XcZ-secure
pseudorandom functions according to Definition 5.11.
In particular, for all QPT XcZ adversaries A the advantage function defined as
AdvX
cZ-dprf-sec
F,A (λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr [GXcZ-dprf-secF,A (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
= max
{
AdvX
cZ-prf-sec
F,A (λ),Adv
XcZ-prf-sec
F′,A (λ)
}
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
GX
cZ-dprf-sec
F,A (λ):
1 K $←− {0, 1}κ(λ)
2 x $←− {0, 1}ι(λ)
3 g $←− {functions f : {0, 1}ι(λ) → {0, 1}ω(λ)}
4 g′ $←− {functions f : {0, 1}κ(λ) → {0, 1}ω(λ)}
5 b $←− {0, 1}
6 st $←− AO
F
PRF,OF
′
PRF
1
7 b′ $←− A2(st)
8 return Jb′ = bK
OFPRF(x):
9 if b = 0
10 return F(K,x)
11 else
12 return g(x)
OF′PRF(K):
13 if b = 0
14 return F′(x,K)
15 else
16 return g′(K)
Figure 5.13: Definition of a dual pseudorandom function F with respect to two-stage adversary
A = (A1,A2).
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Security of the dual-PRF combiner. We can now show that the dual-PRF combiner
constitutes a hybrid KEM: the combined KEM K = dualPRF[K1,K2, dPRF,F] preserves the
security offered by the strongest of the input KEMs K1,K2, if dPRF and F offer the same level
of security.
Theorem 5.13 (Dual-PRF is robust). Let K1 be an XcZ-IND-ATK-secure KEM or K2 be a
UcW-IND-ATK-secure KEM. Set RcT = max{XcZ,UcW}. Furthermore, let dPRF : K1 ×K2 →
K ′ be an RcT-secure dual PRF, and F : K ′ × {0, 1}? → K be an RcT-secure PRF. Then the
combiner dualPRF[K1,K2, dPRF,F] as defined in Figure 5.11 is RcT-IND-ATK secure.
More precisely, for any QPT adversary A of type RcT against the combined KEM K =
dualPRF[K1,K2, dPRF,F], we derive efficient adversaries B1, B2, B3, and B4 such that
AdvRcT-ind-atkK,A (λ) ≤ 2 ·
(
min
{
AdvRcT-ind-atkK2,B1 (λ),Adv
RcT-ind-atk
K1,B2 (λ)
}
+ AdvR
cT-dprf-sec
dPRF,B3 (λ) + Adv
RcT-prf-sec
F,B4 (λ)
)
.
Proof. As for the XOR-then-MAC combiner, we prove the theorem by considering a sequence
of game hops. The game hops are depicted in Figure 5.14. We focus on the case that K1
becomes insecure. The case for when K2 becomes insecure proceeds similarly. Again, we show
the theorem statement for IND-CCA security, which implies the IND-CPA case.
Game0(λ):
1 (pk1, sk1) $←− KGen1(1λ)
2 (pk2, sk2) $←− KGen2(1λ)
3 pk ← (pk1, pk2)
4 sk ← (sk1, sk2)
5 (c?1 , K1) $←− Encaps1(pk1)
6 (c?2 , K2) $←− Encaps2(pk2)
7 c? ← (c?1 , c?2)
8 K′ ← dPRF(K1, K2)
9 K?0 ← F(K′, c?)
10 K?1 $←− K
11 b $←− {0, 1}
12 st $←− AODecaps1 (pk, c?, K?b )
13 b′ $←− A2(st)
14 return Jb′ = bK
Game1(λ):
1 (pk1, sk1) $←− KGen1(1λ)
2 (pk2, sk2) $←− KGen2(1λ)
3 pk ← (pk1, pk2)
4 sk ← (sk1, sk2)
5 (c?1 , K1) $←− Encaps1(pk1)
6 (c?2 , K2) $←− Encaps2(pk2)
7 c? ← (c?1 , c?2)
8 K˜2 $←− K2
9 K′ ← dPRF(K1, K˜2 )
10 K?0 ← F(K′, c?)
11 K?1 $←− K
12 b $←− {0, 1}
13 st $←− AODecaps1 (pk, c?, K?b )
14 b′ $←− A2(st)
15 return Jb′ = bK
Game2(λ):
1 (pk1, sk1) $←− KGen1(1λ)
2 (pk2, sk2) $←− KGen2(1λ)
3 pk ← (pk1, pk2)
4 sk ← (sk1, sk2)
5 (c?1 , K1) $←− Encaps1(pk1)
6 (c?2 , K2) $←− Encaps2(pk2)
7 c? ← (c?1 , c?2)
8 K˜′ $←− K ′
9 K?0 ← F( K˜′ , c?)
10 K?1 $←− K
11 b $←− {0, 1}
12 st $←− AODecaps1 (pk, c?, K?b )
13 b′ $←− A2(st)
14 return Jb′ = bK
Game3(λ):
1 (pk1, sk1) $←− KGen1(1λ)
2 (pk2, sk2) $←− KGen2(1λ)
3 pk ← (pk1, pk2)
4 sk ← (sk1, sk2)
5 (c?1 , K1) $←− Encaps1(pk1)
6 (c?2 , K2) $←− Encaps2(pk2)
7 c? ← (c?1 , c?2)
8 K˜2 $←− K
9 K˜′ $←− K ′
10 K˜ ← K
11 K?0 ← K˜
12 K?1 $←− K
13 b $←− {0, 1}
14 st $←− AODecaps1 (pk, c?, K?b )
15 b′ $←− A2(st)
16 return Jb′ = bK
ODecaps(c = (c1, c2)):
15 if c = c?
16 return ⊥
17 else
18 K′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1)
19 K′2 ← Decaps2(sk2, c2)
20 K′′ ← dPRF(K′1, K′2)
21 return F(K′′, c)
ODecaps(c = (c1, c2)):
16 if c = c?
17 return ⊥
18 elseif c2 = c?2
19 K′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1)
20 K′′ ← dPRF(K′1, K˜2 )
21 return F(K′′, c)
22 else
23 K′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1)
24 K′2 ← Decaps2(sk2, c2)
25 K′′ ← dPRF(K′1, K′2)
26 return F(K′′, c)
ODecaps(c = (c1, c2)):
15 if c = c?
16 return ⊥
17 elseif c2 = c?2
18 K′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1)
19 K′′ ← dPRF(K′1, K˜2)
20 if K′1 = K1
21 return F( K˜′ , c)
22 else
23 return F(K′′, c)
24 else
25 K′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1)
26 K′2 ← Decaps2(sk2, c2)
27 K′′ ← dPRF(K′1, K′2)
28 return F(K′′, c)
ODecaps(c = (c1, c2)):
17 if c = c?
18 return ⊥
19 elseif c2 = c?2
20 K′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1)
21 K′′ ← dPRF(K′1, K˜2)
22 if K′1 = K1
23 return F(K˜′, c)
24 else
25 return F(K′′, c)
26 else
27 K′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1)
28 K′2 ← Decaps2(sk2, c2)
29 K′′ ← dPRF(K′1, K′2)
30 return F(K′′, c)
Figure 5.14: Game hops for proof of Theorem 5.13.
Game0(λ): The original RcT-IND-CCA game GR
cT-ind-cca
K,A against the combiner K = dualPRF[K1,
K2, dPRF,F].
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Game1(λ): First, we replace the value K2 by a uniformly random element K˜2 from the same key
spaceK2. The real key for challenge b = 0 is then computed as K?0 ← F(dPRF(K1, K˜2), c?).
If the adversary asks a decapsulation query c = (c1, c?2), where c1 6= c?1, then the value K˜2
is used instead of Decaps2(sk2, c?2).
We argue that if there exists an efficient adversary A that can distinguish Game0(λ) from
Game1(λ), this implies the existence of an efficient adversary B1 against the IND-CCA
security of K2. The reduction works as follows:
Algorithm B1 receives as input (pk2, c?2, k?b′), where pk2 is the public key, c?2 the challenge
ciphertext, and k?b′ the real or random challenge key in the two-stage IND-CCA game for
K2.
To initialize A, the reduction B1 generates the key pair (pk1, sk1) for K1 and sets pk ←
(pk1, pk2). It computes the first challenge ciphertext portion c?1 as well as the key share K1
itself by running Encaps1(pk1). B then sets K? ← F(dPRF(K1, k?b′), c?), where c? = (c?1, c?2).
The reduction then initializes A on input (pk, c?,K?).
Decapsulation queries by A of the form c = c? are immediately answered with ⊥.
For any decapsulation query c = (c1, c2) such that c2 6= c?2, the reduction first computes
K1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1) by itself. B1 then queries c2 to its own decapsulation oracle for K2
to receive the answer K2. B1 then returns F(dPRF(K1,K2), c) to the adversary.
If the decapsulation query is such that c = (c1, c?2), then B1 uses k?b′ in place of the
decapsulation of c?2. It then proceeds to compute the response as in the previous case,
i.e., it computes the decapsulation K1 of c1 itself and derives the final response as
F(dPRF(K1, k?b′), c) .
At some point, A terminates and outputs a guess bit bguess. The reduction B1 then outputs
the same bit bguess.
Clearly, B1 simulates the environment for A corresponding to Game0(λ) if the challenge
key k?b′ is the actual key (i.e., if b′ = 0), and corresponding to Game1(λ) if k?b′ is random
(i.e., b′ = 1).
Hence, we have
AdvG0K,A(λ) ≤ AdvG1K,A(λ) + 2 · AdvX
cZ-ind-cca
K2,B1 (λ).
The game hop works completely analogous for K1 being secure and K2 insecure, yielding
an adversary B2 against the IND-CCA security of K1.
Game2(λ): Next, we replace the value dPRF(K1, K˜2) used for computing the challenge value
K?0 by a uniformly random value K˜ ′ $←− K ′. Furthermore, for any query of A to the
decapsulation oracle of the form c = (c′1, c?2), where c′1 6= c?1 but K1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c′1) we
change the decapsulation oracle to immediately return F(K˜ ′, c).
We argue that if an adversary can efficiently distinguish Game1(λ) from Game2(λ), this
would imply an efficient adversary B3 against the PRF security of dPRF′ and thus contradict
the dual-PRF security of dPRF. The reduction works as follows:
The reduction B3 generates key pairs (pk1, sk1), (pk2, sk2), as well as c?1, c?2 (with encapsu-
lated keys K1 and K2, respectively). It then queries its PRF oracle OPRF about K1 to
receive a value y?b′ which is either dPRF′(K,K1) = dPRF(K1,K) with K $←− K2 chosen
by its challenger (b′ = 0), or a uniformly random element computed as g(K1) from K2
(b′ = 1) in the PRF security game for dPRF′.
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B3 then initializes A on input pk ← (pk1, pk2), challenge ciphertext c? ← (c?1, c?2) and
challenge key K? ← F(y?b′ , c?).
Queries of A on the challenge ciphertext are immediately rejected by returning ⊥. Each
decapsulation query for c′ = (c′1, c′2) with c′2 6= c?2 is answered with the help of sk1 and sk2
by first decapsulating the ciphertexts to K ′1 and K ′2, respectively, and then computing the
final key as F(dPRF(K ′1,K ′2), c′).
If A queries a ciphertext c′ = (c′1, c?2), then B3 first decapsulates c′1 to K ′1. If K ′1 = K1, B3
returns F(y?b′ , c′). Otherwise, B3 queries its oracle on K ′1 to receive the answer y which
is either dPRF′(K,K ′1) = dPRF(K ′1,K) in case b′ = 0 or a uniformly random element
computed as g(K ′1) if b′ = 1. Then, the answer for A is computed as F(y, c′).
At some point, A terminates with output bit bguess. B3 outputs the same guess.
Observe that if B3 receives the real value, i.e., if b′ = 0, then K? ← F(dPRF(K1,K), c?)
for random K and the situation is as in Game1(λ) since K is distributed as K˜2. If on the
other hand B3 receives y?b′ ← g(K1), i.e., if b′ = 1, then K? ← F(y?b′ , c?) is distributed as
in Game2(λ).
Hence, if A is able to efficiently distinguish the two games, B3 can win the PRF game
against dPRF′ and thus the dual-PRF game against dPRF with non-negligible advantage.
For K1 being secure and K2 insecure, the argument is analogous, as dPRF is a dual PRF,
i.e., dPRF(K, ·) is also a pseudorandom function.
We have:
AdvG1K,A(λ) ≤ AdvG2K,A(λ) + 2 · AdvR
cT-dprf-sec
dPRF,B3 (λ).
Game3(λ): In the last step, we replace the value F(K˜ ′, c?) by a uniformly random value K˜ $←− K .
Note, that there is no change in the description of the decapsulation oracle.
We argue that any efficient distinguisher A between Game2(λ) and Game3(λ) immediately
yields an efficient adversary B4 against the pseudorandomness of F:
The reduction B4 first generates key pairs (pk1, sk1), (pk2, sk2) and then the challenge
ciphertext parts c?1 and c?2 via Encaps1(pk1) and Encaps2(pk2), respectively. It then queries
its oracle OPRF on c? ← (c?1, c?2) and receives some element y?b′ as output which is either
F (K, c?) for random K ← K ′ chosen by its challenger (b′ = 0), or a uniformly random
element from K computed as some g(c?) (b′ = 1). Let pk ← (pk1, pk2) and c? ← (c?1, c?2).
B4 then initializes A on input (pk, c?,K?), where K? ← y?b′ .
Decapsulation queries by A of the form c = c? are immediately answered with ⊥. Whenever
A asks a decapsulation query of the form (c1, c2), where c1 6= c?1 and c2 6= c?2, B4 simply
decapsulates with the help of its secret keys sk1 and sk2 and returns the same answer as
the real decapsulation oracle.
For queries of the form c′ = (c′1, c?2), B4 decapsulates c′1 using via K ′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c′1). If
K ′1 6= K1, B4 uses dPRF(K ′1, K˜2) to compute the answer F(dPRF(K ′1, K˜2), c′). Otherwise,
i.e., if Decaps1(sk1, c′1) = K1, B4 queries its oracle on c′ to receive either F (K, c′) in case
b′ = 0 or g(c′) if b′ = 1 and forwards this to the adversary.
At some point, A terminates and outputs a guess bit bguess. B4 then outputs the same
guess bit.
We see that if b′ = 0, B4 faithfully simulates Game2(λ) and if b′ = 1, B4 simulates
Game3(λ). Thus, if A can distinguish between the two games, B4 also wins its PRF game
with non-negligible advantage.
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We have:
AdvG2K,A(λ) ≤ AdvG3K,A(λ) + 2 · AdvR
cT-prf-sec
F,B4 (λ).
The analogous argument applies when K1 is secure.
To conclude the proof, we note that in Game3(λ) neither the challenge ciphertext and challenge
key nor the decapsulation oracle depend on the secret bit b. Thus, the adversary can do no
better than guessing and we have
AdvG3K,A(λ) ≤ 0
which yields the final bound and shows that K = dualPRF[K1,K2, dPRF,F] is a hybrid KEM
that achieves RcT-IND-CCA security.
5.3.4 N: Nested Dual-PRF Combiner
In a different approach, the hybrid TLS 1.3 draft by Schank and Stebila [SS17] extends the key
schedule by an additional extraction to accommodate the second key share (cf. Figure 5.10).
The main structure of extraction followed by expansion is however the same in both proposals.
Combiner description. We can thus simply revise the dualPRF combiner from the previous
section with a further preprocessing step for the key K1 such that we get an intermediate key
ke
$←− Ext(0,K1), where Ext is a PRF modeling the extraction step of HKDF. We refer to this
combiner as the nested dual-PRF combiner N and it is depicted in Figure 5.15.
KGenN(1λ):
1 (pk1, sk1) $←− KGen1(1λ)
2 (pk2, sk2) $←− KGen2(1λ)
3 pk ← (pk1, pk2)
4 sk ← (sk1, sk2)
5 return (pk, sk)
EncapsN(pk):
6 (c1,K1) $←− Encaps1(pk1)
7 (c2,K2) $←− Encaps2(pk2)
8 c = (c1, c2)
9 ke = Ext(0,K1)
10 kd = dPRF(ke,K2)
11 K = F(kd, c)
12 return (c,K)
DecapsN(sk, c):
13 K′1 ← Decaps1(sk1, c1)
14 K′2 ← Decaps2(sk2, c2)
15 k′e = Ext(0,K′1)
16 k′d = dPRF(k′e,K′2)
17 return F(k′d, (c1, c2))
Figure 5.15: Hybrid KEM constructed by the nested dual-PRF combiner N[K1,K2,Ext, dPRF,F].
Security of the nested dual-PRF combiner. We confirm that the nested dual-PRF
combiner N is indeed a robust KEM combiner in our desired sense:
Theorem 5.14 (Nested dual-PRF is robust). Let K1 be an XcZ-IND-ATK-secure KEM or K2
be a UcW-IND-ATK-secure KEM. Set RcT = max{XcZ,UcW}. Then let dPRF : K ′×K2 → K ′′
be an RcT-secure dual PRF and F : K ′′ × {0, 1}? → K and Ext : {0, 1}∗ × K1 → K ′ be
RcT-secure PRFs. Then the nested dual-PRF combiner K = N[K1,K2,Ext, dPRF,F] as defined
in Figure 5.15 is RcT-IND-ATK secure.
More precisely, for any QPT adversary A of type RcT against the combined KEM K =
N[K1,K2,Ext, dPRF,F], we derive efficient adversaries B1, B2, . . . , B5 such that
AdvRcT-ind-atkK,A (λ) ≤ 2 ·
(
min
{
AdvRcT-ind-atkK2,B1 (λ),Adv
RcT-ind-atk
K1,B2 (λ)
}
+ AdvR
cT-prf-sec
Ext,B3 (λ) + Adv
RcT-dprf-sec
dPRF,B4 (λ) + Adv
RcT-dprf-sec
F,B5 (λ)
)
.
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Proof. The proof proceeds as for the dualPRF combiner (Thm. 5.13), except that there is an
additional step in which we replace the output of Ext(0,K1) by a uniformly random string. As
done before, we argue that an adversary cannot detect such a change, as otherwise this would
immediately imply an efficient adversary against the pseudorandomness of Ext. The proof then
proceeds as for the dualPRF combiner.
5.4 Modeling Hybrid Authenticated Key Exchange
The rest of this chapter deals with the question of how to build authenticated key exchange
from hybrid key encapsulation mechanisms. After introducing the relevant security definitions
in this section, in Section 5.5 we present a generic compiler that uses a hybrid key encapsulation
mechanism alongside SigMA-style authentication [Kra03]. This is a well-known compiler to build
authenticated key exchange from an unauthenticated key agreement protocol. It is for example
used in the design of TLS 1.3 [Res18] and the Internet Key Exchange protocol [KHN+14].
5.4.1 Two-stage Bellare–Rogaway Security Definitions
The model we use for hybrid authenticated key exchange is based on the Bellare–Rogaway
model as introduced in Chapter 4.2. Recall that the goal of the adversary is to distinguish
session keys in so-called fresh sessions of its choice from random. The adversary interacts with
honest participants in the authenticated key exchange protocol executions via oracle queries
which allow the adversary to fully control all network communications. Additionally, these
queries enable the adversary to learn long-term secret values of participants and session keys.
We adjust the Bellare–Rogaway model to accommodate two-stage adversaries in order to allow
for a security analysis with respect to adversaries of different quantum capabilities. As before,
we only allow adversaries that are at most post-quantum, i.e., whose interaction with parties is
through classical oracle queries.
The following two definitions transfer the properties of BR-Match security and BR key secrecy
to the two-stage setting. As for the other two-stage security definitions, the first stage adversary
is actively interacting with the protocol, whereas the second stage adversary only has access to
oracle queries that are not tied to the execution of the protocol, i.e., it may for example still
learn secret key values.
Definition 5.15 (Two-stage BR-Match security). Let KE be an authenticated key exchange
protocol and A = (A1,A2) be a QPT two-stage adversary of type XcZ interacting with KE via
the queries defined in Section 4.2.1 in the following game GX
cZ-BR-Match,D
KE,A (λ):
Setup. The challenger generates long-term public/secret-key pairs for each participant U ∈ U .
Query Phase 1. The adversary A1 receives the generated public keys and has access to the
queries NewSession, Send, Reveal, Corrupt, and Test.
Stage Change. The adversary A1 passes some state st to the second stage adversary A2 and
terminates.
Query Phase 2. A2 may now perform local computations on state st and only has access to
queries Reveal and Corrupt.
Stop. At some point, the adversary A2 stops with no output.
We say that A wins the game GXcZ-BR-Match,DKE,A (λ) if at least one of the following conditions
holds:
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1. Different session keys in partnered sessions:
There exist two distinct sessions pi and pi′ with pi.sid = pi′.sid 6= ⊥, and pi.stexec, pi′.stexec 6=
rejected, but pi.K 6= pi′.K.
2. Different intended partner in partnered sessions:
There exist two sessions pi := pikU,V and pi′ := pik
′
V ′,U ′ such that pi.sid = pi′.sid 6= ⊥ ,
pi.role = initiator, and pi′.role = responder, but U 6= U ′ or V 6= V ′.
3. More than two sessions share the same session identifier:
There exist at least three sessions pi, pi′, and pi′′ such that pi, pi′, pi′′ are pairwise distinct,
but pi.sid = pi′.sid′ = pi′′.sid 6= ⊥.
We say KE is XcZ-BR-Match secure or simply two-stage BR-Match secure if for all QPT
XcZ adversaries A the advantage function
AdvXcZ-BR-MatchKE,A (λ) := Pr
[
GX
cZ-BR-Match,D
KE,A (λ) = 1
]
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Definition 5.16 (Two-stage BR key secrecy). Let KE be a key exchange protocol with key
distribution D. Let A = (A1,A2) be a QPT adversary of type XcZ interacting with KE via the
queries defined in Section 4.2.1 in the following game GX
cZ-BR,D
KE,A (λ):
Setup. The challenger generates long-term public/secret-key pairs for each participant U ∈ U ,
chooses the test bit btest $←− {0, 1} at random, and sets lost← false.
Query Phase 1. Adversary A1 receives the generated public keys and may query NewSession,
Send, Reveal, Corrupt, and Test.
Stage Change. At some point, A1 terminates and outputs some state st to be passed to the
second stage adversary A2.
Query Phase 2. A2 may now perform local computations on state st, but may query only
Reveal and Corrupt.
Guess. At some point, A2 terminates and outputs a guess bit bguess.
Finalize. The challenger sets lost← true if the following condition holds.
Adversary has tested and revealed the key in a single session or in two partnered sessions:
There exist two (not necessarily distinct) sessions pi, pi′ such that pi.sid = pi′.sid, pi.stkey =
revealed, and pi′.tested = true.
A wins the game if bguess = btest and lost = false. We say KE provides XcZ-BR key secrecy
(with/without forward secrecy) if for all QPT XcZ adversaries A the advantage function
AdvX
cZ-BR,D
KE,A (λ) :=
∣∣∣Pr [GXcZ-BR,DKE,A (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣
is negligible in the security parameter.
Finally, these two notions constitute what it means for a key exchange protocol to be
two-stage BR secure:
Definition 5.17 (Two-stage BR security). We say a key exchange protocol KE is XcZ-BR secure
(with/without forward secrecy) if KE provides BR-Match security (Def. 5.15) and XcZ-BR key
secrecy (with/without forward secrecy) (Def. 5.16).
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Implications between two-stage BR notions
Similarly to the two-stage security notions of indistinguishability for KEMs, the following
implications hold for two-stage BR security.
Proposition 5.18 (QcQ-BR =⇒ CcQ-BR =⇒ CcC-BR). Let KE be an authenticated key
exchange protocol. If KE is QcQ-BR secure, then KE is also CcQ-BR secure. If KE is CcQ-BR
secure, then it is also CcC-BR secure.
Proof. Let A = (A1,A2) be a two-stage adversary. The proof is straightforward since every
classical adversary can be seen as a quantum adversary that forgoes its additional quantum
power. It thus holds that AdvQcQ-BRKE,A (λ) ≥ AdvC
cQ-BR
KE,A (λ) ≥ AdvC
cC-BR
KE,A (λ).
Separations between two-stage BR notions
We give separations based on the compiler CSigMA that we will prove secure in the next section.
The full proofs of the security are very much like the proof given in that section for the generic
construction, thus we only give a proof sketch here, highlighting the relevant points.
Theorem 5.19 (CcC-BR 6=⇒ CcQ-BR 6=⇒ QcQ-BR). There exists an authenticated key
exchange protocol KE′ that is CcC-BR secure but not CcQ-BR secure. Furthermore, there exists
an authenticated key exchange protocol KE′′ that is CcQ-BR secure but not QcQ-BR secure.
Proof Sketch. We show both separations separately and focus on the case of BR key secrecy.
CcC-BR key secrecy 6=⇒ CcQ-BR key secrecy. Consider the Diffie–Hellman KEM depicted in
Figure 5.16. It is well known that KE′ = CSigMA[K,S,M,KDF] with DH key agreement K
and secure signatures and MACs is a classically BR-secure protocol. However, a CcQ-BR
adversary can extract the secret key K = gxy from the transcript by using its local
quantum power to break the discrete logarithm of, e.g., either pk = gx or c = gy, hence
trivially breaking key secrecy.
KGen(1λ):
1 x $←− Zq
2 pk ← gx
3 sk ← x
4 return (pk, sk)
Encaps(pk):
5 y $←− Zq
6 c← gy
7 K ← pky
8 return (c,K)
Decaps(sk, c):
9 K′ ← csk
10 return K′
Figure 5.16: Diffie-Hellman KEM K = (KGen,Encaps,Decaps).
CcQ-BR key secrecy 6=⇒ QcQ-BR key secrecy. LetK = (KGen,Encaps,Decaps) be a Q-IND-CPA-
secure KEM, let S be an CcC-unforgeable signature scheme, M be a CcC-unforgeable
message authentication scheme and KDF be a CcQ-secure key derivation function modeled
as a PRF.
Theorem 5.21 establishes that the compiler KE′′ = CSigMA[K,S,M,KDF] achieves CcQ-BR
security, and in particular key secrecy. However we see that the compiler CSigMA does
not achieve QcQ-BR key secrecy. A locally quantum adversary A1 in the first stage can
for example forge signatures in Game3(λ) of the proof. Thus, in the end, the correct
identification of the associated session can no longer be guaranteed. This enables the
adversary to ask a Reveal query on this session and hence trivially break key secrecy.
52
5.5. A Generic Compiler for Hybrid AKE
5.4.2 Further two-stage definitions
The compiler for the hybrid AKE that will be presented in the next Section 5.5 makes use of
signatures and message authentication codes. In the following we give the security definitions of
these primitives for two-stage adversaries.
Definition 5.20 (Two-stage EUF-CMA security of signatures). Let S = (KGen,Sign,Vfy) be a
signature scheme and let A = (A1,A2) be a two-stage QPT XcZ adversary interacting with S in
the Game GXcZ-euf-cmaS,A given in Figure 5.17.
We say that S is XyZ-euf-cma-secure if for any QPT XcZ adversary A the advantage function
AdvXcZ-euf-cmaS,A (λ) := Pr
[
GXcZ-euf-cmaS,A (λ) = 1
]
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
GXcZ-euf-cmaS,A (λ):
1 LOSign ← ∅
2 (pk, sk) $←− KGen(1λ)
3 (st) $←− AOSign1 (pk)
4 (σ′,m′) $←− A2(st)
5 return JVfy(pk, σ′,m′) ∧m′ 6∈ LOSignK
OSign(m):
6 LOSign ← LOSign ∪ {m}
7 return Sign(sk,m)
Figure 5.17: Existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks of S = (KGen,Sign,Vfy) with
respect to two-stage adversaries A = (A1,A2).
Existential unforgeability under chosen-message attack of a message authentication scheme
M = (KGen,MAC,Vfy) is defined analogously to Definition 5.20.
5.5 A Generic Compiler for Hybrid AKE
We are now ready to answer the question of how to achieve hybrid authenticated key exchange
from hybrid key encapsulation mechanisms in the two-stage adversary setting. There exists a
vast body of literature on compilers for authenticated key exchange [BCK98, KY07, BCGP08,
JKSS12, LSY+14, dSGSW17]. We opt for the approach of building hybrid AKE from a hybrid
key encapsulation mechanism combined with SigMA-style authentication [Kra03]. The compiled
protocol, denoted by CSigMA is depicted in Figure 5.18. It takes as input an IND-CPA-secure
(hybrid) KEM K, a signature scheme S, a message authentication schemeM—both existentially
unforgeable under chosen-message attacks— and a secure key derivation function KDF modeled
as a PRF.
Compiler description. Informally, the compiled protocol proceeds as follows:
First, Alice and Bob execute the hybrid KEM to achieve key agreement on a shared key value
K. They each retain their local view of the previous communication, the transcript t, and use
the shared value K to derive the final session key as well as a MAC key Kmac.
In the next phase, Alice and Bob authenticate each other. Alice goes first in sampling a
nonce rA and sending it to Bob. Bob also samples his nonce rB and uses his long-term signing
key skB to issue a signature σB over the transcript t of the key exchange, as well as the nonces
rA and rB. To indicate, that Bob has the role of responder in this key exchange, Bob will also
include the designated label "0" within the signature.
Furthermore, Bob authenticates his identity B by computing a message authentication tag
τb as MAC(Kmac, "0"||B). He then sends his response B, rB, σB, τb to Alice. Alice verifies both
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Alice Bob
identity A identity B
long-term signing keys long-term signing keys
(pkA, skA) (pkB, skB)
(epkA, eskA) $←− KGen(1λ)
epkA
(c,K) $←− Encaps(epkA)
c
K ← Decaps(eskA, c)
Output of K: shared key K, transcript t = (epkA, c)
Kmac ← KDF(K, "MAC"||t)
rA
$←− {0, 1}|nonce| rA
rB
$←− {0, 1}|nonce|
σB ← Sign(skB, "0"||t||rA||rB)
τB ← MAC(Kmac, "0"||B)
B, rB, σB, τB
abort if S.Vfy(pkB, σB, "0"||t||rA||rB) = 0
or ifM.Vfy(Kmac, τB, "0"||B) = 0
σA ← Sign(skA, "1"||t||rA||rB)
τA ← MAC(Kmac, "1"||A)
A, σA, τA
abort if S.Vfy(pkA, σA, "1"||t||rA||rB) = 0
or ifM.Vfy(Kmac, τA, "1"||A) = 0
K = KDF(K, "KE"||(t, rA, rB, A,B)), sid = (t, rA, rB, A,B)
Figure 5.18: Compiled protocol CSigMA building AKE from KEMs, signatures, and MACs.
the signature and the MAC she received from Bob and aborts if either is invalid. Analogously
to Bob, she then computes her signature σA and tag τA and sends them, along with her identity
A, to Bob. Alice then accepts after deriving the final session key.
Finally, Bob verifies the received signature and MAC from Alice and aborts if either is
invalid. If the verifications are successful, Bob derives the final session key and accepts.
Security analysis. We now show that the compiled protocol CSigMA achieves two-stage BR
security (cf. Definition 4.3).
One would generally assume that the “weakest” primitive determines the overall security of
the compiled protocol. However, as it turns out this intuition is not quite correct. Naturally,
in case either the unauthenticated key agreement K or the key derivation function KDF are
only classically secure, we cannot expect more than classical CcC-BR security of the compiled
protocol. Similarly, post-quantum QcQ-BR security can only be achieved if all components
of the protocol provide this level of security. Interestingly though, for the compiled protocol
to guarantee security against future-quantum adversaries (CcQ-BR security) it suffices for the
signature and MAC scheme to be classically secure when combined with Q-IND-CPA-secure key
encapsulation and at least CcQ-secure key derivation. This is due to the fact that, in the proof
of the main theorem (Thm. 5.21) the signatures and message authentication codes of the test
session pi? and its potential partner pi?a must be received while the first stage adversary, which
is classical, is present. As soon as the stage change occurs, the adversary loses the power to
interfere with still ongoing sessions and message transmissions via the then withdrawn Send
54
5.5. A Generic Compiler for Hybrid AKE
oracle.
Theorem 5.21. Let K be an R-IND-CPA-secure key encapsulation mechanism, S be an ScT-
unforgeable signature scheme, M be a UcV-unforgeable message authentication scheme, and
KDF be a WcX-secure key derivation function with output key space D modeled as a PRF. Then
the compiled protocol CSigMA is YcZ-BR secure with forward secrecy, where
- YcZ = CcC, if either the key encapsulation mechanism K or the key derivation function
KDF are only classically secure, i.e., if either R = C or WcX = CcC.
- YcZ = CcQ, if the employed signature and MAC scheme are at least classically secure, i.e.,
if ScT,UcV ∈ {CcC,CcQ} (and R = Q, WcX ≥ CcQ).
- YcZ = QcQ, if all components are resistant against post-quantum adversaries, i.e., ScT =
UcV = WcX = QcQ (and R = Q).
More precisely, for any efficient QPT adversary A of type YcZ there exist efficient adversaries
B1,B2,B3, and B4 such that
AdvYcZ-BRCSigMA,A(λ) ≤ n2s · 2|nonce| + ns ·
(
nu · AdvScT-euf-cmaS,B1 (λ)
+ ns ·
(
2 · AdvR-ind-cpaK,B2 (λ) + 2 · Adv
WcX-prf-sec
KDF,B3 (λ) + Adv
UcV-euf-cma
M,B4 (λ)
))
,
where ns denotes the maximum number of sessions, |nonce| is the bit-length of the nonces rA
and rB, and nu the maximum number of participants.
To prove Theorem 5.21, we show the required properties, BR-Match security and YcZ-BR
key secrecy, separately.
Proof of Match security. Let t be the transcript of the key encapsulation mechanism K
between parties A and B. Recall that the session identifier sid is set to be sid← (t, rA, rB, A,B)
which consists of public information only. We argue that A cannot achieve any of the three
winning conditions defined in Def. 5.15 with non-negligible probability:
Ad 1. Partnered sessions agree on the session identifier sid, which fixes the transcript t and
hence also the input value K to the key derivation function. Consequently, partnered
sessions derive the same session keys.
Ad 2. The session identifiers contain the partner identities, thus agreement on the session
identifiers implies agreement on the partner identity, excluding the possibility of different
intended partners.
Ad 3. For more than two honest sessions to share a session identifier, a third honest session
must share a colliding transcript t with the initial two sessions and must have a collision in
either of the (randomly chosen) nonces rA or rB (depending on whether the third session
is initiator or responder). It is easy to see that this occurs only with negligible probability.
Proof of key secrecy. For the proof we again apply the game hopping technique where we
bound the respective difference in the adversary’s advantages until the adversary cannot win
anymore.
Game0(λ): The original two-stage BR key secrecy game GY
cZ-BR,D
CSigMA,A (λ).
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Game1(λ): We start by aborting the game if two sessions of honest parties generate the same
nonce rA or rB. Let ns denote the maximum number of sessions and |nonce| the length of
the nonces. Since there are ns possible pairs of sessions randomly selecting nonces, the
probability of an abort for this reason is upper-bounded by n2s · 2−|nonce|. Hence we have
AdvG0CSigMA,A(λ) ≤ n2s · 2−|nonce| + Adv
G1
CSigMA,A(λ).
Game2(λ): For simplicity of the argument it is beneficial to restrict the adversary to a single
Test query only. This can be done via a standard hybrid argument, guessing the tested
session in the beginning, and using the Reveal queries resp. random keys to answer other
Test queries. Since session partnering can be checked publicly due to the public session
identifiers, we can also answer consistently in such simulated Test queries. Note also that
the adversary always has access to the Reveal oracle in the second stage, even if the other
queries are prohibited. This strategy reduces the adversary A’s advantage by a factor of
at most 1ns . We thus have that
AdvG1CSigMA,A(λ) ≤ ns · Adv
G2
CSigMA,A(λ).
From now on, the test session is known in advance and we denote it by pi?. Notice that,
in order for the adversary to win, pi? has received all incoming messages and must have
accepted before the stage change of A occurred.
Game3(λ): We abort the game if the test session pi? run by party U ∈ {A,B} receives a
signature σV on ("b"||t||rA||rB) that verifies correctly but has not been signed by some
honest party V at this point. Note that this signature must have been received prior
to any stage change of the adversary since the second stage of the adversary does not
have access to Test. Furthermore, recall that the concerned participants, and thus their
long-term secrets, may not be corrupted before the tested session has accepted. In case of
a corruption of one of the involved parties after acceptance, forward secrecy is achieved
since this does not interfere with the honest generation of the signature σV received by
session pi? in this game hop.
The probability of an abort happening for this reason can be upper-bounded by the success
probability of a reduction B1 against the ScT-euf-cma security of the signature scheme S.
The reduction B1 obtains some public key pk? as its challenge and proceeds by guessing
the party V under whose identity the forgery received by pi? is issued. B1 generates all key
exchange parameters as specified, except for setting pkV ← pk?. The signing operations
by V are performed by relaying the queries to the signature oracle, any other action can
be carried out by B1 itself. If at some point the tested session pi? accepts a signature for a
previously unsigned message, then B1 outputs this message-signature pair as a forgery.
Since the correctly validated signature has not been created by an honest party before,
party V cannot have signed ("b"||t||rA||rB) with "b" ∈ {0, 1} in the past. At most it could
have signed ("b′"||t||rA||rB) for b′ = 1 − b. With probability 1nu , where nu is the total
number of users, our reduction correctly anticipates the party V , and thus
AdvG2CSigMA,A(λ) ≤ Adv
G3
CSigMA,A(λ) + nu · AdvS
cT-euf-cma
S,B1 (λ).
Game4(λ): Next, we guess the honest session pi?a of party V that has issued the valid signature
σV obtained by pi? in Game3(λ) and abort if our guess was wrong. Due to the previous
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game hop such a session must exist. Furthermore it is unique since there is no collision
among the nonces due to Game1(λ). Note that the session pi?a is not necessarily partnered
with the test session pi?, since it need not have accepted yet. We therefore refer to this
session as associated.
This game hop reduces the adversary’s advantage by a factor of at most 1ns . Thus, we have
AdvG3CSigMA,A(λ) ≤ ns · Adv
G4
CSigMA,A(λ).
Game5(λ): We now replace the encapsulated value K in both the test session and its associated
session by a uniformly random value K˜ of the same length, after the KEM phase and
before the parties compute the MAC key. Both parties use the key K˜ instead for the
subsequent computations.
If A were able to efficiently distinguish Game4(λ) and Game5(λ), then this implies an
efficient adversary B2 against the R-ind-cpa security of K. The reduction B2 simulates the
environment for A as follows:
Initially, B2 receives as challenge a public key epk? and a corresponding challenge ciphertext
c? along with the challenge key K?b′ .
In order to initialize A, the reduction B2 generates all key exchange parameters as specified.
B2 can initiate any new sessions that A establishes via NewSession and can answers all
Corrupt queries with the appropriate long-term secret key.
B2 further simulates all Send queries. For Send queries on pi? and pi?a , the adversary B2
uses (epk?, c?) as transcript t for the key encapsulation, creates signatures with the correct
signing key of the parties, and computes tags with Kmac ← KDF(K?b′ , "MAC"||t).
For all but the predicted sessions pi? and pi?a , algorithm B2 simulates any Reveal query
straightforwardly by itself. For the session pi?a , if it has already accepted, algorithm B2
derives the session key by using K?b′ as the allegedly encapsulated key from the KEM
phase. Note that, at this point, we have not yet shown that the associated session pi?a is
partnered with the test session, such that the adversary could Reveal that session without
violating freshness.
Once A queries Test query on pi?, algorithm B2 simulates the Test by providing Ktest ←
KDF(K?b′ , "KE"||(t, rA, rB, A,B)) to A. Note that depending on the nature of K?b′ the
environment for A then corresponds to either Game4(λ) if b′ = 0 or Game5(λ) if b′ = 1.
At some point, A terminates and outputs some bguess. The reduction B2 outputs the same
bguess. It is easy to see that if A can win its game with non-negligible probability, so can
B2. Hence,
AdvG4CSigMA,A(λ) ≤ Adv
G5
CSigMA,A(λ) + 2 · Adv
R-ind-cpa
K,B2 (λ).
Game6(λ): We now replace the session key K and the MAC key Kmac by uniformly random
values K˜ and K˜mac from D in the test session pi? as well as the associated session pi?a .
We argue that an adversary A that can efficiently distinguish Game5(λ) from Game6(λ)
yields an efficient adversary B3 against the pseudorandomness of KDF.
The reduction B3 generates all key exchange parameters and long-term keys itself and
initializes A. This means in particular, that B3 can answer all NewSession, Corrupt and
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Reveal queries (assuming A does not query Reveal on pi? and pi?a wlog as this would result
in a trivial loss for A.)
Similarly, B3 can faithfully execute all Send queries. For pi? and pi?a when the MAC tags
are computed, B3 queries its oracle OPRF in the pseudorandomness game on "MAC"||t
where t is the appropriate transcript. The response Kb′ by the oracle is then either
KDF(K, "MAC"||t) if b′ = 0 for some key K that was chosen at the beginning of the
pseudorandomness game or g("MAC"||t) for some random function g if b′ = 1. The
reduction then uses Kb′ as MAC key in pi? and pi?a . Note again that signatures can be
faithfully simulated by the reduction since it has generated the long-term keys of the
participants.
Once A asks a Test query, B3 queries "KE"||(t, rA, rB, A,B) to OPRF to receive Kb′ which is
either KDF(K, "KE"||(t, rA, rB, A,B)) if b′ = 0 or g("KE"||(t, rA, rB, A,B)) if b′ = 1. The
reduction returns Kb′ as Ktest to A.
At some point, A terminates with output bguess which B3 also uses as its output.
Observe that B3 perfectly simulates Game5(λ) if b′ = 0 and Game6(λ) if b′ = 1. Thus, if
A can distinguish the two games, B3 can win the pseudorandomness game against KDF
and we have
AdvG5CSigMA,A(λ) ≤ Adv
G6
CSigMA,A(λ) + 2 · Adv
WcX-prf-sec
KDF,B3 (λ).
Game7(λ): Next, we abort the game if the associated session pi?a accepts with a different session
identifier than the test session, i.e., if pi?a .sid 6= pi?.sid 6= ⊥. Since, at this point, all entries
in the session identifier are set except for the partner identity, this can only happen if
the adversary can cause pi?a to accept a signature σW and MAC τW for some identity
W 6= U . The adversary may indeed sign under an identifier of a previously corrupted
party W . However, to succeed A still needs to forge the corresponding tag τW . This tag
depends on the MAC key which is derived from the secret value K shared between parties
U and V . Similar to Game3, the probability of an abort happening in this game can be
upper-bounded by the success probability of an adversary B4 against the UcV-euf-cma
security of the MAC schemeM. Hence, we have
AdvG6CSigMA,A(λ) ≤ Adv
G7
CSigMA,A(λ) + Adv
UcV-euf-cma
M,B4 (λ).
To conclude the proof, observe that the adversary expects the challenge value Ktest to be a
uniformly random string for btest = 0 or to be the output of the key derivation function applied
to the output of the key encapsulation mechanism K. These two cases cannot be distinguished
by A since both keys are drawn independently and uniformly at random from the key space.
Hence, the adversary cannot gain any information about the test bit btest and can do no better
than to guess. We thus arrive at the final bound
AdvG7CSigMA,A(λ) ≤ 0.
We saw that hybrid key exchange protocols are well-suited to safely transition to post-
quantum algorithms, accounting for the case that either of the deployed algorithms may fail.
Security guarantees are established for past, ongoing, and future session. In the next chapter, we
answer the question which security guarantees can be achieved for standard key exchanges when
a cryptographic primitive or hardness assumption fails. As far as intuition goes, if no hybrid
techniques have been employed, we will only be able to make statements about sessions that
have been established before such a breakdown occurred. However, we will see that the model
can be extended to also capture the case of hybrid key exchanges as treated in this chapter.
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Modern designs of cryptographic protocols are amenable to security analyses which reduce the
security of the protocol to the security of the employed cryptographic primitives. The security
guarantees for the protocol are thus ultimately tied to the security of each individual primitive:
with only one of the primitives broken, all bets are usually off. However, the actual security
guarantees that remain vary with the protocol under consideration.
Key exchange protocols in particular often rely on a significant number of cryptographic
primitives and hardness assumptions. For example, the simple AKE construction presented
in Section 5.5 relies on the security of the key encapsulation mechanism, unforgeability of
both the MAC and signature scheme, and the security of the key derivation function. Further
common assumptions for key exchange protocols are the collision resistance of hash functions
or cryptographic assumptions such as decisional or computational Diffie-Hellman problems
(DDH,CDH) or the interactive PRF-ODH assumption.
Yet, not all of the primitives and hardness assumptions contribute equally to the protocol’s
overall security at every point in time. While in general it is indeed expected that future sessions
are vulnerable once the security of a component in a key exchange is broken, the question is:
what can we say about the secrecy of sessions established prior to that breakdown? For the
special case of hybrid protocols that were introduced in the last chapter, we even expect positive
answers for ongoing and future sessions in the presence of certain breakdowns. We will see
shortly that the notions of forward secrecy [Gün90, DVOW92, CK01] and post-compromise
security [CCG16] answer these questions only partially. A comprehensive notion of security
against breakdowns of arbitrary (keyed and unkeyed) primitives and cryptographic hardness
assumptions has been lacking so far.
This is despite the fact that examples for failures of actively deployed primitives and
hardness assumptions abound: they range from weak ciphers like RC4 [GMPS14, ABP+13] and
OCB2 [IIMP19], over poor Diffie–Hellman parameter choices [ABD+15], to advances in breaking
(still) widely deployed hash functions like MD5 [dB94, WY05, SLdW07] or SHA-1 [WYY05,
Ste13, SKP16, SBK+17]. These vulnerabilities can in particular enable key-exchange-level
attacks. For example, Bhargavan and Leurent [BL16] showed that in many key exchanges,
the employed hash functions must actually be collision resistant and not—as often argued by
practitioners—only second-preimage resistant. Their SLOTH 5 attacks on TLS showed that if
there exist efficient collision-finding algorithms, then credential-forwarding, impersonation, and
downgrade attacks are possible.
5Short for: security losses from obsolete and truncated transcript hashes
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Our Contributions
There is hence a need for a generic formal tool to identify the security assurances of key
exchange protocols in case some arbitrary underlying primitives or hardness assumptions
break. In this chapter, we introduce a novel security notion called breakdown resilience, that
models Bellare–Rogaway-style key exchange security under the breakdown of cryptographic
primitives and hardness assumptions. A stronger version of our model captures the impact
of cryptographic breakdowns on ongoing and future sessions. While key exchange protocols
in general guarantee no security in this setting, for special designs such as hybrid protocols,
this notion becomes meaningful. We finally exercise our models by studying the breakdown
resilience of practice-inspired protocol designs. In more detail our contributions are as follows:
• In Section 6.2, we propose a formal security model for authenticated key exchange that
is able to provide a formal ground for analyses capturing primitive breakdowns. The
resulting notions are termed (strong) breakdown resilience. We formalize breakdowns via
an additional Break oracle provided to the adversary beyond the classical oracles given in
a Bellare–Rogaway-style key exchange model.
We further concretely describe the behavior of the Break oracle for a number of crypto-
graphic primitives and assumptions that are commonly employed in key exchange protocols.
In our presentation we opt for the conservative choice of considering strong break capabili-
ties, thus making the adversary more powerful and providing stronger security guarantees
of resistant protocols. We note however, that the model can generically handle other
choices for consequences of breakdowns.
• In Section 6.3, we then exercise our model on an authenticated variant of the NewHope
protocol. NewHope is a post-quantum key exchange protocol proposed by Alkim et
al. [ADPS16b] which has also been submitted (in a different variant [AAB+19]) to the
NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization process. Using our new formalism,
we confirm the intuition that, in particular, signature and MAC breakdowns do not
compromise the security of prior completed sessions if the key agreement and derivation
itself remains secure.
• In Section 6.4, we consider a hybrid AKE scheme based on the dualPRF KEM combiner
proposed in Section 5.3. We leverage the formalism of strong breakdown resilience to
directly show the hybrid property of this AKE construction. We argue that the formalism
of (strong) breakdown resilience for AKE yields results comparable to those in the two-stage
hybrid model presented in Section 5.5 and thus constitutes a viable alternative approach,
especially when considering component failures that were not caused by additional quantum
computing capabilities.
Personal scientific contribution in this chapter. All the material from this chapter,
with the exception of Section 6.4, appeared in the joint work with Marc Fischlin and Felix
Günther called Breakdown Resilience of Key Exchange Protocols: NewHope, TLS 1.3, and
Hybrids [BFG19]. The full version of the paper can be found on ePrint [BFG17]. My main
contributions lie in the development of the security model for (strong) breakdown resilience, as
well as the proof of breakdown resilience for the NewHope protocol variants. The TLS 1.3
analysis in [BFG17, BFG19] was entirely conducted by Felix Günther and will thus be omitted
from this thesis. The result for strong breakdown resilience of the AKE construction based on
KEM combiners in Section 6.4 is a novel contribution and has not appeared elsewhere.
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6.1 Related Work
The idea of breakdown resilience extends, and is inspired by, conceptual ideas of prior work
on the security of both key exchange specifically and cryptographic protocols more broadly.
Yet, our notion of breakdown resilience is novel and unmet by any (combination of) previously
defined security goals, as we discuss in the following.
Forward secrecy. Forward secrecy [Gün90, DVOW92, CK01] as a security property of session
keys derived in a key exchange protocol demands that even if an involved party’s long-term secret
is compromised, any previously derived key remains secure. While this property is closely related
to our scenario, breakdown resilience takes a conceptually distinct approach to forward secrecy
(and also stronger security models allowing ephemeral key reveal such as [CK01, LLM07]): its
focus is on the breakdown of complete primitives or hardness assumptions rather than on the
exposure of specific protocol values in selected sessions. Furthermore, the breakdown-resilience
scenario also covers breaks of both unkeyed cryptographic building blocks (e.g., breaking collision
resistance of hash functions) and complexity-theoretic hardness assumptions.
Post-compromise security. With their notion of post-compromise security, Cohn-Gordon,
Cremers, and Garratt [CCG16] establish security guarantees for communication after participants
have been compromised to various degrees. (Strong) breakdown resilience differs from this
notion in that it does not consider the compromise of single parties but the global breakdown
of cryptographic building blocks on a protocol level. Strong breakdown resilience may be seen
as a generalization of the concept of post-compromise security while our standard notion of
breakdown resilience is concerned with the security of sessions that were completed before a
breakdown occurred.
Bitcoin security in the presence of broken primitives. Giechaskiel, Cremers, and Ras-
mussen [GCR16, GCR18] were the first to systematically explore how broken or weakened hash
functions and/or signature schemes affect the security of Bitcoin. While their study was focused
on Bitcoin, we present a general framework that can be applied to analyze a whole class of
cryptographic protocols, namely AKE protocols, and may very well be transferable in spirit to
other kinds of protocols as well.
Downgrade resilience. A breakdown of a primitive or hardness assumption willingly em-
ployed by both parties conducting a key exchange is conceptually different from a downgrade of a
connection to an insecure cipher suite during the negotiation phase. In the breakdown-resilience
setting we are concerned with the security of past sessions after a breakdown has occurred, while
the notion of downgrade resilience, formally treated by Bhargavan et al. [BBF+16] and Dowling
and Stebila [DS15], assures that weak cipher suites will never be successfully negotiated in case
matching stronger cipher suites are preferred by both participants.
Hybrid key exchange. The proposed model for hybrid key exchange by Bindel et al. [BBF+19]
(see also Chapter 5) is tailored to breakdowns of key encapsulation mechanisms that were caused
specifically by quantum adversaries. Our model for (strong) breakdown resilience offers a general,
alternative approach which captures the breakdown of multiple, arbitrary primitives or hardness
assumptions, irrespective of the cause, thereby gaining more flexibility, while losing the directly
visible implications of varying quantum adversaries on the scheme in question. However, we will
see later in Section 6.4, that the notion of strong breakdown resilience enables an analysis of
hybrid protocols that is comparable to the AKE version in [BBF+19] presented in Chapter 5.5.
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6.2 Modeling Breakdown Resilience
For integrating breakdown resilience into the Bellare–Rogaway security model for authenticated
key exchange, we are interested in the security of completed sessions in the case that cryptographic
primitives or hardness assumptions used in the key exchange protocol break.
To capture resilience against breakdowns, we augment our model with a Break query that
allows the adversary to break the security of cryptographic primitives or hardness assumptions
contained in a dedicated, specified set FBDR. More precisely, this set has the form FBDR =
{(f1, sec-prop1), (f2, sec-prop2), . . . }, i.e., FBDR contains tuples (f, sec-prop), determining all
primitives/hardness assumptions f for which some security property sec-prop may break. As a
result of the Break query, the adversary may—depending on the broken security property of
the primitive or assumption—be given certain key material or access to additional oracles in
the model. To capture that we expect only sessions to remain secure that completed before
the breakdown occurred, we introduce a flag breakdown which is set when Break is called and
checked within the (accordingly modified) Send query.
A note on considered sessions. As mentioned before, for classical key exchange designs
one cannot expect any security guarantees to remain for ongoing and future sessions, as their
security usually depends on the broken primitive. In Section 6.2.3, we will however discuss a
stronger variant of breakdown resilience that is able to capture the security of hybrid designs
that aim to withstand the breakdown of certain building blocks (cf. Chapter 5).
For now, however, we are interested in the question of whether the expected security level is
still achieved in past sessions (Scenarios 1 to 3 in Figure 6.1) and thus exclude sessions that are
still active at the time of breakdown or start after it (Scenarios 4 and 5 in Figure 6.1).
It turns out that not only the status of the tested session is crucial for the security guarantees,
but also that of a potential (unfinished) communication partner, which we previously have referred
to as the associated session. A breakdown of a primitive in the middle of the communication
may enable the adversary to interfere with the correct partnering of sessions, leading to trivial
attacks on the session key in question.
Consider, for example, a test session that has accepted and has output its last message to the
intended partner session, say, to authenticate itself (final-message authentication is very common
in key exchange protocols). An adversary with breakdown capabilities for the authentication
mechanism, e.g., the signature and MAC scheme in the CSigMA compiler can modify this last
message by, e.g., forging a signature and MAC tag for a different identity. This causes the
intended partner to accept with a different session identifier.
Since partnering of sessions was defined via session identifiers, the two sessions are then not
partnered. However, the relevant key material has already been established at this point and
so the unpartnered session may still derive the same final shared key as our test session. The
adversary could hence learn the session key through a Reveal query on the unpartnered session
and trivially distinguish the tested key from random.
We thus need to exclude sessions from being tested that accepted prior to the breakdown
but have a “semi-completed” partner session that, at the time, already holds all the relevant
cryptographic material for the final key derivation (Scenario 3 in Figure 6.1). We use a notion of
contributive identifier (cid) to identify such almost-partnered sessions. Intuitively, contributive
identifiers relate two sessions which exchanged the messages establishing the key material (e.g.,
values gx and gy in a Diffie–Hellman-style protocol), but are not yet partnered (e.g., because
the authenticating signatures have not been sent yet). Identical contributive identifiers thus
indicate that sessions may eventually derive the same key, despite not being partnered yet.
An alternative to using contributive identifiers would be to demand that only sessions that
fully completed before breakdown with an honest partner would be considered valid test sessions
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of (non-)permissible Test queries wrt. a breakdown. The dotted purple line
indicates the point in time of a breakdown. T denotes a test query on session pi?, pi?a denotes a (potential,
if gray) associated session (semi-)partnered with pi? holding the same contributive identifier (cid). A
checkmark 3 (resp. a cross 7) indicates whether the test query is admissible or not.
(as in Scenario 1). This, however, would limit the adversary to purely passive attacks in the
phase before the breakdown. In contrast, our approach with contributive identifiers is less
restrictive, as we still allow the adversary to test completed sessions without an honest partner
(Scenario 2), e.g., where the adversary communicated with that party.
6.2.1 Extensions to the Bellare–Rogaway Model
In the following, we specify the formal extensions made to the basic Bellare–Rogaway-style
security model from Section 4.2. These changes enable us to formalize a model for breakdown
resilience in a generic way. As we will see later, our notion of a Break query is versatile and can
capture a wide variety of breakdowns.
Breakdown flag. We introduce a global flag breakdown (initialized to false) in the security
game, indicating whether the adversary has issued a Break query. This establishes the timing of
the breakdown (cf. the dotted purple line in Figure 6.1).
Contributive identifiers. As briefly touched upon, we augment the model with the concept
of contributive identifiers. These identifiers enable us to specify that we do not expect security
of sessions that, at time of breakdown, had a “semi-partnered” session that shares the same
key material. We thus demand that the tested session accepted prior to the breakdown and
does not share a contributive identifier with another session that was still running at the time
of breakdown. To capture this formally, we add the following variables to those associated with
each session pikU,V :
• cid ∈ {0, 1}? ∪ {⊥} indicates the contributive identifier. The default value is ⊥.
• stbdexec ∈ {running, accepted, rejected,⊥} denotes the state of execution at the time of
breakdown (i.e., when the Break query was issued the first time). The default value prior
to a breakdown is ⊥.
Remark 6.1. We opt to use the formalization of contributive identifiers introduced by Dowling
et al. [DFGS15a] in their analysis of TLS 1.3 candidate handshakes in the multi-stage key
exchange setting. There, contributive identifiers constitute “unfinished” session identifiers,
where not all values have been set yet. The concept of contributive identifiers is related to
the notion of origin-sessions for partnering based on matching conversations introduced by
Cremers and Feltz [CF12] and furthermore the notion of (peer-)exchange variables used by
Bhargavan et al. [BFK+14]. Since we define partnering based on session identifiers, the approach
by [DFGS15a] is however the most natural fit for our setting.
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To avoid trivial choices and to relate the contributive identifiers to session identifiers we add
two requirements for Match security:
• First, as in [DFGS15a], same session identifiers must imply same contributive identifiers,
capturing the intuition that partnered sessions should in particular be contributively
partnered.
• Second, since we restrict the Test query based on common contributive identifiers, we
demand that at most two sessions share the same contributive identifier. This prevents
that Test queries are excluded by trivial choices of colliding contributive identifiers.
Break query. We add a Break query that complements the adversarial queries described in
Section 4.2.1 and allows the adversary to schedule the timing of breakdowns. The query will
set the flag breakdown to true, record the current execution state of sessions, and provide the
adversary with the capability to break the security of any (f, sec-prop) ∈ FBDR, where FBDR is
a fixed parameter of the security game.
Break(): Causes for all (f, sec-prop) ∈ FBDR the breakdown of the security property sec-prop of
the cryptographic primitive or hardness assumption f .
If breakdown = false, for all sessions pi record the current state of execution in the variable
stbdexec, i.e., pi.stbdexec ← pi.stexec. Set breakdown ← true. Depending on the entries in the
set FBDR, provide the adversary with the specified responses and/or oracle accesses (cf.,
e.g. Table 6.1). The Break oracle may be queried repeatedly, which enables the adversary
to obtain an updated response in order to, e.g., receive further key material used in an
encryption scheme since the last call of Break.
Which capability the adversary A is given when breaking the security sec-prop of a primitive
or assumption f depends on the latter’s type and may, e.g., be exposing all key material used
within f to A or granting access to additional oracles. We discuss options for common primitives
and the corresponding behavior of Break later in Section 6.2.4.
Modified Send query. Once the breakdown flag is set to true, ongoing sessions and sessions
that are initiated after the breakdown must be considered revealed as we expect their keys to be
aﬄicted by the breakdown. To enforce this, we replace the Send query from Section 4.2.1 by the
following slightly modified version that sets the session key state to revealed if breakdown = true;
the change is underlined in the following description.
SendBDR(pikU,V ,m): Causes the message m to be sent to the session pikU,V . If there exists no
session pikU,V , the query outputs ⊥. Else the response of the session owner U upon receipt
of message m is returned, and the state of execution stexec is updated. If stexec changes to
accepted with an intended communication partner V that was previously corrupted or if
breakdown = true, then set stkey ← revealed.
6.2.2 Breakdown-resilient Bellare–Rogaway Security Definitions
We are now ready to define the security notion of breakdown resilience (BDR) for an authenticated
key exchange protocol. Extending the Bellare–Rogaway-style model from Section 4.2, we again
divide the security properties into BDR-Match security and BDR key secrecy. Both security
notions differ from the original Bellare–Rogaway-like notions by including the set of primitive
breakdowns FBDR under consideration and the novel Break oracle as well as replacing the
original Send oracle by the modified SendBDR version. The BDR-Match definition furthermore
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reflects that contributive identifiers must coincide in matching sessions but be distinct otherwise;
BDR key secrecy leverages the introduced contributive identifiers to exclude test sessions with
semi-completed partners at the time of breakdown.
Definition 6.2 (BDR-Match security). Let KE be a key exchange protocol, and let FBDR be the
set of cryptographic primitives and hardness assumptions the adversary can break in the model.
Let A be a PPT adversary interacting with KE via the queries NewSession, SendBDR, Reveal,
Corrupt, Test, and Break in the following game GBDR-Match(FBDR)KE,A (λ):
Setup. The challenger generates long-term public/secret-key pairs for each participant U ∈ U .
Query. The adversary A receives the generated public keys and has access to the queries
NewSession, SendBDR, Reveal, Corrupt, Test, and Break.
Stop. At some point, the adversary stops with no output.
We say that A wins the game GBDR-Match(FBDR)KE,A (λ) if at least one of the following conditions
holds:
1. Different session keys in partnered sessions:
There exist two distinct sessions pi and pi′ with pi.sid = pi′.sid 6= ⊥, and pi.stexec, pi′.stexec 6=
rejected, but pi.K 6= pi′.K.
2. Different or unset contributive identifiers in partnered sessions:
There exist two distinct sessions pi and pi′ such that pi.sid = pi′.sid 6= ⊥, but pi.cid 6= pi′.cid
or pi.cid = pi′.cid = ⊥.
3. Different intended partner in partnered sessions:
There exist two sessions pi := pikU,V and pi′ := pik
′
V ′,U ′ such that pi.sid = pi′.sid 6= ⊥ ,
pi.role = initiator, and pi′.role = responder, but U 6= U ′ or V 6= V ′.
4. More than two sessions share the same session identifier or contributive identifier:
There exist at least three sessions pi, pi′, and pi′′ such that pi, pi′, pi′′ are pairwise distinct,
but pi.sid = pi′.sid′ = pi′′.sid 6= ⊥ or pi.cid = pi′.cid′ = pi′′.cid 6= ⊥.
We say KE is BDR-Match secure for FBDR if for all PPT adversaries A the advantage function
AdvBDR-Match(FBDR)KE,A (λ) := Pr
[
GBDR-Match(FBDR)KE,A (λ) = 1
]
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Definition 6.3 (BDR key secrecy). Let KE be a key exchange protocol with key distribution D,
and let FBDR be the set of cryptographic primitives and hardness assumptions the adversary can
break in the model.
Let A be a PPT adversary interacting with KE via the queries NewSession, SendBDR, Reveal,
Corrupt, Break, and Test in the following game GBDR(FBDR),DKE,A (λ):
Setup. The challenger generates long-term public/secret-key pairs for each participant U ∈ U ,
chooses the test bit btest $←− {0, 1} at random and sets lost← false.
Query. The adversary A receives the generated public keys and has access to the queries
NewSession, SendBDR, Reveal, Corrupt, Test, and Break.
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Guess. At some point, A stops and outputs a guess bguess.
Finalize. The challenger sets the lost flag to lost ← true if at least one of the following
conditions hold:
1. Adversary has tested and revealed the key in a single session or in two partnered
sessions:
There exist two (not necessarily distinct) sessions pi, pi′ such that pi.sid = pi′.sid,
pi.stkey = revealed, and pi′.tested = true.
2. Adversary has tested a session whose contributive partner session was running at the
time of breakdown:
There exist two distinct sessions pi, pi′ such that pi.tested = true, pi.cid = pi′.cid, and
pi′.stbdexec = running.
The adversary A wins the game GBDR(FBDR),DKE,A (λ) if bguess = btest and lost = false.
We say that KE provides BDR key secrecy for FBDR with/without forward secrecy if for all
PPT adversaries A the advantage function
AdvBDR(FBDR),DKE,A (λ) := Pr
[
GBDR(FBDR),DKE,A (λ) = 1
]
− 12
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Definition 6.4 (Breakdown resilience). We say a key exchange protocol KE is breakdown
resilient for FBDR (with/without forward secrecy) if KE provides BDR-Match security and BDR
key secrecy for FBDR (with/without forward secrecy), according to Definitions 6.2 and 6.3.
Fundamental Properties
The model for breakdown resilience is a proper extension of the Bellare–Rogaway model for
AKEs given in Section 4.2, thus breakdown resilience implies standard BR security:
Proposition 6.5. If a key exchange protocol KE achieves breakdown resilience for some FBDR
(incl. FBDR = ∅) with/without forward secrecy according to Definition 6.4, then KE is also
BR-secure with/without forward secrecy according to Definition 4.3.
Proof. If the Break query is not asked by the adversary, the flag breakdown and the modification
to the original Send query are essentially not touched and may thus be omitted. Likewise, the
second Finalize condition in Definition 6.3 becomes void as stbdexec = ⊥ for all sessions. But
then the models and in particular the Match security definition (modulo contributive identifiers)
and the key secrecy definition for breakdown resilience and original BR security coincide.
As mentioned earlier, it is often convenient to consider breakdown resilience for a stronger
cryptographic hardness assumption than the one employed in a (non-breakdown-resilient)
security proof, with the discrete logarithm problem DLP vs. decisional and computational DH
DDH and CDH being a specific example. We hence make this relation more precise via the
following proposition, which may prove useful when considering the breakdown of a cryptographic
hardness assumption X whose breakdown implies the ability to break some other assumption Y .
In our setting this means that one can provide the reply of the Break oracle for Y by the answer
for X. We say that solving X implies solving Y .
Proposition 6.6. Let Π be some protocol and let X and Y be some cryptographic hardness
assumptions with X ∈ FBDR, but Y 6∈ FBDR. Assume that solving X implies solving Y . Then, if
Π is breakdown resilient for FBDR, then Π is also breakdown resilient for F ′BDR = FBDR ∪ {Y }.
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Figure 6.2: Illustration of permissible Test queries for strong breakdown resilience. Scenarios 1 and 2
are as in Figure 6.1; Scenarios 3, 4, and 5 are now permissible.
Proof. We can directly simulate the Break query for F ′BDR via a Break query for FBDR, since
the Break response for X allows to provide the response for Y .
6.2.3 Strong Breakdown Resilience
In Chapter 5 we discussed hybrid protocols that have built-in redundancy to withstand the
breakdowns of single cryptographic components. Security of these protocols is then achievable
not only for past sessions, as is the case for breakdown resilience as defined now, but also for
ongoing and future sessions.
We observe, that the breakdown-resilience model can be readily adjusted to also capture
these scenarios, when restricting FBDR to those cryptographic components for which the hybrid
protocol ensures redundancy. We term the resulting notion strong breakdown resilience.
Figure 6.2 depicts the now admissible Test scenarios for strong breakdown resilience. In
order to extend the basic model of breakdown resilience to encompass security for future and
ongoing sessions, a couple of minor changes are necessary:
Send query. The previously introduced modified SendBDR ensured that ongoing and future
sessions at the time of breakdown were set to revealed and could thus not be tested by the
adversary. This is no longer wished for in the strong breakdown-resilience scenario, so here the
original, unmodified Send query of the Bellare–Rogaway-model (cf. Section 4.2.1) is employed.
Contributive identifiers and state of execution at breakdown. Similarly, contributive
identifiers (cid) that were needed to identify cases that are not testable (cf. Figure 6.1) become
superfluous and any mention of them in the security definitions of BDR-Match security and
BDR key secrecy (Definitions 6.2 and 6.3) can be omitted. Finally, we no longer need to record
the execution state at breakdown stbdexec.
6.2.4 Defining the Break Oracle
We next give an exemplary specification of the behavior of the Break oracle and capabilities
the adversary is provided with for a number of common cryptographic primitives and hardness
assumptions. Table 6.1 covers a wide range of standard primitives and assumptions underlying the
security of most key exchange protocols (and in particular the NewHope protocols [ADPS16b,
AAB+19] we analyze in Section 6.3).
Keyed primitives and unkeyed primitives with secret input. For keyed primitives
(both public-key and secret-key ones), the basic idea for the Break oracle is to hand the adversary
all secret keys which have been created in protocol executions so far. Since the adversary in our
model can call the Break oracle multiple times it may also access subsequently generated keys.
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Primitive or
Cryptographic
Hardness Assumption
(f)
Algorithms Security Assumption
(sec-prop)
Break Response
Asymmetric or Symmetric
Encryption Scheme E
E = (KGen,Enc,Dec) IND-CCA
(indistinguishability under adap-
tive chosen ciphertext attack)
return all previous outputs (pk, sk) or
sk for which (pk, sk) ← KGen or sk ←
KGen
Key Encapsulation
Mechanism K
K = (KGen,Encaps,Decaps) IND-CCA
(indistinguishability under adap-
tive chosen ciphertext attack)
return all previous outputs (pk, sk) for
which (pk, sk)← KGen
Signature Scheme S S = (KGen,S,Vfy) EUF-CMA
(existential unforgeability under
chosen message attack)
return all previous pairs (pk, sk)
for which (pk, sk)← KGen
MAC SchemeM M = (KGen,MAC,Vfy) EUF-CMA
(existential unforgeability under
chosen message attack)
return all previous values sk for which
sk ← KGen
Hash Function Family H H = (KGen,H) STD-Coll-Res
(standard-model collision resis-
tance)
programmable access to H:
After breakdown, A sets output of H
queries on previously unseen values
H = (KGen,RO) RO-Coll-Res
(random-oracle collision resis-
tance)
programmable access to RO:
After breakdown, A sets output of RO
queries on previously unseen values
H = (KGen,H) SecPre
(second preimage resistance)
programmable access to H:
After breakdown, A can set output of H
query on previously unseen value x′ to
y, where y = H(x) for some previously
seen value x
H = (KGen,RO) RO-Rand
(random-oracle randomness)
return all previous s for which s← RO(·)
H = (KGen,RO) RO-One-Way
(random-oracle one-wayness)
return all previous pairs (x, s) for which
s← RO(x)
Pseudorandom Function
Family PRF
PRF = (KGen,F) prf-sec
(output pseudorandomness)
return all previous values k for which
k ← KGen
PRF = (KGen,RO) RO-Rand
(random-oracle randomness)
return all previous s for which s← RO(·)
PRF = (KGen,RO) RO-One-Way
(random-oracle one-wayness)
return all previous pairs (x, s) s.t. s←
RO(x)
Discrete Log Assumption GroupExp(h, x) = hx in
multiplicative cyclic group
G = 〈g〉, h ∈ G
DLP
discrete logarithm problem
return all previous pairs (x, hx) for which
hx ← GroupExp(h, x)
Factoring Assumption GenModulus(1n) = (N, p, q)
s.t. N = p · q where p, q are
n-bit primes
Prime-Fact
prime factorization
return all previous tuples (N, p, q) for
which (N, p, q)← GenModulus(·)
Table 6.1: Potential Break oracle specifications.
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In order for Break to provide the necessary information, we make the key generation algorithm
of a primitive explicit and have all honest parties invoke it when generating key material for this
primitive. For example, any keys used for an encryption scheme E = (KGen,Enc,Dec) in honest
sessions will be generated via the key generation algorithm KGen, with the challenger in the
security game storing the output. This approach enables the challenger to return an exhaustive
list of all secret keys of a primitive up to the point of breakdown when a Break query is asked.
In key exchange protocols it is common that keys for keyed primitives are not derived via
an explicit key generation algorithm but, e.g., sampled at random or generated through a key
derivation function. We implicitly treat such key derivations as a trivial (identity function) key
generation algorithm in our model, hence recording also such keys for exposure through a Break
query. This means for example that the function is no longer unpredictable or pseudorandom.
To capture this formally, we again assume that the challenger keeps a list of all function outputs
generated by honest sessions, in order to provide the according list to the adversary in case of a
Break query.
Public primitives. For public primitives like a hash function H and security properties like
collision resistance we have to capture the increased capabilities of the adversary A after the
breakdown differently. Here, regardless of whether H is modeled as a random oracle RO or
considered in the standard model, the adversary A must be able to generate collisions after the
break. To this end, we allow A to program H globally on previously unseen input values after
the breakdown occurred. In particular, after the break A answers all queries by honest sessions
to the hash function H itself (but consistently with previous replies). If, on the other hand,
we aim at modeling breakdown of the one-wayness of a random oracle, we instead hand the
adversary all input-output pairs which honest parties have evaluated.
Cryptographic hardness assumptions. Finally, we can also treat the breakdown of inter-
esting cryptographic assumptions for key exchange via the Break oracle. We illustrate this here
by the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and the factoring problem (Prime-Fact), which we treat
similarly to public-key primitives. For the example of DLP, we mandate that honest sessions
invoke a given algorithm GroupExp for group exponentiations, which then allows the challenger
in the security game to provide the adversary with all secret exponents employed in honest
sessions on a Break query. Note that for related cryptographic assumptions, the breakdown
of one assumption can imply the breakdown of the other. For example, we can restrict our
attention to DLP for Diffie–Hellman-style protocols, as (resilience against) a breakdown of DLP
in particular implies (resilience against) the breakdown of other commonly used assumption like
DDH and CDH.
Remark 6.7. We stress that Table 6.1 only gives (conservative) recommendations on how the
Break oracle can be implemented for the most common primitives and hardness assumptions in
the area of key exchange. Depending on the security properties required from the primitives in
a specific key exchange setting, one may wish to specify different responses for the Break query.
This is easily possible in our model as the Break query itself is generic.
6.3 Breakdown Resilience of Auth-NewHope
In this section, we show a first application of our new security model. For our analysis, we
consider a (classically) authenticated variant of the post-quantum secure key exchange scheme
NewHope. NewHope is a lattice-based key exchange protocol that was originally introduced in
2016 by Alkim et al. [ADPS16b] as an improvement over previous work by Bos et al. [BCNS15]
with respect to efficiency and parameter sizes. The protocol soon gained widespread attention,
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not least because of its deployment as the post-quantum component in the hybrid key exchange
experiment CECPQ1 in Google Chrome Canary [Bra16].
We will see that, unlike in the Diffie-Hellman-setting, Alice and Bob only agree on approxi-
mately the same value after they have exchanged their public keys, due to the nature of ring
elements. In order for them to agree on a common value that will be the input to the final
key derivation, they have to execute a so-called error-reconciliation mechanism, that was first
introduced by Ding, Xie, and Lin [DXL12] and is based on the idea of fuzzy extractors [DRS04],
to establish shared keys from noisy data. This is achieved by Bob providing additional reconcili-
ation information to Alice alongside his public key, that Alice can use to derive the same secret
as Bob with high probability.
Later that same year, a simpler, encryption-based version, NewHope-Simple [ADPS16a],
was introduced. Contrary to the first design, this variant uses encryption to establish a
shared cryptographic key between the communicating parties, thereby forgoing the need for
reconciliation. NewHope-Simple then served as the basis for the key encapsulation mechanisms
in [AAB+19] that were submitted to the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization
process [Nat15] in 2017 and that have made it into the second round of the process. In
the following, for the purpose of a clear distinction we will refer to the different schemes as
NewHope-Usenix, NewHope-Simple, and NewHope-Nist, respectively.
For now, we focus on the analysis of the reconciliation-based NewHope-Usenix. At
the end of this section, we will investigate the breakdown resilience of generic KEM-based
constructions, thereby also capturing the breakdown resilience of the variants NewHope-Simple
and NewHope-Nist that were formulated as KEMs.
6.3.1 Protocol Description
In its originally proposed form, NewHope-Usenix provides unauthenticated key agreement. For
our analysis, we consider an authenticated version of NewHope-Usenix, in the following referred
to as Auth-NewHope. The authenticated version of the protocol is depicted in Figure 6.3,
where the original protocol (above the double line) is followed by SigMA-authentication [Kra03].
In the following description, we focus on the unauthenticated NewHope-Usenix protocol as
SigMA-authentication has already been discussed in Section 5.5.
Alice first generates the public parameter a by choosing a random seed seed and setting
a← XOF(seed). She then generates her public key b← as+ e, where s, e $←− ψn16 and sends
seed, b to Bob.
Bob computes the parameter a from seed and generates his public key in the same manner as
Alice, i.e., b′ ← as′+ e′ with s′, e′ $←− ψn16. He then computes the approximate shared secret
v as v ← bs′ + e′′, where e′′ $←− ψn16. As Alice will not be able to derive the exact same
value, Bob additionally computes reconciliation information r as r $←− HelpRec(v). This
value will allow Alice and Bob to agree on an exact shared value with high probability.
Finally, he sends his public key b′ and the reconciliation information r to Alice.
Alice computes the approximate shared secret v′ ← b′s = ass′ + e′s. Note that this is indeed
not the same value v that Bob holds, since v = ass′ + es′ + e′′. The reconciled common
shared secret w is then given as Rec(v, r) on Bob’s side and Rec(v′, r) on Alice’s side. This
can then be used to derive the final session key K (at the end of the protocol run) as well
as a MAC key Kmac
Next, Alice and Bob authenticate each other via SigMA-authentication (cf. compiler description
in Section 5.5 for details).
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Alice Bob
identity A identity B
long-term signing keys long-term signing keys
(pkA, skA) (pkB, skB)
seed $←− {0, 1}256
a← XOF(seed)
s, e $←− ψn16
b← as+ e
b, seed
a← XOF(seed)
s′, e′, e′′ $←− ψn16
b′ ← as′ + e′
v ← bs′ + e′′
r $←− HelpRec(v)
b′, r
v′ ← b′s
w ← Rec(v′, r) w ← Rec(v, r)
Output: shared secret w, transcript t = (b, seed, b′, r)
Kmac ← KDF(w, "MAC"||t)
rA
$←− {0, 1}|nonce| rA
rB
$←− {0, 1}|nonce|
σB ← Sign(skB, "0"||t||rA||rB)
τB ← MAC(Kmac, "0"||B)
B, rB, σB, τB
cid = (t, rA, rB, B)
abort if S.Vfy(pkB, σB, "0"||t||rA||rB) = 0
or ifM.Vfy(Kmac, τB, "0"||B) = 0
σA ← Sign(skA, "1"||t||rA||rB)
τA ← MAC(Kmac, "1"||A)
A, σA, τA
abort if S.Vfy(pkA, σA, "1"||t||rA||rB) = 0
or ifM.Vfy(Kmac, τA, "1"||A) = 0
K = KDF(w, "KE"||(t, rA, rB, A,B)), sid = (t, rA, rB, A,B)
Figure 6.3: The Auth-NewHope protocol with original unauthenticated key exchange
NewHope-Usenix above the double line and SigMA-style authentication below.
Cryptographic assumptions. Auth-NewHope relies on the following cryptographic prim-
itives and hardness assumptions: random-oracle randomness of the extendable-output func-
tion XOF, pseudorandomness of the key derivation function KDF, and existential unforgeability
of the signature scheme S and MAC schemeM.
The post-quantum security of all NewHope schemes is further based on the (decisional)
Ring-Learning-with-Errors ((D)RLWE), which informally states that as+ e for public a, secret
s, and small error e, is indistinguishable from a random ring element.
More formally, let R = Z[X]/Xn + 1 for n = 2m with m ≥ 0 be the ring of integers of the 2n-
th cyclotomic number field. For q an integer, define Rq to be the ring R/qR ∼= Zq[X]/(Xn + 1).
Then the decisional RLWE problem is defined as follows:
Definition 6.8 (DRLWE problem). Let Rq be the ring R/qR ∼= Zq[X]/(Xn + 1), χ some error
distribution, and A be a PPT algorithm. Let GdrlweRq ,χ,A be the game defined in Figure 6.4. We say
that the decisional Ring-LWE problem (DRLWE) is hard for Rq, χ, if for any PPT adversary A
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the advantage function defined as
AdvdrlweRq ,χ,A(λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr[GdrlweRq ,χ,A(λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Hardness of DRLWE implies hardness of the decision Diffie–Hellman-like problem DDH`,
which is particularly convenient for analyzing DH-like key exchange protocols based on DRLWE
such as NewHope:
Definition 6.9 (DDH` problem). Let Rq be the ring R/qR ∼= Zq[X]/(Xn + 1), χ some error
distribution, and A be a PPT algorithm. Let Gddh`Rq ,χ,A be the game defined in Figure 6.4. We say
that the decisional Diffie–Hellman-like problem (DDH`) is hard for Rq and χ, if for any PPT
adversary A the advantage function defined as
Advddh`Rq ,χ,A(λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr[Gddh`Rq ,χ,A(λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
GdrlweRq,χ,A(λ):
1 a $←− Rq
2 s, e $←− χ
3 b?0 ← as+ e
4 b?1
$←− Rq
5 btest $←− {0, 1}
6 bguess $←− A(a, b?btest)
7 return Jbtest = bguessK
Gddh`Rq,χ,A(λ):
1 a $←− Rq
2 s, s′, e, e′′ $←− χ
3 b← as+ e
4 b′ ← as′ + e′
5 v ← bs′ + e′′
6 r $←− HelpRec(v)
7 w0 $←− Rec(v, r)
8 w1 $←− {0, 1}n
9 btest $←− {0, 1}
10 bguess $←− A(a, b, b′, r, wbtest)
11 return Jbtest = bguessK
Figure 6.4: Decisional ring LWE problem DRLWE (left) and decisional Diffie-Hellman-like problem
DDH` (right).
Theorem 6.10 (DRLWE =⇒ DDH`). Let q be an odd integer, and χ be a distribution on Rq.
It holds: if the decision ring LWE problem for Rq, χ is hard, then the DDH-like problem for
Rq, χ is hard, i.e., there exist efficient adversaries B1,B2 such that
Advddh`Rq ,χ,A(λ) ≤ AdvdrlweRq ,χ,B1(λ) + AdvdrlweRq ,χ,B2(λ).
The proof of Theorem 6.10 can for example be found in [BCNS15, Theorem 1] and is based
on Peikert’s proof of IND-CPA security of the corresponding key encapsulation mechanism [Pei14,
Lemma 4.1].
6.3.2 Security analysis
In the following, we show that Auth-NewHope achieves breakdown resilience with forward
secrecy for FBDR = {(XOF,RO-Rand), (S,EUF-CMA), (M,EUF-CMA)} by establishing the corre-
sponding BDR-Match security and BDR key secrecy properties. Note that FBDR neither contains
the hardness assumptions DRLWE (or DDH`), nor the key derivation function KDF, as a break
of any of these makes key secrecy impossible to achieve. Without the hardness of DRLWE (and
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hence DDH`) we cannot replace the input to the key derivation function by a uniform random
value in order to later argue indistinguishability. Furthermore, the break of KDF causes the
adversary to see all previous outputs of the key derivation function, thus trivially enabling it to
distinguish real from random keys.
Theorem 6.11. Let FBDR = {(XOF,RO-Rand), (S,EUF-CMA), (M,EUF-CMA)}. Then Auth-
NewHope is breakdown-resilient for FBDR with forward secrecy. More precisely, for any efficient
PPT adversary A there exist efficient adversaries B1, B2, B3, and B4 such that
AdvBDR(FBDR),DA-NH,A (λ) ≤ n2s · 2−|nonce| + ns ·
(
nu · Adveuf-cmaS,B1 (λ)
+ ns ·
(
2 · Advddh`B2 (λ) + 2 · Advprf-secKDF,B3(λ) + Adveuf-cmaM,B4 (λ)
))
,
where ns is the maximum number of sessions, nu is the maximum number of users, and |nonce|
is the bit-length of the nonces rA and rB.
Proof of BDR-Match security. In order to achieve BDR-Match Security, we need to show
that the four conditions from Definition 6.2 are satisfied. Recall that the session identifiers
are defined as sid = (pk, c, rA, rB, A,B), containing public information only, and that the
contributive identifiers are set as cid = (pk, c, rA, rB, B).
Ad 1. Since the session identifier already determines all inputs to the key derivation function
KDF, partnered sessions necessarily also agree on the session key.
Ad 2. Since cid contains all entries in sid except for A’s identity, it trivially holds that same
session identifiers imply identical contributive identifiers.
Ad 3. Both identifiers A and B are comprised in the session identifier. Thus, agreement on the
session identifier implies agreement on the intended partner’s identity.
Ad 4. In order for three sessions to share the same session or contributive identifier, with
respect to two honest sessions a third honest session must pick, as responder, its random
values s′, e′, e′′, r, and rB such that they collide or, as initiator, pick colliding random
values seed, s, e, and rA. This will only happen with negligible probability.
Proof of BDR key secrecy.
Game0(λ): The original BDR key secrecy game GBDR(FBDR),DA-NH,A (λ).
Game1(λ): We abort the game if there are two sessions of honest parties which generate the
same nonce rA resp. rB. The probability of this happening is at most ns · 2−|nonce|, where
ns denotes the maximum number of sessions, since nonces in any n2s possible pairs of
sessions are both chosen at random.
We thus have
AdvG0A-NH,A(λ) ≤ AdvG1A-NH,A(λ) + n2s · 2−|nonce|.
Game2(λ): We proceed by guessing the tested session, thus reducing our adversary’s advantage
by a factor of at most 1ns :
AdvG1A-NH,A(λ) ≤ ns · AdvG2A-NH,A(λ).
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In the following, this allows us to know the tested session, denoted by pi?, in advance.
Observe that pi? must have accepted (and received all incoming messages) prior to the
first Break query issued by A in order for the latter to win, as otherwise its session key
would be considered revealed.
Game3(λ): Next, we abort the game if the tested session pi?, run by some party U (where
U ∈ {A,B}), obtains a valid signature σV on ("b"||t||rA||rB) which has not been signed
by an honest party V at this point. Recall that this message must have been received
prior to any Break query, in particular before a breakdown of S, as otherwise pi? would be
considered revealed and could not be tested.
Furthermore, long-term secrets of the involved parties may not be corrupted before the
test session has accepted. Forward secrecy is achieved since a subsequent Corrupt query
on the owner of the test session pi? (or its intended partner) does not contradict the fact
that pi? receives an honestly generated signature according to this game hop.
We now show that the probability of an abort happening for this reason can be bounded
by the success probability of the following reduction B1 against the unforgeability of the
signature scheme S.
The reduction B1 receives a public key pk? as challenge and guesses the party V under
whose name the forgery obtained in pi? is issued. It creates all parameters for the key
exchange as specified, except for setting pkV ← pk?. Any signature creation of V is
performed through a query to the signature oracle, all other steps can be carried out by
B1 itself.
If at some point the tested session pi? accepts a signature for a previously unsigned message,
then B1 outputs this message-signature pair as a forgery. In this case, since the nonces
are unique and the valid signature has not been created by an honest party before, party
V cannot have signed ("b"||t||rA||rB) earlier, only ("b′"||t||rA||rB) for b′ = 1− b (if at all).
With probability 1nu , where nu is the total number of users, our reduction predicts the
party V correctly, such that we have
AdvG2A-NH,A(λ) ≤ AdvG3A-NH,A(λ) + nu · Adveuf-cmaS,B1 (λ).
Game4(λ): In the next step, we guess the honest session pi?a of party V which has sent the valid
signature σV received by pi? in Game3 and abort if we guessed incorrectly. This session
is unique because the nonces are unique and there must be such a session which creates
the signature according to the previous game. Still, the session may not necessarily be
partnered with the test session, but must (at least) have the same contributive identifier,
such that we call this session associated.
Changing the game like this reduces the adversary’s advantage by a factor of at most 1ns ,
with ns again being the maximum number of sessions. Hence, we have
AdvG3A-NH,A(λ) ≤ ns · AdvG4A-NH,A(λ).
Game5(λ): As the next step, we replace the value w in the test session (and its associated
session pi?a) by a uniformly random value w˜. If the adversary A can distinguish Game5 from
Game4, then there exists an adversary B2 that can solve the DDH` problem as follows.
Algorithm B2 obtains a DDH` challenge (aˆ, bˆ, bˆ′, rˆ, wˆ) and simulates the environment for
A picking the according seed seed′ upfront and programming the random oracle modeling
XOF such that XOF(seed′) = aˆ before any execution starts.
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In the predicted sessions pi? and pi?a algorithm B2 then sets a ← aˆ, b ← bˆ, b′ ← bˆ′, and
r ← rˆ. Note that it is irrelevant for the argument if another honest session accidentally
picks the same seed seed′ and thus derives the same aˆ since the non-uniqueness of the
parameter does not affect the security of the protocol in terms of key secrecy. In fact, in
many RLWE-based key exchange schemes, this parameter is globally fixed upfront for all
executions.
Furthermore, a breakdown of XOF does not imply any advantage for the adversary in
detecting the simulation (as the value aˆ will appear to have been validly generated in
an honest execution) or disturbing the programming of the random oracle (since the
breakdown can only happen after the test session has been completed). Thus, when
computing the keys K and Kmac in the two sessions, the given value wˆ is used instead as
input to the key derivation function KDF.
At some point, A terminates and outputs a guess bit bguess. Upon this, B2 also terminates
and outputs the same bguess.
If wˆ is genuine, , i.e., the internal bit b′ of the DDH` challenge is 1, then the simulation
above is as in Game4. If wˆ is random, i.e., b′ = 0, B2 faithfully simulates Game5. Hence,
if the efficient adversary A can distinguish the two games with non-negligible advantage,
then B2 can solve DDH` efficiently with non-negligible advantage. It follows that
AdvG4A-NH,A(λ) ≤ AdvG5A-NH,A(λ) + 2 · Advddh`B2 (λ).
Since DDH` is not part of FBDR, this bound especially holds in the BDR scenario.
Game6(λ): Next, we replace the session key K and the MAC key Kmac by uniformly random
values K˜ and K˜mac from the appropriate key space D in pi? and pi?a . Distinguishing Game6
and Game5 by A would immediately imply the existence of an efficient adversary B3 that
breaks the pseudorandomness of KDF with non-negligible advantage.
The reduction B3 generates all key exchange parameters and long-term keys itself and
initializes A. This means in particular, that B3 can answer all NewSession, Corrupt and
Reveal queries (assuming A does not query Reveal on pi? and pi?a wlog as this would result
in a trivial loss for A.)
Similarly, B3 can faithfully execute all Send queries. For pi? and pi?a when the MAC tags are
computed, B3 queries its oracle OPRF in the pseudorandomness game on "MAC"||t where t is
the appropriate transcript. The response Kb′ of the oracle is then either KDF(K, "MAC"||t)
if b′ = 0 for some key K that was chosen at the beginning of the pseudorandomness game
or g("MAC"||t) for some random function g if b′ = 1. The reduction then uses Kb′ as MAC
key in pi? and pi?a . Note again that signatures can be faithfully simulated by the reduction
since it has generated the long-term keys of the participants.
Once A asks a Test query, B3 queries "KE"||(t, rA, rB, A,B) to OPRF to receive Kb′ which is
either KDF(K, "KE"||(t, rA, rB, A,B)) if b′ = 0 or g("KE"||(t, rA, rB, A,B)) if b′ = 1. The
reduction returns Kb′ as Ktest to A.
At some point, A terminates with output bguess which B3 also uses as its output.
Observe that B3 perfectly simulates Game5(λ) if b′ = 0 and Game6(λ) if b′ = 1. Thus, if
A can distinguish the two games, B3 can win the pseudorandomness game against KDF
and we have
AdvG5A-NH,A(λ) ≤ AdvG6A-NH,A(λ) + 2 · Advprf-secKDF,B3(λ).
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As (KDF, ·) 6∈ FBDR, this bound again particularly holds in the BDR scenario.
There are now four possibilities for the status of the associated session pi?a .
1. First, at the point of the breakdown query, the associated session had not accepted
yet, i.e., pi?a owned by V has the role responder and waited for the final authentication
message. But then pi?a ’s state was running and its contributive identifier was, and is,
identical to the one in U ’s session pi?, since the signature is over the entries in cid
and V knows resp. sent its identifier. This however means that the adversary is not
allowed to test the session it has actually tested, by definition of a successful attack.
2. The associated session pi?a had already finished upon the breakdown query with
status rejected. This means that it does not hold a session key and is therefore of no
relevance to the authentication.
3. The associated session pi?a had already finished upon the breakdown query and it is
partnered with the test session. But then it cannot be revealed by the adversary.
4. Lastly, the associated session pi?a had already finished upon the breakdown query but
it is not partnered with the test session. But this case would allow the adversary
to safely reveal the session key of the associated (but unpartnered) session, which
could break key secrecy. Yet, this would lead to a contradiction of the unforgeability
of the MAC, as we discuss next.
Game7(λ): As the final change, we abort the game if the associated session pi?a of party V
accepts before the breakdown query with a session identifier pi?a .sid 6= ⊥ which does not
equal pi?.sid. This can only happen if the adversary is able to make pi?a obtain a valid
signature σW and MAC tag τW for some identity W 6= U since all entries except for the
peer identity of pi?a .sid are already fixed at this point.
We assume that the associated session has already accepted and that no Break query has
occurred yet. In particular, while the adversary may be able to sign under a corrupt party’s
identifier W , the MAC scheme, on the other hand, must still be secure. Furthermore,
the MAC tag depends on the key Kmac shared between the honest parties U and V and
includes the sender’s identity.
Similarly to Game3, the probability of an abort happening for this reason can be bounded
by the success probability of an adversary B4 against the unforgeability of the MAC
scheme M. That is, since we have already replaced the key Kmac by an independent
random value, we can use an external OMAC oracle for an unknown key in a simulation
instead, and use oracle queries to create the MACs for "b"||U and "b′"||V for b′ = 1− b as
required in the test session and its associated session. It follows that a valid MAC τW for
"b"||W created by the adversary for identity W 6= U in the associated session constitutes
a successful forgery for a fresh message. We have
AdvG6A-NH,A(λ) ≤ AdvG7A-NH,A(λ) + Adveuf-cmaM,B4 (λ).
To complete the proof we note that the adversary expects the challenge value Ktest to be
either the output of KDF(w, ”KE”||(t, rA, rB, A,B)) (btest = 0) or a uniformly random string
(btest = 1). At this point, both cases btest = 0 and btest = 1 are indistinguishable for A since both
keys are of equal length and are drawn independently and uniformly at random. Furthermore,
the session key in the associated session (which coincides with the now random key Ktest in case
of btest = 0 and is independent of Ktest for btest = 1) cannot be revealed, because that session is
either partnered or held the same contributive identifier upon breakdown. Thus A cannot learn
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any information about the bit btest. The only strategy for A is to guess and thus we have the
final bound:
AdvG7A-NH,A(λ) ≤ 0.
Remark 6.12. By modeling the breakdown of the signatures and MACs, while the unauthenticated
key agreement and the key derivation function remain secure, we, in particular, re-confirm the
result from the previous chapter that for CcQ security, i.e. security against future-quantum
adversaries, it is not necessary for the authentication mechanisms to remain secure in order to
protect sessions before the breakdown.
A note on the security bound. It may be surprising at first that the unforgeability of
the signature and MAC scheme enter into the security bound of Theorem 6.11 although the
signature scheme S as well as the MAC schemeM are affected by the breakdown. However,
both the valid signature obtained by pi? in Game3 as well as the MAC tag in Game7 must
necessarily have been created before a breakdown had occurred. Thus, both unforgeability
assumptions still hold at the respective points in time.
The security of the extendable-output function XOF (modeled as a random oracle) does
not enter into the security bound for key secrecy. We recall that in NewHope-Usenix the
function XOF is applied to a uniformly random chosen seed to generate the public parameter
a freshly for each protocol execution. This is done to avoid backdoors and all-for-the-price-of-
one-attacks. However, the security of RLWE-based protocols does not rely on the parameter a
being indistinguishable from random as it is in general public and fixed for all executions (cf.
for example [BCNS15]).
Furthermore, note that the key derivation function KDF and the extendable-output function
XOF proposed in [ADPS16b] both rely on the (pseudo-)randomness of SHA-3. In our analysis
we treat these two primitives as independent and generic cryptographic building blocks such
that a break of XOF does not imply a break in the key derivation function KDF (and vice versa).
This result shows, that the protocol can withstand breakdowns of XOF if the key derivation
function KDF is based on a different primitive.
6.3.3 Encryption-based Auth-NewHope
As mentioned before, the encryption-based variants of NewHope are formalized as key encapsu-
lation mechanisms. In Figure 6.5, we see the key exchange flow Auth-Kem between Alice and
Bob in this setting, with only the parts shown that differ from Auth-NewHope in Figure 6.3.
Note, that there is nothing peculiar that distinguishes this variant from any other KEM flow.
Therefore, we can show the breakdown resilience of any authenticated key exchange protocol
Auth-Kem that combines a KEM K with SigMA-authentication. For the precise specifications
of the algorithms KGen,Encaps and Decaps for the case of NewHope, we refer the interested
reader to [AAB+19].
Theorem 6.13 (BDR security of Auth-Kem). Let FBDR = {(S,EUF-CMA), (M,EUF-CMA)}.
Then Auth-Kem is breakdown resilient for FBDR with forward secrecy. More precisely, for any
efficient, adversary A there exist efficient adversaries B1, B2, B3 and B4 such that
AdvBDR(FBDR),DA-KEM,A ≤ n2s · 2−|nonce| + ns ·
(
nu · Adveuf-cmaS,B1
+ ns ·
(
2 · Advind-cpaK,B2 + 2 · Adv
prf-sec
KDF,B3 + Adv
euf-cma
M,B4
))
,
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where ns is the maximum number of sessions, nu is the maximum number of users, and
|nonce| is the bit-length of the nonces.
Proof. The proof is mostly analogous to the proof of Theorem 6.11. In the proof of key secrecy
Game5(λ) is replaced by the following:
Game′5(λ): As the next step, we replace the value K in the test session (and its associated
session pi?a) by a uniformly random value K˜ of equal length. If the adversary A can
distinguish Game′5(λ) from Game4(λ), then there exists an adversary B2 that can break
the IND-CPA security of the key encapsulation mechanism K as follows.
Algorithm B2 obtains its challenge public key, ciphertext and key epk, c?,K?b′ , where either
(c?,K?b′) $←− Encaps(epk) (b′ = 0) or K?b′ is a random element from the key space (b′ = 1).
B2 simulates the environment for A by creating all long-term keys of participants as
specified and initializing A with the resulting public keys of participants. This ensures in
particular, that B2 can answer all NewSession and Corrupt queries of the adversary.
Furthermore, B2 can execute all Send requests by A for sessions other than the test session
and the associated session pi 6= pi?, pi?a . For pi? and pi?a , B2 uses its challenge epk and c?
for the first two message flows. The session key K and the MAC key Kmac are computed
as the KDF keyed with K?b′ and the respective label. B2 can also answer all Reveal for
sessions that are not the test session or its associated session. For pi? and pi?a , A will not
query Reveal since this would cause it to trivially lose the game.
Once A queries Test on pi?, the reduction B2 computes the challenge key for A as KDF(K?b′ ,
"KE"||(t, rA, rB, A,B)), i.e., when computing the keys K and Kmac in the two sessions, the
given value K?b′ is used instead as input to the key derivation function KDF.
At some point, A terminates and outputs a guess bit bguess. Upon this, B2 also terminates
and outputs the same bguess.
If K?b′ is genuine (i.e., b′ = 0), then the simulation above is as in Game4(λ). If K?b′ is
random (i.e., b′ = 1), B2 simulates Game′5(λ). Hence, if the efficient adversary A can
distinguish the two games with non-negligible advantage, then B2 can distinguish real from
random keys in key encapsulation mechanisms efficiently with non-negligible advantage.
Alice Bob
identity A identity B
(epk, esk) $←− KGen(1λ)
epk
c,K $←− Encaps(epk)
c
K ← Decaps(esk, c)
t← (epk, c)
Kmac ← KDF(K, "MAC"||t)
SigMA-Authentication
with cid = (epk, c, rA, rB, B)
K← KDF(K, "KE"||(t, rA, rB, A,B))
Figure 6.5: The NewHope-Nist key encapsulation mechanism K = (KGen,Encaps,Decaps).
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It follows that
AdvG4Auth-Kem,A ≤ Adv
G′5
Auth-Kem,A + 2 · Advind-cpaK,B2 .
Since (K, IND-CPA) is not part of FBDR, this bound especially holds in the BDR scenario.
6.4 Strong Breakdown Resilience of Hybrid AKE
In this section, we show how our model of (strong) breakdown resilience from Section 6.2.3 can
be leveraged to achieve results about hybrid AKE constructions similar to the two-stage model
in Section 5.5.
Comparison with two-stage hybrid AKE. Chapter 5 was specifically concerned with the
question of how to design hybrid key exchanges that ease the transition from the classical to
the post-quantum setting. The (strong) breakdown-resilience framework on the other hand is
not concerned with what causes the breakdowns and is thus meaningful in generic scenarios.
However, we can make statements that are comparable to the setting of hybrid key exchanges
with quantum adversaries.
For an authenticated key exchange protocol KE and appropriate definitions of the set FBDR,
the notion of strong breakdown resilience coincides with the notion of two-stage XcZ-BR security
(Def. 5.17) for XcZ ∈ {CcC,QcQ}, i.e., for either classical or post-quantum adversaries. Two-
stage CcQ-BR security, i.e., BR security against future-quantum adversaries, is captured by the
basic breakdown-resilience model for AKE (Def. 6.4). This is visible in the security analyses of
the NewHope AKE protocols in Section 6.3, where we employed a post-quantum secure key
exchange scheme with classical authentication, generating the same result for future-quantum
adversaries as in the generic hybrid AKE compiler analysis in Section 5.5.
We furthermore note that we do not see any benefits in a definition of (strong) breakdown-
resilient IND-ATK security of KEMs analogous to the two-stage IND-ATK definitions (cf. Def. 5.2)
that we used to establish the security of our hybrid KEM constructions. Our aim when considering
(strong) breakdown resilience is to show security of entire AKE protocols when underlying
primitives or hardness assumptions break. On a primitive level, if one is not specifially interested
in the impacts of quantum adversaries, the existing proof techniques for combiners are sufficient
(cf., e.g., [GHP18] for examples of such proofs).
6.4.1 The AKE Compiler
As an example for an AKE compiler, we again consider the combination of a key encapsulation
mechanism with SigMA-authentication as in the previous chapters. In particular, this facilitates
direct comparison with the results on hybrid AKE security from Section 5.5.
We choose to analyse the compiler CSigMA [dualPRF,S,M,KDF] consisting of the dual-PRF
combiner dualPRF[K1,K2, dPRF,F] (cf. Figure 5.11), a signature scheme S, MAC schemeM, and
key derivation function KDF modeled as a PRF. The compiler is essentially depicted in Figure 6.5,
where instead of the NewHope-Nist KEM we use the algorithmic descriptions of KGen,Encaps,
and Decaps of the dualPRF combiner. As mentioned before, in the strong breakdown resilience
setting we have no needs for contributive identifiers and thus their consideration can be omitted
for this analysis.
Since we only have defined dual-PRF security in the two-stage setting so far, we want to
take this opportunity to define it also in the (standard) adversarial setting:
79
Chapter 6. Breakdown Resilience of Key Exchange Protocols
Definition 6.14 (Dual-PRF security). Let F : {0, 1}κ(λ)×{0, 1}ι(λ) → {0, 1}ω(λ) be an efficient
keyed function key length κ(λ), input length ι(λ) and output length ω(λ). Define F′ : {0, 1}ι(λ) ×
{0, 1}κ(λ) → {0, 1}ω(λ) such that F′(x,K) := F(K,x). Let A be a PPT adversary interacting
with F,F′ in the Game Gdprf-secF,A (λ) given in Figure 6.6.
We say that F is a dual pseudorandom function if both F and F′ are pseudorandom functions
according to Definition 3.13. In particular, for all PPT adversaries A the advantage function
defined as
Advdprf-secF,A (λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr [Gdprf-secF,A (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
= max
{
Advprf-secF,A (λ),Adv
prf-sec
F′,A (λ)
}
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Gdprf-secF,A (λ):
1 K $←− {0, 1}κ(λ)
2 x $←− {0, 1}ι(λ)
3 g $←− {functions f : {0, 1}ι(λ) → {0, 1}ω(λ)}
4 g′ $←− {functions f : {0, 1}κ(λ) → {0, 1}ω(λ)}
5 b $←− {0, 1}
6 b′ $←− AOFPRF,OF
′
PRF
7 return Jb′ = bK
OFPRF(x):
8 if b = 0
9 return F(K,x)
10 else
11 return g(x)
OF′PRF(K):
12 if b = 0
13 return F′(x,K)
14 else
15 return g′(K)
Figure 6.6: Definition of a dual pseudorandom function F.
6.4.2 Security Analysis
We now conduct the security analysis of the CSigMA compiler with the dualPRF combiner in the
strong breakdown-resilience model. The aim of this analysis is to show that this model is a
viable alternative for analysis of post-quantum hybrid AKE. The previous chapter considered
AKE from KEM that had already been proven to be hybrid. Now we implicitly prove the hybrid
property of the KEM simultaneously with the proof for the hybrid AKE.
Choice of FBDR and specification of oracle Break. The choice for FBDR in the hybrid
AKE setting is straightforward, as this can only contain components of “combiner primitives”.
Since dualPRF is built from two KEMs K1 and K2, and CSigMA requires the key exchanges to
be secure at least against chosen-plaintext attacks, we have that FBDR ∈ {{(K1, IND-ATK)},
{(K2, IND-ATK)}}.
As mentioned earlier, security analyses aim to be conservative when it comes to the power
of the adversary since stronger adversaries lead to more meaningful results. Thus when A
calls Break, it will get access to an unrestricted decapsulation oracle OFBDRDecaps for the KEM
specified by FBDR. On input a public key pk and ciphertext c, the oracle then returns the
decapsulation Decaps1(sk, c) for FBDR = {(K1, IND-ATK)} and analogously Decaps2(sk, c) for
FBDR = {(K2, IND-ATK)}, where sk is the corresponding secret key to pk.
Alternative specifications for Break could be to hand either all previously generated key pairs
or all previous outputs of the encapsulation algorithm of the respective KEM to the adversary.
The solution with the decapsulation oracle is slightly more elegant as it does not require the
adversary to call Break multiple times to get the latest information since the last call of Break.
This is however a minor consideration and does not make any difference in the proof.
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Theorem 6.15 (CSigMA[dualPRF,S,M,KDF] is strongly breakdown resilient).
Let FBDR ∈ {{(K1, IND-ATK)}, {(K2, IND-ATK)}}. Let KE := CSigMA [dualPRF,S,M,KDF] with
dualPRF[K1,K2, dPRF,F] the KEM combiner defined as in Figure 5.11. Then KE achieves strong
breakdown resilience for FBDR with forward secrecy. More precisely, for any efficient adversary
A there exist efficient adversaries B1, B2, . . . , B7 such that
AdvsBDR(FBDR),DKE,A ≤ n2s · 2−|nonce| + ns ·
(
nu · Adveuf-cmaS,B1 + ns ·
(
2 ·min
{
Advind-atkK2,B2 (λ),Adv
ind-atk
K1,B3 (λ)
}
+ 2 · Advdprf-secdPRF,B4(λ) + 2 · Adv
prf-sec
F,B5 (λ) + 2 · Adv
prf-sec
KDF,B6(λ) + Adv
euf-cma
M,B7
))
,
where ns is the maximum number of sessions, nu is the maximum number of users, and |nonce|
is the bit-length of the nonces.
Proof. For the proof we focus on the case where FBDR =
{
(K1, IND-CCA)
}
. The case where K2
becomes insecure works analogously. The IND-CPA case follows from the IND-CCA case.
Note that sBDR-Match security is independent of the adversarial model and the employed
KEM and thus follows from the Match security established for CSigMA in Section 5.5. Next we
show sBDR key secrecy.
Game0(λ): The original sBDR key secrecy game GsBDR(FBDR),DKE,A (λ).
Game1(λ): We abort the game if there are two sessions of honest parties which generate the
same nonce rA resp. rB. The probability of this happening is at most ns · 2−|nonce|, where
ns denotes the maximum number of sessions, since nonces in any n2s possible pairs of
sessions are both chosen at random.
We thus have
AdvG0KE,A(λ) ≤ AdvG1KE,A(λ) + n2s · 2−|nonce|.
Game2(λ): We proceed by guessing the tested session, thus reducing our reduction’s advantage
by a factor of at most 1ns :
AdvG1KE,A(λ) ≤ ns · AdvG2KE,A(λ).
In the following, this allows us to know the tested session, denoted by pi?, in advance.
Observe that, since we are in the strong breakdown-resilience setting, pi? must not have
accepted prior to the first Break query issued by the adversary.
Game3(λ): Next, we abort the game if the tested session pi?, run by some party U (where
U ∈ {A,B}), obtains a valid signature σV on ("b"||t||rA||rB) which has not been signed
by an honest party V at this point.
Note that long-term secrets of the involved parties may not be corrupted before the test
session has accepted. Forward secrecy is achieved since a subsequent Corrupt query on the
owner of the test session pi? (or its intended partner) does not contradict the fact that pi?
receives an honestly generated signature according to this game hop.
We now show that the probability of an abort happening for this reason can be bounded
by the success probability of the following reduction B1 against the unforgeability of
the signature scheme S. The reduction B1 receives a public key pk? as challenge and
guesses the party V under whose name the forgery obtained by pi? is issued. It creates all
parameters for the key exchange as specified, except for setting pkV ← pk?. Any signature
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creation of V is performed through a query to the signature oracle, all other steps can be
carried out by B1 itself.
If at some point the tested session pi? accepts a signature for a previously unsigned message,
then B1 outputs this message-signature pair as a forgery. In this case, since the nonces
are unique and the valid signature has not been created by an honest party before, party
V cannot have signed ("b"||t||rA||rB) earlier, only ("b′"||t||rA||rB) for b′ = 1− b (if at all).
With probability 1nu , where nu is the total number of users, our reduction predicts the
party V correctly, such that we have
AdvG2KE,A(λ) ≤ AdvG3KE,A(λ) + nu · Adveuf-cmaS,B1 (λ).
As (S, ·) 6∈ FBDR, this bound again particularly holds in the sBDR scenario.
A call of Break at any point in time, results in the adversary gaining access to an
unrestricted decapsulation oracle OFBDRDecaps of K1. Since a break of the primitive implies
that there exists an efficient algorithm to solve the underlying problem, the reduction can
answer all decapsulation requests, even those that involve public keys and ciphertexts that
have been adversarially generated. This is the same for all reductions in this proof and we
will not mention it further.
Game4(λ): In the next step, we guess the honest session pi?a of party V which has sent the valid
signature σV received by pi? in Game3(λ) and abort if we guessed incorrectly. This session
is unique because the nonces are unique and there must be such a session which creates
the signature according to the previous game.
Changing the game like this reduces the adversary’s advantage by a factor of at most 1ns ,
with ns again being the maximum number of sessions. Hence, we have
AdvG3KE,A(λ) ≤ ns · AdvG4KE,A(λ).
Game5(λ): We now replace the value K2 in the computations of pi? and pi?a by a uniformly
random element K˜2 from the same key space K2. The real session key (b = 0) is then
computed from the value K ← F(dPRF(K1, K˜2), c).
We argue that if there exists an efficient adversary A that can distinguish Game4(λ) from
Game5(λ), this implies the existence of an efficient adversary B2 against the IND-CCA
security of K2. The reduction works as follows:
Algorithm B2 receives as input (pk?2, c?2,K?b′), where pk?2 is the public key, c?2 the challenge
ciphertext, and K?b′ the real or random challenge key in the IND-CCA game for K2.
To initialize the environment for A, the reduction B2 generates all long-term key pairs
of participants. This enables B2 to correctly establish all new sessions via NewSession
requests of A and return sound answers to any Corrupt queries.
Send queries that involve sessions other than pi? and pi?a , can be executed by B2. For
the predicted sessions pi? and pi?a , B2 chooses (pk1, sk1) $←− KGen1 itself and computes the
respective encapsulation (c1,K1) $←− Encaps1(pk1). In the second component it injects its
challenge, i.e., B2 sets pk ← (pk1, pk?2) and c ← (c1, c?2). The MAC key Kmac and the
session key K are computed from the value K ← F(dPRF(K1, K˜2), c).
All Reveal queries on sessions pi 6= pi?, pi?a can be answered faithfully by B2. Note that we
can assume that A will not query Reveal on pi? or pi?a as this would result in trivial loss of
the game for A.
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When A queries Test on pi?, the reduction computes the challenge key as KDF(K, "KE"||(t,
rA, rB, A,B)), where K ← F(dPRF(K1,K?b′), c).
At some point, A terminates and outputs a guess bit bguess. The reduction B2 then outputs
the same bit bguess.
Clearly, B2 simulates the environment for A corresponding to Game0(λ) if its challenge
key K?b′ is the actual key (i.e., if b′ = 0), and corresponding to Game1(λ) if K?b′ is random
(i.e., b′ = 1).
Hence, we have
AdvG4KE,A(λ) ≤ AdvG5KE,A(λ) + 2 · Advind-ccaK2,B2 (λ).
The game hop works completely analogous for K1 being secure and K2 insecure, yielding
an adversary B3 against the IND-CCA security of K1.
Game6(λ): Next, we replace the value K ′ in the computations of pi? and pi?a by a uniformly
random value K˜ ′ $←− K ′.
We argue that if an adversary can efficiently distinguish Game5(λ) from Game6(λ), this
implies an efficient adversary B4 against the PRF security of dPRF′ and thus contradict
the dual-PRF security of dPRF. The reduction works as follows:
To initialize the environment for A, the reduction B4 generates all long-term key pairs
of participants. This enables B4 to correctly establish all new sessions via NewSession
requests of A and return sound answers to any Corrupt queries.
All Send queries can be executed by B4. Note again that we can assume that A will not
ask a Reveal query on pi? or pi?a as this would result in a trivial loss.
Once A asks Test, B4 queries its PRF oracle OPRF on K1 from pi? and pi?a to receive a value
κ?b′ which is either dPRF′(K,K1) = dPRF(K1,K) with K $←− K2 chosen by its challenger
(b′ = 0), or a uniformly random element computed as g(K1) from K2 (b′ = 1) in the PRF-
security game for dPRF′. B4 returns the session key K computed as KDF(F(κ?b′ , c), "KE"||(t,
rA, rB, A,B))) as challenge to A.
At some point, A terminates with output bit bguess. B4 outputs the same guess.
Observe that if B4 receives the real values, i.e., b′ = 0, then K?0 ← F(dPRF(K1,K), c) for
random K and the situation is as in Game5(λ) since K is distributed as K˜2. If on the
other hand B4 receives κ?b′ ← g(K1), i.e., if b′ = 1, then K?0 ← F(κ?b′ , c) is distributed as in
Game6(λ).
Hence, if A is able to efficiently distinguish the two games, B4 can win the PRF game
against dPRF′ and thus the dual-PRF game against dPRF with non-negligible advantage
as well.
For K1 being secure and K2 insecure, the argument is analogous, as dPRF is a dual PRF,
i.e., dPRF(K, ·) is also a pseudorandom function.
We have:
AdvG5KE,A(λ) ≤ AdvG6KE,A(λ) + Advdprf-secdPRF,B4(λ).
As (dPRF, ·) 6∈ FBDR, this bound again particularly holds in the sBDR scenario.
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Game7(λ): We now replace the value F(K˜ ′, c?) by a uniformly random value K˜ $←− K .
We argue that any efficient distinguisher A between Game6(λ) and Game7(λ) immediately
yields an efficient adversary B5 against the pseudorandomness of F:
The reduction B5 works analogously to the reduction B4. It can faithfully simulate all
NewSession,Corrupt,Reveal, and OFBDRDecaps queries. When A queries Test, B5 uses its own
OPRF oracle on the ciphertext of pi? and uses the response κ?b′ to derive the final challenge
key for A.
At some point, A terminates and outputs a guess bit bguess. B4 then outputs the same
guess bit.
We see again that if b′ = 0, B5 faithfully simulates Game6(λ) and if b′ = 1 we are in
Game7(λ). Thus, if A can distinguish between the two games, B5 also wins its game with
non-negligible advantage.
We have:
AdvG6KE,A(λ) ≤ AdvG7KE,A(λ) + 2 · Advprf-secF,B5 (λ).
The analogous argument applies when K1 is secure. As (F, ·) 6∈ FBDR, this bound again
particularly holds in the sBDR scenario.
Game8(λ): Next, we finally replace the session key K and the MAC key Kmac by uniformly
random values K˜ and K˜mac in pi? and pi?a . Distinguishing Game7 and Game8 by A
would immediately imply the existence of an efficient adversary B6 that breaks the
pseudorandomness of KDF with non-negligible advantage.
For this, as elaborated in previous games, B6 simply replaces KDF executions keyed with K
by an oracle call in its pseudorandomness game, again simulating one of the two games
depending on the oracle response.
Thus, we have
AdvG7KE,A(λ) ≤ AdvG8KE,A(λ) + 2 · Advprf-secKDF,B6(λ).
As (KDF, ·) 6∈ FBDR, this bound again particularly holds in the sBDR scenario.
Game9(λ): Finally, we abort the game if the associated session pi?a of party V accepts with a
session identifier pi?a .sid 6= ⊥ which does not equal pi?.sid. This can only happen if the
adversary is able to make pi?a obtain a valid signature σW and MAC τW for some identity
W 6= U since all entries except for the peer identity of pi?a .sid are already fixed at this
point. In particular, while the adversary may be able to sign under a corrupt party’s
identifier W for which the adversary may know the signing key due to a Corrupt query,
the MAC scheme, on the other hand, must still be secure. Furthermore, the MAC tag
depends on the key Kmac shared between the honest parties U and V and includes the
sender’s identity.
Again, the probability of an abort happening for this reason can be bounded by the success
probability of an adversary B7 against the unforgeability of the MAC schemeM. That is,
since we have already replaced the key Kmac by an independent random value, we can
use an external OMAC oracle for an unknown key in a simulation instead, and use oracle
queries to create the MACs for "b"||U and "b′"||V for b′ = 1− b as required in the test
session and its associated session. It follows that a valid MAC τW for "b"||W created by
the adversary for identity W 6= U in the associated session constitutes a successful forgery
for a fresh message. We have
AdvG8KE,A(λ) ≤ AdvG9KE,A(λ) + Adveuf-cmaM,B7 (λ).
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To complete the proof we note that the adversary expects the challenge value Ktest to be either
the output of KDF(K, ”KE”||(t, rA, rB, A,B)) (btest = 0) or a uniformly random value (btest = 1).
At this point, both cases btest = 0 and btest = 1 are indistinguishable for A since both keys
are of equal length and are drawn independently and uniformly at random. Furthermore, the
session key in the associated session (which coincides with the now random key Ktest in case of
btest = 0 and is independent of Ktest for btest = 1) cannot be revealed, because that session is
either partnered or held the same contributive identifier upon breakdown. Thus A cannot learn
any information about the bit btest. The only strategy for A is to guess and thus we have the
final bound:
AdvG9KE,A(λ) ≤ 0.
In the last two chapters we have seen how key exchanges can be adjusted to handle future
failures of cryptographic primitives and hardness assumptions. Key exchanges can be actively
built with these failures in mind by employing combiner techniques (cf. Chapter 5) and in this
chapter we showed that if a breakdown occurs, we can retrospectively gain assurances about
the security of communications that had been established before the fact.
In the next part of the thesis we turn towards a relatively new foundational assumption in
key exchange called PRF-ODH. We give a systematic study of the PRF-ODH assumption which
underlies today’s key exchanges based on Diffie–Hellman. While not actively “future-proofing”
the key exchange itself, the rigorous study of new assumptions contributes to the confidence
that we place in the analysis of current and future protocols that employ this assumption.
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Chapter 7
PRF-ODH
Relations, Instantiations, and Impossibility Results
Proposing new cryptographic assumptions is a valid strategy to analyze or design protocols
which have escaped formal treatment so far. However, the security analysis—usually carried out
via a reduction to the new assumption—is only the first step. Only the systematic categorization
of the new assumption completes the analysis and yields a meaningful security claim.
In the context of key exchange protocols, a fairly new assumption called the pseudorandom-
function oracle Diffie–Hellman (PRF-ODH) has been put forward by Jager et al. [JKSS12] for
the analysis of TLS 1.2. Informally, the PRF-ODH assumption says that the function value
PRF(guv, x?) for a DH key guv looks random, even if given the DH key shares gu and gv, and if
seeing related values PRF(Su, x) and/or PRF(T v, x) for chosen values S, T , and x. It is a variant
of the oracle Diffie–Hellman assumption introduced by Abdalla et al. [ABR01] in the context of
the encryption scheme DHIES, where the hash function is replaced by a pseudorandom function.
PRF-ODH appears to be a natural assumption for any DH-based key exchange protocol,
aiming at security against man-in-the-middle attacks (see Figure 7.1). In Diffie–Hellman-based
protocols both parties, Alice and Bob, exchange key shares gu and gv and locally compute
the session key by keying a pseudorandom key derivation function with the shared secret guv,
applied to some label x which usually contains (parts of) the transcript. The man-in-the-middle
adversary Eve can now try to attack Bob’s session key PRF(guv, ·) by submitting a modified
value S instead of gv to Alice, yielding a related key PRF(Su, ·) on Alice’s side. The PRF-ODH
assumption now guarantees that Bob’s key can still be considered indistinguishable from random
for the adversary.
Note that simple authentication of transmissions does not provide a remedy against the just
described problem. The adversary could impersonate a different (corrupt) party towards Alice,
and only re-use the Diffie–Hellman data, authenticated under the corrupt party’s key. Then the
Diffie–Hellman keys in the executions would still be non-trivially related. This happens especially
if keys are used across multiple sessions. Another problem is that some protocols may derive
keys “early”, e.g., before applying signatures. Examples for this are deriving keys for encryption
of the handshake or the post-handshake authentication mechanism in TLS 1.3 [Res18].
After its introduction in [JKSS12] (and prior to the publication of [BFGJ17a] on which
this chapter is based) the PRF-ODH assumption has been used to analyze many further key
exchange protocols such as [KPW13, BFK+14, DFGS15a, DFGS15b, DFGS16, FG17, BF17].
Notably, these analyses employ different versions of the PRF-ODH assumption, due to the
different usages of the key shares gu and gv. These key shares can be ephemeral (used in a single
session), semi-static (used in a small number of sessions), or static (used in multiple sessions).
Therefore, the man-in-the middle adversary may ask to see no related key for either key share,
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Alice Eve Bob
ephemeral ephemeral
or (semi-)static or (semi-)static
key gu key gv
gu−−−−−−−→
gu−−−−−−−→
gv←−−−−−−−
key derivation
S←−−−−−−− K ← PRF(guv , ·)
related key derivation
K′ ← PRF(Su, ·)
Figure 7.1: Origin of the PRF-ODH assumption: Man-in-the-middle attack on DH-based key exchange
protocol.
a single related key, or multiple related keys.
For instance, while Jager et al. [JKSS12] required only security against a single query for
one of the two key shares, Krawczyk et al. [KPW13] had to modify the originally proposed
PRF-ODH assumption because they require security wrt. multiple oracle queries against one
key share. In [FG17] an extra query to the other key share has been added, and [BF17] must
ensure security in presence of multiple queries to both key shares.
A unifying definition and a comprehensive treatment of the various PRF-ODH assumptions
had however been lacking. Especially the question whether the PRF-ODH assumption (or,
rather, which variant) can be instantiated in the standard model is of utmost interest. Some
of the aforementioned works refer to PRF-ODH as a standard-model assumption, since there
is no immediate reference to a random oracle. We will see later that this conclusion may be
misguided.
Our Contributions
Our contributions are as follows:
• As our first contribution, in Section 7.2, we give a comprehensive, unified definition of
the various PRF-ODH assumptions used in prior works on key exchange analyses. We
generally speak of the lrPRF-ODH assumption, where l, r ∈ {n, s,m} allowing the adversary
no (n), a single (s), or multiple (m) PRF oracle queries under keys related to the “left”
key share gu or the “right” key share gv. Such queries are handled by oracles ODHu and
ODHv, returning the corresponding pseudorandom function value.
• In order to support a better comparison between the various notions, in Section 7.3, we
relate the different flavors of lrPRF-ODH in terms of strength of the underlying assumption.
• In Section 7.4, we discuss how the different flavors of PRF-ODH can be instantiated from
various Diffie–Hellman assumptions and thus provide a systematic categorization into the
realm of well-understood hardness assumptions based on Diffie–Hellman.
• Since PRF-ODH has been used in connection with applied protocols like TLS, we finally
address the question which security guarantees we get for practical key derivation functions
used in such protocols. We are especially interested in the security of HMAC [KBC97]
which is the basis of the key derivation function HKDF [Kra10, KE10] that is, for example,
used in TLS 1.3 to derive keys.
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We show in Section 7.5 that HMAC achieves the strongest notion of mmPRF-ODH security
under the strong Diffie–Hellman assumption StDH and assuming that the compression
function is a random oracle.
• In Section 7.6, we briefly sketch our impossibility result which argues that it is implausible
to instantiate even the mildest one-sided PRF-ODH assumptions in the standard model.
Personal contributions in this section. All the material from this chapter appeared in the
joint work with Marc Fischlin, Felix Günther, and Christian Janson with the title PRF-ODH:
Relations, Instantiations, and Impossibility Results [BFGJ17a]. The full version of the paper can
be found on ePrint [BFGJ17b]. My main contributions lie in the development of the generalized
notion of lrPRF-ODH, the instantiation proofs, as well as the proof of the PRF-ODH security of
HMAC.
7.1 Related Work
Here, we briefly discuss the origins of PRF-ODH and show where PRF-ODH has been employed
in previous works and where it has been adopted since the publication of [BFGJ17a] in 2017.
Furthermore, we briefly discuss the relationship between PRF-ODH and related-key security for
pseudorandom functions as introduced by Bellare and Kohno [BK03], where the adversary can
ask to see PRF values for transformed keys φ(K). While similar in spirit at first glance, it seems
to us that the notions differ in technical details which makes it hard to relate them.
Oracle Diffie–Hellman assumption. In [ABR01], Abdalla, Bellare, and Rogaway intro-
duced the oracle Diffie–Hellman (ODH) assumption to show security of their public key encryption
scheme DHIES. Let H be a cryptographic hash function. Informally, the ODH assumption asks
an adversary A to distinguish H(guv) from a random string of the same length when given gu
and gv as well as access to an oracle that, on input X, returns H(Xv).
Usages of (lr)PRF-ODH. As mentioned before, PRF-ODH is a natural assumption for DH-
based key exchanges and has thus, unsurprisingly, been used in analyses of different protocols.
These include the analysis of the TLS 1.2 [DR08] ephemeral and static Diffie–Hellman handshake
modes [JKSS12, KPW13, BFK+14], the Diffie–Hellman-based and resumption handshake can-
didates [DFGS15a, DFGS15b, DFGS16] of TLS 1.3 [Res18], as well as a former TLS 1.3 0-RTT
handshake candidate [FG17], and a 0-RTT extension of the Extended Access Control (EAC)
protocol [BF17]. Since the systematic introduction of lrPRF-ODH in [BFGJ17a], the unified
assumption has further proven useful in the realm of secure messaging. The assumption has been
employed in the (full version) analysis of the Signal messaging protocol [CCD+16, CCD+17] as
well as the Asynchronous Ratcheting Tree (ART) protocol for secure group messaging [CCG+18].
Further real-world key exchange protocol analyses using lrPRF-ODH include the security analysis
of Wireguard [DP18] and the Noise framework [DRS19].
Related-key attacks. PRF-ODH requires the output of a PRF keyed with a DH value to be
indistinguishable from random even when given access to PRF evaluations keyed with related
group elements that share (at least) one exponent with the challenge key. On a high level, this
setting resembles the concept of related-key attack (RKA) security for pseudorandom functions
as introduced by Bellare and Kohno [BK03]. This resemblance raises the question whether the
PRF-ODH assumption can be instantiated from RKA-secure PRFs (or vice versa).
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Related-key attack security of a PRF f : K × D → R with respect to a set Φ of related-
key-deriving (RKD) functions is defined as the indistinguishability of two oracles F(·,K)(·)
and G(·,K)(·) for a randomly chosen key K $←− K. The distinguishing adversary A may query the
oracles on inputs (φ, x) ∈ Φ×D to which the oracles respond with F(φ,K)(x) := f(φ(K), x) and
G(φ,K)(x) := g(φ(K), x) for a function g drawn uniformly at random from the set FF(K,D,R)
of all functions K ×D → R. Formally, the advantage of A against the RKA-PRF security of f
with respect to the set Φ is defined as
AdvRKA-PRF,Φf,A (λ) :=
∣∣∣Pr [AF(·,K) = 1 | K $←− K]− Pr [AG(·,K) = 1 | K $←− K, g $←− FF(K,D,R)] ∣∣∣.
Intuitively, one should now be able to relate RKA-PRF security to PRF-ODH security by
considering two correlated sets of RKD functions corresponding to the PRF-ODH oracles ODHu
and ODHv with respect to a group G with generator g and two exponents u, v ∈ Zq:
ΦODHu := {φODHu,S | S ∈ G \ {gv}} where φODHu,S(K) := (K1/v)logg(S),
ΦODHv := {φODHv ,T | T ∈ G \ {gu}} where φODHv ,T (K) := (K1/u)logg(T ).
Insurmountable hurdles however seem to remain when trying to relate PRF-ODH notions
and RKA-PRF security (for according sets Φ) via implications.
In the one direction, the adversary in the PRF-ODH setting is provided with the DH shares gu
and gv forming the (challenge) PRF key while such side information on the key is not given in
the RKA-PRF setting. Hence, in a reduction of PRF-ODH security to some RKA-PRF notion,
even for an appropriate RKD function set a simulation always lacks the means to provide the
PRF-ODH adversary with these shares.
In the other direction, the RKA-PRF challenge can be issued on any related key φ(K) for
an admissible RKD function φ while the PRF-ODH challenge is, for the case of the real PRF
response, always computed on the key guv. A reduction would hence need to map the RKA-PRF
challenge for an arbitrary, related key onto the fixed PRF-ODH challenge key.
Though on a high level capturing a relatively similar idea, the exact relation between
PRF-ODH and RKA-PRF security hence remains an open question.
7.2 Modeling PRF Security under Related DH Keys
In this section we provide a unifying definition of the PRF-ODH assumption that captures
variants from the literature and discuss its relation to these previous occurrences [JKSS12,
KPW13, DFGS15b, DFGS16, BF17, FG17]. Furthermore, we provide a symmetric variant of
this generic definition that has been employed in key exchange analyses following [BFGJ17a].
Definition 7.1 (Generic PRF-ODH assumption). Let G = Gλ be a cyclic group of order q with
generator g whose choice depends on the security parameter λ. Let F : G× {0, 1}? → {0, 1}λ be
a pseudorandom function keyed with K ∈ G and with an input label x ∈ {0, 1}? that outputs a
value y ∈ {0, 1}λ, i.e., y ← F(K,x).
The generic security game for lrPRF-ODH (cf. Figure 7.2) is parametrized by l, r ∈ {n, s,m}
indicating how often the adversary is allowed to query a certain “left” resp. “right” oracle (ODHu
resp. ODHv), where n means that no query is allowed, s that a single query is allowed, and m
that multiple, i.e., polynomially many, queries are allowed to the respective oracle.
We say that a pseudorandom function F with keys from G = Gλ provides lrPRF-ODH security
(for l, r ∈ {n, s,m}) if for any PPT A the advantage defined as
AdvlrPRF-ODHG,F,A (λ) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr [GlrPRF-ODHG,F,A (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
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GlrPRF-ODHG,F,A (λ):
1 u $←− Zq
2 nl, nr ← 0
3 Q← ∅
4 afterchall← false
5 (x?, st) $←− AODHu(G, g, gu)
6 v $←− Zq
7 b $←− {0, 1}
8 y?0 ← F(guv, x?)
9 y?1
$←− {0, 1}λ
10 afterchall← true
11 b′ $←− AODHu,ODHv (gv, y?b , st)
12 if x? ∈ Q
13 b′ $←− {0, 1}
14 return Jb′ = bK
ODHu(S, x):
15 if nl ≥ l or S /∈ G
16 return ⊥
17 if l = s and afterchall = false
18 return ⊥
19 else
20 nl ← nl + 1
21 y ← F(Su, x)
22 if S = gv
23 Q← Q ∪ {x}
24 return y
ODHv(S, x):
25 if nr ≥ r or S /∈ G
26 return ⊥
27 else
28 nr ← nr + 1
29 y ← F(Sv, x)
30 if S = gu
31 Q← Q ∪ {x}
32 return y
Figure 7.2: PRF-ODH security of pseudorandom function F. In numerical evaluations of l and r we
naturally define n = 0, s = 1, and m =∞.
snPRF-ODH
mnPRF-ODH
ssPRF-ODH
msPRF-ODH smPRF-ODH
mmPRF-ODH
nsPRF-ODH
nmPRF-ODH
nnPRF-ODH
Figure 7.3: Different PRF-ODH variants from Definition 7.1. Solid arrows indicate the trivial implications
between PRF-ODH variants.
In the following, if clear from the context, we will omit the group G and its generator g as
explicit inputs to the adversary.
Relations to PRF-ODH assumptions in the literature. This generic and parametrized
lrPRF-ODH definition gives rise to nine different notions (depicted in Figure 7.3) and captures
different variants of the PRF-ODH assumption present in the literature. The PRF-ODH formula-
tion put forward by Jager et al. [JKSS12] is captured by ours when setting the parameters to
l = s and r = n, meaning that the “left” oracle (i.e., the DH share gu) can be queried only once.
Note that the access to ODHu in Line 5 is only given if l = m, capturing that Jager et al. first
request their challenge before issuing an oracle query. The administrative flag afterchall that is
set to true once the challenge has been generated ensures this. The same variant, snPRF-ODH,
was also used by Dowling et al. [DFGS16].
Krawczyk et al. [KPW13] modified the PRF-ODH formulation of Jager et al. since they
require security wrt. multiple “left” oracle queries against the respective DH key share. Thus,
their variant is captured by ours through setting the parameters to l = m and r = n, and thus
making use of Line 5.
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Other works further introduced an additional query to the other DH key share, due to
the fact that these key shares are static or semi-static, i.e., used across multiple sessions. In
more detail, Fischlin and Günther [FG17] require an extra single “right” oracle query while still
requesting polynomially many queries to the “left” oracle. This is captured by our definition
when setting the parameters to l = m and r = s. Lastly, Brendel and Fischlin [BF17] for their
0-RTT extension of the Extended Access Control (EAC) protocol require to query both key
shares multiple times, which our definition captures as well by choosing the parameters as l = m
and r = m. Due to the different ways in which ephemeral, semi-static, and long-term keys are
combined, both the analysis of the Signal protocol by Cohn-Gordon et al. [CCD+16], as well
as the analysis of the Noise framework by Dowling, Rösler, and Schwenk [DRS19] require a
multitude of the above mentioned assumptions. These analyses, as well as the analysis of earlier
TLS 1.3 draft handshakes by Dowling et al. [DFGS15b] and the Wireguard analysis by Dowling
and Paterson [DP18] require notions of PRF-ODH in which the challenger provides the value gv
to the adversary at the outset in Line 5.
Such change is accompanied by giving the adversary in Line 5 of Figure 7.2 also access to
the ODHv oracle in case r = m. The respective game Gsym-lrPRF-ODHG,F,A (λ) is depicted in Figure 7.4.
Note that this definition does not capture Dowling et al.’s interpretation of PRF-ODH [DFGS15b],
as they only allow oracle accesses after the challenge has been generated.
Gsym-lrPRF-ODHG,F,A (λ):
1 u, v $←− Zq
2 nl, nr ← 0, Q← ∅
3 afterchall← false
4 (x?, st) $←− AODHu,ODHv (G, g, gu, gv)
5 b $←− {0, 1}
6 y?0 ← F(guv, x?)
7 y?1
$←− {0, 1}λ
8 afterchall← true
9 b′ $←− AODHu,ODHv (y?b , st)
10 if x? ∈ Q
11 b′ $←− {0, 1}
12 return Jb′ = bK
ODHu(S, x):
13 if nl ≥ l or S /∈ G
14 return ⊥
15 if l = s and afterchall = false
16 return ⊥
17 else
18 nl ← nl + 1
19 y ← F(Su, x)
20 if S = gv
21 Q← Q ∪ {x}
22 return y
ODHv(S, x):
23 if nr ≥ r or S /∈ G
24 return ⊥
25 if r = s and afterchall = false
26 return ⊥
27 else
28 nr ← nr + 1
29 y ← F(Sv, x)
30 if S = gu
31 Q← Q ∪ {x}
32 return y
Figure 7.4: Symmetric PRF-ODH security of pseudorandom function F. In numerical evaluations of l
and r we naturally define n = 0, s = 1, and m =∞.
In this work, we focus on the common structure of studied PRF-ODH notions [JKSS12,
KPW13, DFGS16, BF17, FG17] that lead to the unifying notion from [BFGJ17a] and are
captured by Definition 7.1 above. However, in Section 7.3 we briefly discuss the impact of the
above mentioned changes regarding the analysis of the relations between the different variants
of the assumption.
Remark 7.2. If we provide the adversary additionally with the share gv in the initialization
phase, then Figure 7.6 symmetrically “collapses” along the central vertical axis, resulting
in Figure 7.5. In other words, this results in equivalences of the notions snPRF-ODH and
nsPRF-ODH, mnPRF-ODH and nmPRF-ODH, as well as msPRF-ODH and smPRF-ODH. We
already note that this is not a contradiction to our separation results among those notions
(given in the next Section 7.3), as they rely on the fact that gv is not given in advance.
Further design options. Another reasonable change could encompass enabling the adversary
in multi-query variants (i.e., where l = m or r = m) to also issue multiple challenge queries, for
the same value gv or even freshly chosen values gvi in each call. However, one can show via a
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sym-nnPRF-ODH
sym-snPRF-ODH
sym-mnPRF-ODH sym-ssPRF-ODH
sym-msPRF-ODH
sym-mmPRF-ODH
Figure 7.5: Notions of the symmetric variant sym-lrPRF-ODH with trivial implications indicated by
solid arrows.
standard hybrid argument that both notions (i.e., single challenge query and multiple challenge
query) are polynomially equivalent.
7.3 Relations
In this section we study the relations of different PRF-ODH variants spanned by our generic
Definition 7.1. An overview of the results is illustrated in Figure 7.6.
Let us start with observing the trivial implications (indicated by solid arrows in Figure 7.6)
which are induced by restricting the adversary’s capabilities in our definition. That is, by
restricting the access to one of the oracles ODHu or ODHv (from multiple queries to a single
query or from a single query to no query) for a notion from Definition 7.1, we obtain a trivially
weaker variant. The more interesting question is which of these implications are strict, i.e.,
which of two given PRF-ODH notions is strictly stronger than the other. For most cases we
can give separations which only require that the underlying primitive exists at all; for some
separations we rely on the random oracle model and a plausible number-theoretic DH-type
assumption. We begin with the standard model separations.
7.3.1 Separations in the Standard Model
Our standard model separations rely on the following family of functions F :
Definition 7.3 (Separating function family F). Let G : G× {0, 1}? → {0, 1}λ. We define the
family of functions F = {Fn}n∈N with Fn : G× {0, 1}? → {0, 1}λ as follows:
Fn(K,x) :=
{
G(K, 1)⊕ . . .⊕ G(K,n) if x = 0
G(K,x) otherwise.
To capture the main idea behind the standard model separations, let us first consider
the (in)security of functions Fn ∈ F in the standard PRF setting. It is easy to see that no
function Fn ∈ F can satisfy the usual security notion for pseudorandom functions as given in
Definition 3.13: For any function Fn, querying the PRF oracle on x0 = 0, . . . , xn = n yields
responses y0, . . . , yn for which the combined XOR value y = y0 ⊕ . . .⊕ yn is always 0 in case
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snPRF-ODH
mnPRF-ODH
ssPRF-ODH
msPRF-ODH smPRF-ODH
mmPRF-ODH
nsPRF-ODH
nmPRF-ODH
nnPRF-ODH
F1 (7.5) F1 (7.5)
F2 (7.6)
F2 (7.6)
F2 (7.6)
F2 (7.7)
F2 (7.7)
F2 (7.7)
F3 (7.8) F3 (7.8)
FRO (7.9)
FRO (7.10)
FRO (7.11)
FRO (7.11)
Figure 7.6: Relations between the different PRF-ODH variants. Solid arrows indicate the trivial
implications between PRF-ODH variants, dashed arrows indicate implications we establish. Struck-out,
densely dotted arrows indicate separations in the standard model via the indicated function Fn ∈ F (cf.
Definition 7.3). Struck-out, sparsely dotted arrows indicated separations in the random-oracle model.
Numbers in parentheses indicate the respective propositions and theorems.
the oracle computes the real function Fn, whereas otherwise it is 0 only with probability 2−λ.
However, in a setting where the PRF adversary A is allowed to query the oracle only a limited
number of times (at most n queries for function Fn), we can indeed establish the following,
restricted PRF security for functions Fn ∈ F .
Proposition 7.4 (F is restricted-PRF secure). If G is a pseudorandom function, then each Fn ∈
F from Definition 7.3 is an n-restricted pseudorandom function in the sense that it provides
PRF security wrt. Definition 3.13 against any adversary that is allowed to query the PRF oracle
OPRF at most n times.
Proof (informal). Let Fn ∈ F be an arbitrary but fixed function from F .
Game0(λ): The original Gr-prf-secFn,A (λ) restricted-PRF game, which is the PRF game where the
adversary trivially loses the game when making more than n queries to the oracle OPRF.
Game1(λ): We replace the pseudorandom function G in the definition of Fn by a truly random
function G′. We argue that any adversary A that can efficiently distinguish Game0(λ)
from Game1(λ) yields an efficient adversary B against the pseudorandomness of G.
The reduction B against the PRF security of G simply initiates A and faithfully simulates
the (restricted) PRF game for A by relaying all of A’s queries to its own PRF oracle for G,
also relaying the oracle responses.
After this change, the output values of Fn on inputs x > 0 are independent random values and
the output on x = 0 is the XOR of the outputs on x = 1, . . . , n. In contrast, for a truly random
function, the outputs on all inputs (incl. x = 0) are independent and random. However, any
adversary A that is allowed to query the PRF oracle on at most n inputs cannot distinguish
these two cases, thus its advantage at this point is bounded by 0.
Let us now turn to the more involved PRF-ODH setting. Equipped with the function
family F , we can establish separations between various PRF-ODH variants, as illustrated in
Figure 7.6. The key insight for these separations is similar to the one in the standard PRF
setting:
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An adversary with a limited number of n queries (including the challenge query in the
PRF-ODH setting) cannot distinguish Fn from a truly random function.
This allows us to establish the following separations:
• nnPRF-ODH (with single challenge query) from snPRF-ODH and nsPRF-ODH (with two
queries: one challenge query and one to one of the ODH oracles) via function F1 (Proposi-
tion 7.5).
• snPRF-ODH and nsPRF-ODH (with two queries) from mnPRF-ODH, ssPRF-ODH, and
nmPRF-ODH (with three or polynomially many queries) via F2 (Proposition 7.6).
• ssPRF-ODH (three queries) from mnPRF-ODH and nmPRF-ODH (with multiple queries
to one of the ODH oracles) using function F3 (Proposition 7.8).
Note that functions Fn ∈ F cannot provide separations between two notions that both allow
polynomially many queries (for example between mnPRF-ODH and msPRF-ODH). To keep the
propositions compact, the given separations constitute the minimal spanning set; recall that if a
notion A implies another notion B, separating a notion C from B also separates C from A.
Proposition 7.5 (nnPRF-ODH 6=⇒ snPRF-ODH, nsPRF-ODH).
If G from Definition 7.3 is nnPRF-ODH secure, then F1 ∈ F is nnPRF-ODH secure, but neither
snPRF-ODH nor snPRF-ODH secure. More precisely, for any efficient adversary A against
the nnPRF-ODH security of F1, there exists an efficient algorithm B such that
AdvnnPRF-ODHG,F1,A (λ) ≤ AdvnnPRF-ODHG,G,B (λ),
but there exist efficient algorithms A1 and A2 with non-negligible advantage
AdvsnPRF-ODHG,F1,A1 (λ) = Adv
nsPRF-ODH
G,F1,A2 (λ) = 1− 2−λ.
Proof. We first show that the function F1 does not provide security in the PRF-ODH sense if
a single query to either oracle is allowed. However, as we will show then, if the underlying
function G is nnPRF-ODH secure, then so is F1.
F1 is not snPRF-ODH or nsPRF-ODH secure. First, we argue that the snPRF-ODH adversary
A1 and nsPRF-ODH adversary A2 are successful (except with negligible probability): Both
first challenge F1 on x? = 0 (obtaining as y?b either y?0 ← G(guv, 1) or y?1 $←− {0, 1}λ). Next,
they query (gv, 1) to their ODHu or (gu, 1) to their ODHv oracle respectively, obtaining
the value y ← G(guv, 1). They distinguish the challenge by outputting 0 if y?b = y and 1
otherwise and win except if coincidentally y?1 = y, which happens with probability at
most 2−λ.
F1 is nnPRF-ODH if G is nnPRF-ODH secure. To see that F1 is nnPRF-ODH secure if G is,
consider a reduction B that simply relays its obtained value gu to A. Furthermore, it
relays the unmodified challenge query of A to its challenger, if x? 6= 0. If x? = 0, B asks
its challenger on 1. Forwarding the response and outputting the same bit b′ as A outputs,
B provides a correct simulation for A and, moreover, wins if A does.
We continue with the separation of snPRF-ODH from mnPRF-ODH, ssPRF-ODH, and nmPRF-ODH
security.
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Proposition 7.6 (snPRF-ODH 6=⇒ mnPRF-ODH, ssPRF-ODH, nmPRF-ODH).
If G from Definition 7.3 is mnPRF-ODH secure, then F2 ∈ F is snPRF-ODH secure, but neither
mnPRF-ODH, nor ssPRF-ODH, nor nmPRF-ODH secure. More precisely, for any efficient
adversary A against the snPRF-ODH security of F2, there exist efficient algorithms B1, B2, B3,
and B4 such that
AdvsnPRF-ODHG,F2,A (λ) ≤ AdvmnPRF-ODHG,G,B1 (λ) + 4 · AdvmnPRF-ODHG,G,B2 (λ)
+ 4 · AdvmnPRF-ODHG,G,B3 (λ) + AdvmnPRF-ODHG,G,B4 (λ),
but there exist efficient algorithms A1, A2, and A3 with non-negligible advantage
AdvmnPRF-ODHG,F2,A1 (λ) = Adv
ssPRF-ODH
G,F2,A2 (λ) = Adv
nmPRF-ODH
G,F2,A3 (λ) = 1− 2−λ.
Proof. We first show that F2 is not mnPRF-ODH, ssPRF-ODH, or nmPRF-ODH secure. After-
wards we show that F2 is however snPRF-ODH secure if G is mnPRF-ODH secure.
F2 is not mnPRF-ODH, ssPRF-ODH, or nmPRF-ODH secure. For this, consider the respective
adversaries A1, A2, A3 which first query the challenge x? = 0, obtaining, besides, g, gv, a
value y?b which equals either y?0 ← F2(guv, 0) = G(guv, 1)⊕G(guv, 2) if b = 0 or y?1 $←− {0, 1}?
if b = 1.
Then the adversaries make the following queries to their oracles, thereby obtaining
values y′ ← G(guv, 1) and y′′ ← G(guv, 2).
• A1 issues two queries (gv, 1) and (gv, 2) to its ODHu oracle.
• A2 issues (gv, 1) to its ODHu oracle and (gu, 2) to its ODHv oracle.
• A3 issues queries (gu, 1) and (gu, 2) to its ODHv oracle.
The adversaries then check whether y?b = y′ ⊕ y′′. If so, they output 0, else 1. Hence, A1,
A2, and A3 always win the mnPRF-ODH, ssPRF-ODH, resp. nmPRF-ODH game for F2,
except when y?1 = y′ ⊕ y′′, which happens with negligible probability 2−λ.
F2 is snPRF-ODH secure if G is mnPRF-ODH secure. For this, we separately consider the two
distinct cases that A issues a challenge query for x? > n and the case that x? ≤ n.
In case x? > n, we can bound A’s advantage, denoted as AdvsnPRF-ODH,x?>nF2,A (λ), by the
advantage of an adversary B1 against the mnPRF-ODH security of G as follows.
Algorithm B1 provides its initially obtained values g, gu as the initial input to A. When A
queries x?, B1 relays the challenge to its own challenge oracle, and forwards the obtained
response (gv, y?b ) back to A. When A issues its (sole) ODHu query (S, x), B1 simply relays
query and response in case x 6= 0. In case x = 0, B1 instead queries its ODHu oracle on
(S, 1) and (S, 2) and returns the combined XOR to A. Finally, when A outputs its guess b′,
B1 stops and outputs the same guess b′.
Observe that B1 is efficient (issuing three queries, where A issues two queries) and provides
a sound simulation for A.
Note in particular that, as x? > n, all of B1’s ODHu queries (in particular on x ≤ n)
are permissible. As the challenge bit b coincides for B1’s mnPRF-ODH game and the
simulated snPRF-ODH game for A, B1 wins if A does, hence
AdvsnPRF-ODH,x
?>n
G,F2,A (λ) ≤ AdvmnPRF-ODHG,G,B1 (λ). (7.1)
In case x? ≤ n, we apply the game hopping technique on the snPRF-ODH game for A.
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Game0(λ): The original snPRF-ODH game for A (with challenge queries x? ≤ n).
Game1(λ): First, we change the function F2 to a function F′2 which is defined as follows:
F′2(K,x) :=

F2(K,x) if K 6= guv
R(i)⊕ G(K, j) if K = guv and x = 0
R(i) if K = guv and x = i
G(K,x) if K = guv and x /∈ {0, i}
for a truly random function R, the group elements gu, gv from the snPRF-ODH
challenge, and some random, but fixed i $←− {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2} such that j 6= i.
We show that if there exists an efficient adversary that can distinguish Game0(λ)
from Game1(λ), then there exists an efficient adversary B2 against the mnPRF-ODH
security of G.
Algorithm B2 obtains gu and begins by sampling b $←− {0, 1} and i $←− {1, 2} at random.
It asks x?? = i as its challenge and obtains (gv, y??b′ ) where y??b′ is either y??0 ← G(guv, i)
or y??1 $←− {0, 1}λ, depending on the challenge bit b′. It then provides A with gu and
responds to A’s queries as follows, dependent on A’s challenge query:
A asks the challenge x? = 0: In this case, B2 queries (gv, j), obtains y as response
and computes y?b , where y?0 ← y??b′ ⊕ y and y?1 $←− {0, 1}λ. It returns y?b to A. Observe
that including y??b′ makes the response in case b = 0 represent either F2 (if b′ = 0) or
F′2 (if b′ = 1).
For A’s ODHu query, we let B2 respond with y??b′ if A queries (gv, i) and have B2
relay the query to its own ODHu oracle otherwise.
A asks a challenge x? 6= 0: We let B2 abort if x? = i (which happens with
probability at most 12). Otherwise we know that x? = j and let B2 query (gv, x?) to
its own ODHu oracle, obtaining y. It sets y?0 = y and y?1 $←− {0, 1}λ and returns y?b
to A.
For A’s ODHu query, B2 simply relays queries (S, x) with S 6= gv or x /∈ {0, i}. In
case A queries (gv, 0), B2 asks its own ODHu query on (gv, j), obtaining y′, and
returns y??b′ ⊕ y′ to A. In case A queries (gv, i), B2 responds with y??b′ .
When A stops and outputs its guess bguess, B2 outputs 0 if b = bguess and 1 otherwise.
B2 correctly simulates the snPRF-ODH game either for function F2 (in case b′ = 0 in
B2’s mnPRF-ODH game) or for function F′2 (in case b′ = 1). By using y??b′ = G(guv, i)
if b′ = 0, B2 computes F2(guv, 0)← G(guv, i)⊕ G(guv, j) in the challenge and ODHu
responses for x? = 0 resp. x = 0, otherwise it computes F′2(guv, 0)← R(i)⊕ G(guv, j).
Similarly, B2 responds to ODHu queries on (gv, i) with either G(guv, i) or R(i),
depending on y??b′ . Furthermore, by picking b $←− {0, 1} on its own and aborting
on x? = i, algorithm B2 also correctly provides A with a real-or-random challenge
response in both cases.
We can determine the advantage of B2 against the mnPRF-ODH security of G as
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follows (informally denoting by, e.g., “B2 = 0” the event that B2 outputs 0).
AdvmnPRF-ODHG,G,B2 (λ) =
∣∣∣Pr[B2 = b′]− 12 ∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣12 · (Pr[B2 = 0 | b′ = 0]+ Pr[B2 = 1 | b′ = 1])− 12 ∣∣∣
= 12 ·
∣∣∣Pr[B2 = 0 | b′ = 0]− Pr[B2 = 0 | b′ = 1]∣∣∣
= 14 ·
∣∣∣Pr[B2 = 0 | b′ = 0 ∧ ¬abort]− Pr[B2 = 0 | b′ = 1 ∧ ¬abort]∣∣∣
≥ 14 ·
∣∣∣AdvsnPRF-ODH,x?≤nG,F2,A (λ)− 12 − AdvsnPRF-ODH,x?≤nG,F′2,A (λ) + 12 ∣∣∣
= 14 ·
∣∣∣AdvsnPRF-ODH,x?≤nG,F2,A (λ)− AdvsnPRF-ODH,x?≤nG,F′2,A (λ)∣∣∣
Hence, by switching from F2 to F′2 we get
AdvsnPRF-ODH,x
?≤n
G,F2,A (λ) ≤ Adv
snPRF-ODH,x?≤n
G,F′2,A (λ) + 4 · Adv
mnPRF-ODH
G,G,B2 (λ). (7.2)
Game2(λ): In a second step, we similarly modify the snPRF-ODH game for A to the game
GsnPRF-ODH,x
?≤n
G,F′′2 ,A (λ) by switching from F
′
2 to a function F′′2 which now also replaces
values G(K, j) by the output of a random function:
F′′2(K,x) :=

F2(K,x) if K 6= guv
R(1)⊕ R(2) if K = guv and x = 0
R(x) if K = guv and x ∈ {1, 2}
G(K,x) if K = guv and x > 2
As before, this change can be bounded by the advantage of an algorithm B3 against
the mnPRF-ODH security of G. Much like the reduction B2, the reduction B3 encodes
its challenge on x?? = i $←− {1, 2} as the value representing G(guv, i) in F′2 resp. R(i)
in F′′2. For inputs x = j, i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}, B3 samples a random value R(j) $←− {0, 1}λ
on its own.
Following the same analysis as for the switch from F2 to F′2, we can bound the
advantage difference introduced by this change. Hence we have
AdvsnPRF-ODH,x
?≤n
G,F′2,A (λ) ≤ Adv
snPRF-ODH,x?≤n
G,F′′2 ,A (λ) + 4 · Adv
mnPRF-ODH
G,G,B3 (λ). (7.3)
Finally, in the snPRF-ODH game for F′′2, the values F′′2(guv, 1) and F′′2(guv, 2) are indepen-
dent, uniformly random values and F′′2(guv, 0) their XOR combination. The advantage of A
in this game can hence immediately be reduced to the advantage B4 in a mnPRF-ODH
game against G.
For this, B4 replies to all challenge and ODHu queries on (guv, x) for x ∈ {0, 1, 2} on its
own with R(x) (for x ∈ {1, 2}) resp. R(1)⊕ R(2) (for x = 0), picking random values R(1),
R(2) $←− {0, 1}λ itself. Note that, since A can pose at most two queries (one challenge
and one ODHu query), these responses are consistent even though B4 does respond with
distinct real (R(x)) or random values.
Beyond that, B4 can simply relay all other queries to its own challenge and ODHu oracles.
This finally determines the advantage of A against F′′2 as
AdvsnPRF-ODH,x
?≤n
G,F′′2 ,A (λ) = Adv
mnPRF-ODH
G,G,B4 (λ). (7.4)
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Combining the above advantage bounds, i.e., Equations (7.1) – (7.4), yields the overall bound.
In a similar way as for Proposition 7.6 we now also separate nsPRF-ODH security from
mnPRF-ODH, ssPRF-ODH, and nmPRF-ODH security.
Proposition 7.7 (nsPRF-ODH 6=⇒ mnPRF-ODH, ssPRF-ODH, nmPRF-ODH).
If G from Definition 7.3 is nmPRF-ODH secure, then F2 ∈ F is nsPRF-ODH secure, but neither
mnPRF-ODH, nor ssPRF-ODH, nor nmPRF-ODH secure. More precisely, for any efficient
adversary A against the nsPRF-ODH security of F2, there exist efficient algorithms B1, B2, B3,
and B4 such that
AdvnsPRF-ODHG,F2,A (λ) ≤ AdvnmPRF-ODHG,G,B1 (λ) + 4 · AdvnmPRF-ODHG,G,B2 (λ)
+ 4 · AdvnmPRF-ODHG,G,B3 (λ) + AdvnmPRF-ODHG,G,B4 ,
but there exist efficient algorithms A1, A2, A3 with non-negligible advantage
AdvmnPRF-ODHG,F2,A1 (λ) = Adv
ssPRF-ODH
G,F2,A2 (λ) = Adv
nmPRF-ODH
G,F2,A3 (λ) = 1− 2−λ.
Proof. In Proposition 7.6 we have already established that F2 provides no nmPRF-ODH,
ssPRF-ODH and mnPRF-ODH security given the respective algorithms A1, A2, and A3. For
the proof that F2 is nsPRF-ODH secure, observe that applying the mirrored proof that F2
is snPRF-ODH secure from Proposition 7.6 establishes the desired bound. In particular, via
algorithms B1, B2, B3, B4 with multiple queries to the ODHv oracle we can similarly to before
reduce the security to the nmPRF-ODH security of G.
We now consider the separation of ssPRF-ODH from mnPRF-ODH and nmPRF-ODH.
Proposition 7.8 (ssPRF-ODH 6=⇒ mnPRF-ODH, nmPRF-ODH).
If G from Definition 7.3 is msPRF-ODH secure, then F3 ∈ F is ssPRF-ODH secure, but neither
mnPRF-ODH nor nmPRF-ODH secure. More precisely, for any efficient adversary A against
the ssPRF-ODH security of F3, there exist efficient algorithms B1, B2, . . . , B5 such that
AdvssPRF-ODHG,F3,A (λ) ≤ AdvmsPRF-ODHG,G,B1 (λ) + 3 · AdvmsPRF-ODHG,G,B2 (λ)
+ 3 · AdvmsPRF-ODHG,G,B3 (λ) + 3 · AdvmsPRF-ODHG,G,B4 (λ) + AdvmsPRF-ODHG,G,B5 (λ),
but there exist algorithms A1 and A2 with non-negligible advantage
AdvmnPRF-ODHG,F3,A1 (λ) = Adv
nmPRF-ODH
G,F3,A2 (λ) = 1− 2−λ.
Proof. As for the previous separations, it is apparent that F3 cannot provide security in the sense
of mnPRF-ODH or nmPRF-ODH. An adversary querying the three values F3(guv, i), i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
can use its ODHu resp. ODHv oracle to distinguish the real value F3(guv, 0) from a random value,
except with negligible probability 2−λ.
For proving that F3 is ssPRF-ODH secure if G is msPRF-ODH secure, we apply the same
proof strategy applied in the proof of Proposition 7.6 for showing snPRF-ODH security of F2
based on the mnPRF-ODH security of G, but with two modifications:
Modification 1: The first difference we have to take into account is that an ssPRF-ODH
adversary A may also issue a (single) ODHv query for a value T 6= gu (beyond its challenge
and one ODHu query). While such a query does not interfere with our proof steps, we
cannot relay such a query to an ODHu oracle. Thus we need that G is msPRF-ODH secure,
providing the reductions with a (single) ODHv oracle call.
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Modification 2: The other change is that we replace values G(guv, i) by the outputs R(i) of a
random function R for three (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) instead of two labels. We abort in each step
if A asks a challenge x? = i for our guessed i, which now happens with probability at
most 13 . Accounting for the modified factor, this yields the three intermediary advantage
bounds of 3 · AdvmsPRF-ODHG,G,Bj (λ) for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
7.3.2 Separations in the Random Oracle Model
We now turn towards the separations in the random oracle model. Here, we will use a version
of the following interactive-inversion DH problem of computing non-trivial v-th roots in G for
implicitly given exponent v:
Interactive-inversion DH. Consider an algorithm A which outputs some group element
X ∈ G with X 6= 1 (and some state information) and then receives gv for random v $←− Zq. At
some point, A terminates with some output Y , such that Y v = X (cf. Figure 7.7).
GiDHG,A(λ):
1 v $←− Zq
2 Y $←− A(gv)
3 return JY v = gK
GiiDHG,A(λ):
1 X $←− A
2 v $←− Zq
3 Y $←− A(gv)
4 if x = 1
5 return ⊥
6 else
7 return JY v = XK
GsiiDHG,A (λ):
1 X $←− A
2 v $←− Zq
3 Y $←− ADDH(gv,·,·)(gv)
4 if X = 1
5 return ⊥
6 else
7 return JY v = XK
DDH(gv, A,B):
8 return JAv = BK
Figure 7.7: Inversion DH problem iDH, interactive-inversion DH problem iiDH and strong interactive-
inversion DH problem siiDH.
Note that the problem would be trivial if X = 1 was allowed (in which case Y = 1 would
provide a solution), or if X can be chosen after having seen gv (in which case X = gv and Y = g
would trivially work). Excluding these trivial cases, in terms of generic or algebraic hardness
the problem is equivalent to the CDH problem (given gu, gv compute guv; cf. Section 3.5):
Assume A “knows” α ∈ Zq such that X = gα. Since X is chosen before seeing gv, the
adversary can only compute it as a power of g and, in addition, X 6= 1 implies α 6= 0. Therefore,
for any valid solution Y the value Y 1/α would be a v-th root of g, because (Y 1/α)v = X1/α = g.
This problem of computing g1/v from g, gv, however, is known as the inversion DH (iDH)
problem (cf. Figure 7.7) and has been shown to be equivalent to the CDH problem with a loose
reduction by Bao, Deng, and Zhu [BDZ03].
Strong interactive-inversion DH. For our separation result we need a slightly stronger
version, where, in the second phase, the adversary also gets access to a decision oracle which, on
input two group elements A,B ∈ G outputs 1 if and only if Av = B.6 We call this the strong
interactive-inversion DH problem and denote it by siiDH (cf. Figure 7.7). Let us further denote
6Note that for example in a pairing-based group such an oracle is given for free, while computing a v-th root
of g (or, equivalently, solving the computational DH problem) may still be hard.
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by AdvsiiDHG,A (λ) the probability that A succeeds in the strong interactive-inversion DH game, i.e.,
AdvsiiDHG,A (λ) = Pr
[
GsiiDHG,A (λ) = 1
]
. (7.5)
With the help of siiDH and the strong Diffie–Hellman assumption StDH, we are now ready
to separate nmPRF-ODH from snPRF-ODH and smPRF-ODH from mnPRF-ODH.
Proposition 7.9 (nmPRF-ODH 6=⇒ snPRF-ODH).
In the random oracle model, and assuming the intractability of StDH and siiDH, there exists
a function FRO which is nmPRF-ODH secure but not snPRF-ODH secure. More precisely, for
any efficient adversary ARO against the nmPRF-ODH security of FRO, there exist efficient
algorithms B1 and B2 such that
AdvnmPRF-ODHG,FRO,ARO (λ) ≤ AdvstDHG,B1(λ) + qODHv · AdvsiiDHG,B2 (λ) +
qRO
q
+ 2−λ,
where qRO and qODHv are the maximum number of queries to the random oracle and the ODHv
oracle, respectively, and q is the order of the group G. However there exists an efficient
algorithm ARO with non-negligible advantage in the snPRF-ODH game, i.e., such that
AdvsnPRF-ODHG,FRO,ARO (λ) ≥ 1− 2−λ+1.
Proof. For the proof consider the function FRO : G× (G× {0, 1}λ)→ {0, 1}λ defined as
FRO(K, (x, y)) :=
{
y if RO
(
Kx−1, (x, 0λ)
)
= y and x 6= 1
RO
(
K, (x, y)
)
else
We first show that this function is not secure in a PRF-ODH sense if a single query to the right
ODHu oracle is allowed. However, as we will argue then, it can withstand polynomially many
queries to the ODHv oracle and thus achieves nmPRF-ODH security.
FRO is not snPRF-ODH secure. We first argue that this function is easy to attack in the
snPRF-ODH sense, when given an ODHu oracle which can be queried once after having
learned the challenge values. To this end let ARO, on input g and gu use x? = (gu, 0λ)
in the challenge query, resulting in the response (gv, y?b ). If gu = 1 then our adversary
can compute the key guv = gv and verify y?b directly via RO, outputting bguess = 0 if the
challenge value matches the computed value. Otherwise, in the single query to the ODHu
oracle let the adversary forward (gv+1, (gu, y?b )) to get the value y. The adversary then
outputs bguess = 0 if and only if this answer y matches y?b .
Note that for b = 0, i.e., y?b is computed as FRO(guv, (gu, 0λ)) and our adversary always
returns bguess = 0. For gu = 1 this is straightforward to see. Otherwise, the key in the
query to ODHu equals guv+v such that the exception is satisfied.
If y?b is random, i.e. b = 1, then we have a match with probability at most 2−λ+1: either
the random y? accidentally matches the actual pseudorandom value, or the random oracle
output RO(guv+u, (gu, y?)) coincides with y?. Both events happen with probability at
most 2−λ.
FRO is nmPRF-ODH secure via siiDH.
For the security in the nmPRF-ODH sense recall that now the adversary has “only” access
to an ODHv oracle for multiple queries, after having received the challenge value y?b for
challenge query x?.
101
Chapter 7. PRF-ODH: Relations, Instantiations, and Impossibility Results
Game0(λ): The original nmPRF-ODH game.
Game1(λ): We first argue that the adversary can never ask the random oracle about the
DH key guv used during the attack. This step will be discussed more thoroughly
for the more general case in the instantiation proof of nmPRF-ODH under the StDH
assumption (cf. Theorem 7.15), so we skip it here. We emphasize that this also
provides a sound simulation of the random oracle answers without explicit knowledge
of u, v in the attack.
We have
AdvnmPRF-ODHG,F,A (λ) ≤ AdvG1G,F,A(λ) + AdvstDHG,B1(λ). (7.6)
Game2(λ): Next, note that we can assume that the adversary with its challenge query
x? = (x′, y′) does not trigger the exceptional event of having the function output
y′ = RO(guv(x′)−1, (x′, 0λ)).
This is since v is only picked after the adversary has submitted x?. Hence, the
probability that any previous random oracle query was about this key, is at most qROq .
Else, y′ matches this previously not queried random oracle value only with probability
2−λ. Hence, the adversary receives the value y? as either RO(guv, (x′, y′)) or as a
random value.
We have
AdvG1G,F,A(λ) ≤ AdvG2G,F,A(λ) +
qRO
q
+ 2−λ.
Since queries (gu, x?) to the ODHv oracle are prohibited and the adversary never asks
the random oracle about the key guv, the only possibility to distinguish a random
challenge y? from an actual random oracle answer, is to trigger the exceptional case
in the function evaluation for the challenge data. As we will show next, this however
would immediately imply an efficient solver for the siiDH problem.
Game3(λ): So assume that the adversary queries its ODHv oracle about (T, (x, y)) such
that T vx−1 = guv, x? = (x, 0λ) for x 6= 1, and y matches RO(T vx−1, (x, 0λ)). In this
case we have x = (Tg−u)v and therefore Tg−u is a v-th root of x 6= 1. This can
now be straightforwardly turned into an efficient solver B2 of the (strong) interactive
inversion assumption siiDH, as follows:
B2 initiates the environment for A by picking u $←− Zq itself. Random oracle queries
of A before it has output its challenge value x?, are answered by lazy sampling. Once
A outputs x?, B2 forwards x? to its own challenger and receives a value gv which it
forwards to A along with a random challenge element y?.
The adversary Amay now query the ODHv oracle in addition to the random oracle. B2
uses its decisional oracle DDH(gv, ·, ·) to answer A’s ODHv and RO queries consistently
(as in the reduction to the StDH problem).
Note that, since B2 had no knowledge of gv prior to A outputting x?, random oracle
responses of A before the challenge request might not have been soundly simulated.
However, the probability that the adversary has made such a query earlier (and thus
could detect the soundness error) is at most qROq , since v is chosen at random in Zq,
and we have already accounted for such cases for the event that the adversary has
not triggered the exceptional event in the challenge query in Game2(λ).
The reduction then guesses the “correct” ODHv query (T, (x, y)) of the adversary
and outputs Tg−u as the v-th root in its strong interactive-inversion DH game.
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Clearly, if A is able to trigger the exceptional case and B2 guesses the correct query,
then B2 wins its siiDH game with non-negligible advantage.
We have
AdvG2G,F,A(λ) ≤ AdvG3G,F,A(λ) + qODHv · AdvsiiDHG,B2 (λ)
where qODHv is the number of oracle queries A makes to the ODHv oracle.
Having excluded all of the above scenarios, we have excluded adversary from making a
“bad” query to the ODHv oracle. Thus, A cannot distinguish the two challenge cases at
all, i.e., AdvG3G,F,A(λ) ≤ 0, which concludes the proof.
The idea can now be transferred to the case that we further allow one oracle query to ODHu,
basically by “secret sharing” the reply in the exceptional case among two queries:
Proposition 7.10 (smPRF-ODH 6=⇒ mnPRF-ODH).
In the random oracle model, and assuming StDH and siiDH, there exists a function FRO which is
smPRF-ODH secure but not mnPRF-ODH secure. More precisely, for any efficient adversary ARO
against the smPRF-ODH security of FRO, there exist efficient algorithms B1,B2, such that
AdvsmPRF-ODHG,FRO,ARO (λ) ≤
√
AdvstDHG,B1(λ) + qODHv · AdvsiiDHG,B2 (λ) +
qRO
q
+ 2−λ,
for the at most qRO and qODHv queries to the random oracle and ODHv oracle, respectively, but
there exists an efficient algorithm ARO with non-negligible advantage
AdvmnPRF-ODHG,FRO,ARO (λ) ≥ 1− 2−λ+1.
Proof. Consider the function FRO : G× (G× {0, 1}λ)→ {0, 1}λ defined as:
FRO(K, (x, y)) =

y ⊕ RO(K, (K, 0λ)) if RO(Kx−1, (x, 0λ)) = y and x 6= 1
RO(K, (K, 0λ)) if RO(Kx−1, (x, 0λ)) = 1λ ⊕ y and x 6= 1
RO(K, (x, y)) else
FRO is not mnPRF-ODH secure. We first show again that this function is easy to attack in the
mnPRF-ODH case. The adversary is very similar to the one in Proposition 7.9. Namely,
our adversary asks the challenge query x? = (gu, 0λ) to receive y?, then asks its ODHu
oracle about (gv+1, (gu, y?)) and (gv+1, (gu, y? ⊕ 1λ)), and adds the answers and compares
them to y?. If and only if the values match it outputs 0. In case gu = 1 it can again
compute the reply directly. Overall, it always outputs 0 if y? is the function value, and
only with probability at most 2−λ+1 if it is random.
FRO is smPRF-ODH secure via siiDH. Arguing again that an algorithm with multi-query access
to ODHv and single-query access to ODHu cannot succeed with non-negligible probability
is very close to the previous case in Proposition 7.9, where the single query to the ODHu
oracle is simulated by returning an independent, uniformly random value. Ensuring
consistency between the two ODH oracles yields a loose reduction to the StDH problem.
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In fact, in the negative result for mnPRF-ODH the adversary only needs to ask two queries
to the ODHu oracle after receiving the challenge query. Since the function is still secure for a
single ODHu query, this is optimal in this regard.
Corollary 7.11 (nmPRF-ODH 6=⇒ smPRF-ODH). Since it holds that smPRF-ODH implies
ssPRF-ODH, which in turn implies snPRF-ODH, the separation between nmPRF-ODH and
snPRF-ODH from Proposition 7.9 immediately also establishes nmPRF-ODH 6=⇒ smPRF-ODH.
Corollary 7.12 (smPRF-ODH 6=⇒ mmPRF-ODH). As mmPRF-ODH implies msPRF-ODH,
which in turn implies mnPRF-ODH, the separation between smPRF-ODH and mnPRF-ODH from
Proposition 7.10 immediately also establishes smPRF-ODH 6=⇒ mmPRF-ODH.
7.3.3 Discussion
Let us close this section with some remarks about the separations.
Remark 7.13. Our separating function family (cf. Definition 7.3) establishes a number of
separations, but cannot be used in order to separate the remaining variants. This is due to the
fact that our function family cannot separate between notions that both allow polynomially
many queries as for example nmPRF-ODH and smPRF-ODH. Thus, we have turned to the
random oracle model to establish further separations. We already note that using this idealized
model is alleviated by the implausibility result of instantiating PRF-ODH in the standard model
which we will briefly discuss later.
In the random oracle model we have shown that it is crucial whether the adversary has
access to the ODHu oracle or not (or how many times). This uses some asymmetry in the two
oracles, namely, that gu is given before the challenge query, and gv only after. Our separations
take advantage of this difference, visualized via the interactive-inversion DH problem which is
only hard if x? is chosen before receiving gv.
It is currently open if the other notions are separable. Beyond the asymmetry that gu is
already available before the challenge by A, it is unclear how to “encode” other distinctive
information into the input to the “memoryless” PRF which one oracle can exploit but the other
one cannot.
Relations between sym-lrPRF-ODH notions. As mentioned already in the remark above,
the random oracle separations given in this section do not carry over to the symmetric setting as
they crucially rely on the asymmetry in the oracles. The results from this section that do apply
in the symmetric setting are depicted in Figure 7.8. The separation between sym-msPRF-ODH
and sym-mmPRF-ODH remains open.
7.4 Instantiations
We next turn to the question how to instantiate the PRF-ODH assumption. Concretely, we
provide instantiations of the two notions that mark both ends of the strength spectrum of the
PRF-ODH variants.
We first show that the weakest PRF-ODH variant, nnPRF-ODH, can be instantiated in the
standard model under well-established assumptions, namely from a pseudorandom function and
assuming intractability of the decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) problem.
On the other end of the spectrum, we establish that both the strongest one-sided PRF-ODH
variants, mnPRF-ODH and nmPRF-ODH, as well as the most general mmPRF-ODH assumption
can be instantiated from the strong Diffie–Hellman assumption (StDH) in the (programmable)
random oracle model.
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sym-nnPRF-ODH
sym-snPRF-ODH
sym-mnPRF-ODH sym-ssPRF-ODH
sym-msPRF-ODH
sym-mmPRF-ODH
F1 (7.5)
F2 (7.6) F2 (7.6)
F3 (7.8)
Figure 7.8: Relations result in the symmetric PRF-ODH setting.
snPRF-ODH
mnPRF-ODH
ssPRF-ODH
msPRF-ODH smPRF-ODH
mmPRF-ODH
nsPRF-ODH
nmPRF-ODH
nnPRF-ODHDDH + PRFG
StDH + prog. ROM StDH + prog. ROM
StDH + prog. ROM
(7.14)
(7.15) (7.15)
(7.18)
no std-model algebraic
black-box reduction
(7.21)
Figure 7.9: Assumptions (in dotted-line rounded rectangles). The dashed horizontal line demarcates
the boundary below which our impossibility result for standard-model algebraic black-box reductions
holds. Numbers in parentheses indicate the respective propositions and theorems.
The proofs for some of the instantiation results have appeared already implicitly in previous
work about key exchange, e.g., in [Kra05, Ust08, DF11, FG14, LJBN15, KW16, LXZ+16]. There
the reduction to the respective DH problem in the random oracle model has been carried out
by dragging along all the steps of the key exchange protocol itself. This is both cumbersome
and, due to the increased complexity, error-prone. Our instantiation results thus, in particular,
yield cleaner, simpler reductions in key exchange protocol security analyses by allowing for a
straightforward reduction to the corresponding PRF-ODH notion.
105
Chapter 7. PRF-ODH: Relations, Instantiations, and Impossibility Results
7.4.1 Standard-Model Instantiation of nnPRF-ODH
We begin with instantiating the nnPRF-ODH assumption in the standard model. We next show
however, that the nnPRF-ODH assumption can be instantiated from a pseudorandom function
F keyed with group elements from G, and assuming that the DDH assumption holds in G:
Theorem 7.14 (DDH + PRFG =⇒ nnPRF-ODH).
If F : G× {0, 1}? → {0, 1}λ is a pseudorandom function and the DDH assumption holds in G,
then F is also nnPRF-ODH-secure. More precisely, for any efficient adversary A against the
nnPRF-ODH security of F, there exist efficient algorithms B1 and B2 such that
AdvnnPRF-ODHG,F,A (λ) ≤ 2 ·
(
AdvddhG,B1(λ) + Adv
prf-sec
F,B2 (λ)
)
.
Proof. The game proceeds in a sequence of game. The respective game hops are depicted in
Figure 7.10.
Game0(λ):
1 u $←− Zq
2 (x?, st) $←− A(G, g, gu)
3 v $←− Zq
4 b $←− {0, 1}
5 y?0 ← F(guv, x?)
6 y?1
$←− {0, 1}λ
7 b′ $←− A(gv, y?b , st)
8 return Jb′ = bK
Game1(λ):
1 u $←− Zq
2 (x?, st) $←− A(G, g, gu)
3 v $←− Zq
4 b $←− {0, 1}
5 z $←− Zq
6 y?0 ← F( gz , x?)
7 y?1
$←− {0, 1}λ
8 b′ $←− A(gv, y?b , st)
9 return Jb′ = bK
Game2(λ):
1 u $←− Zq
2 (x?, st) $←− A(G, g, gu)
3 v $←− Zq
4 b $←− {0, 1}
5 z $←− Zq
6 y?0
$←− {0, 1}λ
7 y?1
$←− {0, 1}λ
8 b′ $←− A(gv, y?b , st)
9 return Jb′ = bK
Figure 7.10: Game hops for proof of Theorem 7.14.
Let A be an efficient adversary against the nnPRF-ODH security of F. We show that A’s
advantage AdvnnPRF-ODHF,A (λ) in winning the nnPRF-ODH game is bounded by B1’s advantage
AdvddhG,B1(λ) against DDH, and B2’s advantage Advprf-secF,B2 (λ) against the pseudorandomness of F.
This is again done via the game-hopping technique.
Game0(λ): The original nnPRF-ODH game.
Game1(λ): As the original game, but we replace the key guv used in computing the challenge
value y?0 by an independent random group element gz ∈ G. We claim that A cannot
distinguish Game0(λ) from Game1(λ) efficiently with non-negligible advantage, since
otherwise there exists an adversary B1 that can efficiently solve DDH. Assume that A is
able to distinguish the two games. Then B1 is constructed as follows:
In the DDH game, B1 receives its challenge (g, gu, gv, gz), where gz is either guv or a
uniformly random group element. In order to decide whether the internal bit b′ of the
DDH challenge is 0 (i.e., gz = guv) or 1 (i.e., gz $←− G), B1 runs A as a subroutine on input
g, gu. B1 answers A’s challenge query x? with (gv, y?) where y? ← F(gz, x?). Eventually,
A outputs a bit bguess, and B outputs the same guess.
Note, that if A can efficiently distinguish the games, i.e., detect whether gz = guv
(Game0(λ)) or not (Game1(λ)), B1 can also efficiently solve its DDH challenge with the
same advantage. Thus, we can bound the advantage by
AdvnnPRF-ODHG,F,A (λ) ≤ AdvG1G,F,A(λ) + 2 · AdvddhG,B1(λ).
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Game2(λ): As the previous game, but this time we replace the challenge value y?0 itself by
a uniform random value, i.e., y?0 $←− {0, 1}λ. We show that if there exists an efficient
adversary A that can distinguish Game1(λ) from Game2(λ), then there necessarily exists
an efficient algorithm B2 that can break the pseudorandomness of F. We construct B2 as
follows:
To initiate the environment for A, algorithm B2 chooses some arbitrary group element gu
and forwards it to A. At some point, A asks the challenge query x?, which B2 relays to its
own OPRF oracle to receive a value y?b′ , which is either F (K,x?) for some randomly chosen
key K $←− G (if b′ = 0) or g(x?) ∈ {0, 1}λ for some random function g (if b′ = 1). Algorithm
B2 forwards y?b′ along with an arbitrarily chosen group element gv to A. Eventually, A
stops and outputs a bit bguess. Algorithm B2 outputs the same bit as A.
Note that b′ = 0 corresponds to Game1(λ), whereas b′ = 1 corresponds to the execution
of Game2(λ). Therefore, if A can efficiently distinguish between the two games, B2 can
distinguish between F values and independent random values with the same advantage.
Hence, we can bound A’s advantage by
AdvG1G,F,A(λ) ≤ AdvG2G,F,A(λ) + 2 · Advprf-secF,B2 (λ).
Since both y?0 and y?1 are now drawn independently and at random from {0, 1}λ, A cannot
do better than guessing, i.e., AdvG2G,F,A(λ) ≤ 0, which completes the proof.
7.4.2 Random-Oracle Instantiation of mnPRF-ODH and nmPRF-ODH
For the original ODH assumption, Abdalla et al. [ABR01] proved that it is implied by the strong
Diffie–Hellman assumption StDH in the random oracle model. In the following, we show that
our strongest one-sided PRF-ODH variants, i.e., mnPRF-ODH and nmPRF-ODH, can also be
instantiated under the strong Diffie–Hellman assumption. Many proofs that implicitly used
PRF-ODH, have employed reductions to GapDH. Note that StDH is implied by the GapDH
assumption, where the adversary can choose the first group element of the decision oracle freely.
Theorem 7.15 (StDH =⇒ mnPRF-ODH, nmPRF-ODH).
In the random oracle model, the strong DH assumption StDH implies mnPRF-ODH security
and nmPRF-ODH security of F(K,x) = RO(K,x) for programmable random oracle RO. More
precisely, for any efficient adversary A against the mnPRF-ODH or nmPRF-ODH security of F,
there exists an efficient algorithm B each such that
AdvmnPRF-ODHG,F,A (λ) ≤ AdvstDHG,B (λ) and AdvnmPRF-ODHG,F,A (λ) ≤ AdvstDHG,B (λ).
We prove the following theorem for the case of mnPRF-ODH only; the case of nmPRF-ODH
follows analogously, noting that by symmetry of the inputs gu, gv we can assume that the
adversary B gets access to a DDH(gv, ·, ·) decision oracle.
Proof. The proof is by straightforward reduction B from mnPRF-ODH to StDH. First, B obtains
group elements g, gu, gv as challenge in the StDH game. To initiate the mnPRF-ODH game-
environment for A, B forwards g and gu to A as input. A now has access to the oracles RO and
ODHu, i.e., A may send queries of the form (S, x) to the ODHu oracle, with S ∈ G and x being
some bit string. To provide an appropriate simulation, it must be ensured that, if A first queries
some (S, x) to ODHu and then (Su, x) to the random oracle RO, the answer of RO is consistent
with the simulation of ODHu, and vice versa. This can be achieved if B can program the RO
and has access to a decisional DDH(gu, ·, ·) oracle.7 B simulates the two oracles as follows:
7We remark that this is the reason why, in the given scenario, the computational DH assumption is not
sufficient.
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Simulation of RO. Repeating queries to RO return the same answer. This can be ensured by
standard bookkeeping techniques. If a previously unseen query (K,x) is received, B must
consider the case that A has already queried (S, x) with K = Su to ODHu. Thus, when
receiving a call (K,x) to RO, algorithm B queries its DDH(gu, ·, ·) oracle on (S,K) for any
group element S that has been queried with x to ODHu. If the DDH oracle returns 1 on
any such input then B answers consistently with the corresponding answer from earlier.
Else, B assigns a fresh value y to (K,x) and returns y to A.
Simulation of ODHu. Analogously to the simulation of the random oracle, B checks each newly
received request by A against all previous query-response pairs of ODHu and answers
consistently in case of repetition. If a previously unseen query (S, x) is received by ODHu,
B must further check whether the related value (Su, x) has been queried to RO before.
Similar to the reverse case, B uses its DDH(gu, ·, ·) oracle on (S,K) on all previous RO
queries (K,x) to detect this. If DDH(gu, S,K) = 1 for some K, the simulation of ODHu
answers with the respective output of RO. Otherwise, a response y is drawn uniformly at
random from {0, 1}λ and returned to A (and the tuple (S, x, y) stored for future reference).
At some point, A issues a challenge query x? to its challenger. Algorithm B answers this query
with gv and some value y?, drawn uniformly at random from {0, 1}λ. Adversary A can now
query ODHu and RO further, with the limitation that it may not query the pair (gv, x?) to
ODHu. These queries are simulated as before.
Eventually, A stops and outputs a guess bit bguess. B queries DDH(gu, gv,K) on all queries
(K,x?) of A to RO. If DDH(gu, gv,K) = 1 for some RO-query (K,x?), then B outputs K in the
StDH game. Otherwise B aborts, admitting failure.
If the efficient adversary A wins the mnPRF-ODH game with non-negligible advantage, then
B also outputs the correct value guv with non-negligible probability. To see this, we note that A
can only win the mnPRF-ODH game in the random oracle model with non-negligible advantage
if guv appears in one of its RO queries.
Assume that this is not the case. Then A expects y? to be either y?0 = RO(guv, x?)
or y?1 $←− {0, 1}λ. By the nature of random oracles (cf. Section 2.6), the two cases are
indistinguishable for A since both are drawn uniformly at random from {0, 1}λ. This holds even
if A could correctly determine the value guv, since it cannot compute y?0 without querying the
random oracle to compare with the received challenge. Thus, A must query guv to the random
oracle in order to distinguish y?0 from y?1. But if A makes such a query (in the simulated game),
then B also efficiently finds the DH value in the list of queries and correctly outputs it.
7.4.3 Random-Oracle Instantiation of mmPRF-ODH
We next look at the case that the adversary can make multiple queries to both oracles, ODHu
and ODHv. Interestingly, this does not follow straightforwardly from the StDH assumption as
above. The reason is that, there, we have used the DDH oracle with fixed element gu to check
for consistency of ODHu queries with random oracle queries.
In the most general mmPRF-ODH case, however, we also need to check consistency across
ODHu and ODHv queries. In particular, a simulator needs to be able to check for queries (S, x) to
ODHu and (T, x) to ODHv that result in the same key Su = K = T v. Yet, the simulator is only
given S, T, g, gu, and gv. Such a test cannot be immediately performed with the DDH(gu, ·, ·)
oracle as in the StDH case, and not even with the more liberal DDH(·, ·, ·) oracle as in the
GapDH case. The above problem of having to identify S, T such that Su = T v, reminds of the
so-called claw finding problem from complexity theory: given black-box access (i.e., oracles) to
two functions f1 : A→ C and f2 : B → C find x ∈ A and y ∈ B such that f1(x) = f2(y).
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ClawStDH. In our case, we do not need to find these elements S and T , but must be able
to verify them for the functions f1(x) := xu and f2(x) = xv. This leads us to augmenting the
StDH problem with a claw-verifying oracle, i.e., an oracle which allows to check for elements
S, T with Su = T v. We call this claw-verifying oracle Claw and the resulting DH problem the
Claw-StDH problem (cf. Figure 7.11).
GClaw-StDHG,A (λ):
1 u, v $←− Zq
2 S $←− ADDH(gu,·,·),Claw(·,·)(gu, gv)
3 return JS = guvK
DDH(gu, X, Y ):
4 return JXu = Y K
Claw(X,Y ):
5 return JXu = Y vK
GsqDHG,A (λ):
1 v $←− Zq
2 S $←− A(gv)
3 return JS = gv2K
Figure 7.11: Claw-StDH and sqDH problem.
For pairing-friendly groups G we get this decisional Claw oracle for free via the bilinear map
e. Claw(S, T ) then outputs 1, if e(gu, S) = e(gv, T ) and 0 otherwise. Next, we show that also
for general groups G the claw-verifying oracle can be implemented in the StDH game, but at
the cost of a loose security reduction to StDH.
The idea of representing the oracle Claw is as follows. Suppose that, in addition to g, gu, and
gv we would also receive the value gu/v (where we assume here and in the following that v 6= 0,
since the case v = 0 is trivial to deal with). Then we can run the check for claws via the stronger
DDH oracle from the Gap DH problem by calling DDH(gu/v, S, T ), checking that Su/v = T and
therefore Su = T v. We will see that we can relax the requirement to a DDH(gu, ·, ·) oracle as
given in the StDH assumption.
The crucial question remains if the computational problem of computing guv given gu/v (in
the presence of a DDH oracle) becomes significantly easier. Switching to the square DH problem
sqDH (cf. Figure 7.11) in an intermediate step, we show that this is not the case, although the
intermediate step causes a loose security relationship.
Proposition 7.16 (SqDH =⇒ Claw-StDH). If the square DH problem sqDH is hard in G,
then so is the claw strong DH problem Claw-StDH. More precisely, for any efficient adversary
A against Claw-StDH, there exists an efficient algorithm B against sqDH such that
Advclaw-stDHG,A (λ) ≤ AdvsqDHG,B (λ).
Proof. Assume that we have an algorithm A against Claw-StDH which on input (g, gu, gv) is
able to compute guv with the help of oracle access to DDH(gu, ·, ·) and the claw-verifying oracle
Claw. Then we show that we can use this algorithm to build an algorithm B for the square DH
problem sqDH (given g, gv compute gv2) relative to a DDH(gv, ·, ·) oracle.
For this, algorithm B for input g, gv picks an r $←− Z?q at random and sets gu = (gv)r. With
this choice, gu/v = gr can be easily computed with the knowledge of r, allowing to implement
the claw-verifying oracle quasi for free. Similarly, we have DDH(gu, ·, ·) = DDH(gv, (·)r, ·), giving
us the “mirrored” oracle for free. Algorithm B now runs A on input (g, gu, gv) and answers all
oracle requests of A during the computation with the help of its DDH(gv, ·, ·) oracle. Suppose
that the adversary A eventually outputs K. Then, B returns K1/r which equals gv2 for a correct
answer K = guv = grv2 of A.
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Next, we show that from a solver for the square-DH problem (with DDH(gv, ·, ·) oracle) we
can build a solver for the StDH problem. Going from the square DH problem to CDH is already
known. Interestingly, though, the common strategies in the literature [MW96, BDZ03, Gal12]
require three calls to the square DH solver in order to compute the square g(u+v)2 = gu2+2uv+v2
and then to divide out gu2 and gv2 . Fortunately, two calls are sufficient, see for example [Kil01],
yielding a tighter security bound.
Proposition 7.17 (StDH =⇒ sqDH). If the strong DH problem StDH is hard in G, then so
is the square DH problem sqDH. More precisely, for any efficient adversary A against sqDH,
there exists an efficient algorithm B against StDH such that
AdvsqDHG,A (λ) ≤
√
AdvstDHG,B (λ).
Proof. Suppose we have an efficient algorithm A against the square DH problem (with oracle
DDH(gv, ·, ·)). A reduction B against the strong DH problem on input gu and gv can then
call A once on g, gu+v and once on g, gr(u−v) for some randomizer r $←− Z?q . Since both inputs
are random and independent, we get two valid answers gu2+2uv+v2 and gr2(u2−2uv+v2) with the
product of the square-DH algorithm’s success probability. Note that these two executions at
most double the number of oracle queries to the DDH oracle. Dividing out the exponent r2
from the second term by raising it to the power 1/r2, and then dividing the two group elements,
the reduction B then obtains g4uv from which it can easily compute guv and thus solve its StDH
challenge.
Overall, combining Proposition 7.16 and 7.17, it holds that solving the problem in presence
of the decisional oracles for gu and gv, and an additional claw-verifying oracle, is implied by
the StDH assumption, albeit with a security loss. More precisely, for any efficient adversary A
against Claw-StDH we get an efficient adversary B (making at most twice as many calls to its
StDH oracle as A) such that
Advclaw-stDHG,A (λ) ≤
√
AdvstDHG,B (λ).
We can now give our security proof for mmPRF-ODH, which also implies security of
msPRF-ODH and smPRF-ODH:
Theorem 7.18. In the random oracle model, Claw-StDH (resp. StDH) implies mmPRF-ODH
security of F(K,x) modeled as a random oracle RO. More precisely, for any efficient adversary A
against the mmPRF-ODH security of F, there exist efficient algorithms B1 and B2 such that
AdvmmPRF-ODHG,F,A (λ) ≤ Advclaw-stDHG,B1 (λ) ≤
√
AdvstDHG,B2(λ)
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the one for mnPRF-ODH, only that we here simulate
the other oracle ODHv as the oracle ODHu, and for each query to either of the oracles also
check via the help of Claw consistency between ODHu and ODHv evaluations. This provides
a sound simulation of the random oracle. It follows as before that the adversary A can only
distinguish genuine y? from random ones if it queries the random oracle about guv (in the sound
simulation), in which case B1 finds this value in the list of queries. From Propositions 7.16
and 7.17, we know that this advantage can further be bounded by an adversary B2 against the
strong DH assumption.
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7.5 The PRF-ODH Security of HMAC
HMAC is a keyed message authentication code which was introduced by Bellare, Canetti, and
Krawczyk in 1996 [BCK96]. It has been standardized both by the IETF as RFC 2104 [KBC97]
and NIST as FIPS Publiction 198-1 [NIS08] and is used in major internet protocols such as TLS
and IPsec. The construction of HMAC is based on Merkle-Damgård hashes [Dam90, Mer90],
which iterate a compression function h over arbitrary-length inputs. Given appropriate padding
Merkle-Damgård-based hash functions inherit their collision-resistance from the underlying
compression function. Similarly, HMAC has been shown to be a PRF, if the underlying
compression function is a PRF [Bel06, Bel15].
In this section we examine the PRF-ODH security of HMAC, complementing previous results
on the PRF security of HMAC [CDMP05, Kra10, BL15]. In particular, we show that HMAC(K,x)
as well as its dual-PRF usage HMAC(x,K) that is keyed on the second input, as encountered in
TLS 1.3 [Res18] (see below), is mmPRF-ODH secure, which is our strongest notion of PRF-ODH
security.
Description of HMAC
The basic construction of HMAC is illustrated in Figure 7.12. Let h : {0, 1}c × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}c
be the underlying compression function and H : {0, 1}? → {0, 1}c the iterated Merkle-Damgård
hash. The iterated compression function is denoted by h? : {0, 1}c ×B+ → {0, 1}c, where B+ is
the set of all bit strings of length n · b with n ∈ N+. On input key K ∈ {0, 1}b and message
m˜ = m1m2 . . .mn of n b-bit blocks, the output of h? (the upper chain in Figure 7.12) is an
computed as
a0 ← K
a1 ← h(a0,m1)
...
an ← h(an−1,mn).
With the above convention we have that H(m) = h?(IV, m˜), where IV ∈ {0, 1}c is the
initialization vector fixed by the description of H and m˜ ∈ B+ the message M padded to a
multiple of the block size b. Finally, for key K ∈ {0, 1}b and label x, HMAC is defined as
HMAC(K,x) := H(K⊕opad||H(K⊕ ipad||x)), where opad and ipad are fixed (distinct) constants
in {0, 1}b. In terms of the iterated compression function we have
HMAC(K,x) = h?(IV,K ⊕ opad||h?(IV,K ⊕ ipad||x||padding)||padding).
Deviating key lengths. HMAC is in general also defined for keys whose lengths differ from
the block size b. The minimal requirements from a security point of view is a length of c bits,
i.e., the output length of the underlying hash function H. Keys of this minimal length are
simply padded to the correct length. Shorter keys are not recommended.
Longer keysK are first hashed down to H(K) ∈ {0, 1}c and then padded. For ease of notation,
we introduce the auxiliary function HMAC′ that takes as input keys of length greater than b
and is defined as HMAC′(K,x) := HMAC(L˜, x) where L := H(K) ∈ {0, 1}c and L˜ ∈ {0, 1}b is
the padded value of L (cf. Figure 7.13). We will see that it is beneficial to consider this more
general case when lifting results about the PRF-ODH security of HMAC to statements about
the key derivation function HKDF, which uses HMAC as dual PRF (cf. Section 7.5.2).
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Figure 7.12: Illustration of computation of y ← HMAC(K,x) with key K ∈ {0, 1}b and label x =
x1x2 . . . xn of size nb.
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Figure 7.13: Illustration of computation of y ← HMAC(K,x) with key K consisting of m blocks
K1K2 . . .Km of size b and label x = x1x2 . . . xn of size nb.
7.5.1 PRF-ODH Security of HMAC
Theorem 7.19. Assume that the underlying compression function h : {0, 1}c×{0, 1}b → {0, 1}c
of HMAC is a random oracle. Then HMAC is mmPRF-ODH-secure under the StDH assumption.
More precisely, for any efficient adversary A against the mmPRF-ODH security of HMAC, there
exists an efficient algorithm B such that
AdvmmPRF-ODHG,HMAC,A (λ) ≤
√
AdvstDHG,B (λ) + (qRO + (qODHu + qODHv) · `ODH + 1)2 · 2−c
where q with the respective index denotes the maximal number of the corresponding oracle queries,
and `ODH the maximal number of oracle calls to h in each evaluation of any ODH oracle call.
Proof. Let the compression function h underlying HMAC be modeled as a random oracle RO.
We note that we can assume each output of the compression function (genuine or simulated, as
below) to be unique and to never hit the initialization vector IV. This assumption is reflected in
the loss of the factor (qRO + (qODHu + qODHv) · `ODH + 1)2 · 2−c in the above security statement,
applying the birthday bound to the maximal number of queries (adding 1 for IV) and noting
that in the simulation we simulate the same number of random oracle evaluations as in the
actual attack.
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Evaluation chains. A key insight for unique outputs of the compression function is that
we can determine evaluation chains in a list of random oracle queries and answers. That is,
starting from any input/output pair of the random oracle, we can try to go backwards along
the HMAC iteration via the unique pre-images in the table, to check if we end up at a value
(IV, L′) for the hash function’s initialization vector IV. Since we assume that no random oracle
evaluation yields IV we can easily identify the beginning of such a chain. This holds for both
the inner and outer branch of the HMAC evaluation such that we can check if a value has been
derived as a full HMAC evaluation, for the key value L. From there on we can also check if we
have a full evaluation chain of the key (if the key is larger than the block size). To distinguish
the two cases we call the former an HMAC evaluation chain for key value L, and the latter a
complete HMAC evaluation chain. They coincide for keys which fit into the block size b.
For evaluation chains we can also extract the input string (and possibly the key input). In
particular, at any point during the simulation we can take any entry in the simulated random
oracle table and determine if there is an evaluation chain for this entry. This implies that we
can determine all existing evaluation chains at any point in time. For some of such completed
chains, we will only know an implicit presentation [Q,R] of the key K with DDH(Q,R,K) = 1,
as in the proof of Theorem 7.18.
Reduction to StDH. We show that if there exists an adversary A against the mmPRF-ODH
security of HMAC, then there necessarily also exists an adversary B that can break StDH with
the corresponding advantage. In the following we discuss the case where the group G is such
that its canonical bit string representation exceeds b bits and we use upstream hashing of the
key. The cases concerning keys from groups with block-sized representations (or even shorter)
can be proven analogously.
The StDH adversary B simulates the mmPRF-ODH environment for A and programs the
random oracle. In addition to the DDH(gu, ·, ·), oracle we assume that B has a claw-verifying
oracle Claw which for inputs S, T checks that Su = T v, and that it can simulate the DDH(gv, ·, ·)
oracle. These extra oracles are accounted for as in the monolithic random oracle case by using
the square root of the advantage against StDH.
Once B has obtained its challenge (g, gu, gv), it runs the mmPRF-ODH adversary A as a
sub-routine on input (g, gu). A then has access to the oracles RO and ODHu (and later also
ODHv). Here, the random oracle RO corresponds to the compression function h and thus takes
inputs of the form (A, x) ∈ {0, 1}c×{0, 1}b. Oracle ODHu takes as input (A, x) ∈ G×{0, 1}? and
is supposed to return a value corresponding to HMAC(Au, x). B must provide sound simulations
of these oracles. This is done as follows:
Simulation of ODHu. Repeated queries (S, x) to ODHu are answered consistently by returning
the same value as before. Thus, in the following we can assume that the received query of
the form (S, x) has not been queried to ODHu beforehand. Else, algorithm B first checks
if there already exists an evaluation chain for a pair (K,x) such that K = Su; this can
be verified with the DDH oracle. If this is the case, B answers consistently with the final
output of the evaluation chain. If not, it verifies if there is an implicit key K = [Q,R]
with Q = gu and R = S, or with Q = gv and Rv = Su, where the former can be checked
directly and the latter can be verified with the help of the oracle Claw.
If B finds a matching key according to one of the cases above, it looks up the corresponding
key value L as before. If, on the other hand, there is no (explicitly or implicitly) matching
key, then B sets H([gu, S]) ← L to a uniformly random value L ∈ {0, 1}c. It stores the
implicit key [gu, S] with the value L for future use.
113
Chapter 7. PRF-ODH: Relations, Instantiations, and Impossibility Results
B then iterates the HMAC computation to get the return value y with key L by calling
its (simulated) oracle RO an all values. More precisely, B computes y := RO?(IV, L˜ ⊕
opad||RO?(IV, L˜⊕ ipad||x||padding)||padding), where L˜ = L||padding, and B then returns
y as response. Note that, if the evaluation chain had already been computed before, the
outcome of this evaluation is consistent with the previous result.
Simulation of ODHv. Analogously to ODHu.
Simulation of RO. Outputs of RO for equal input queries are answered consistently. If a
previously unseen query, say, (A˜, x˜) is received, then B must consider if RO(A˜, x˜) completes
an H([gu, S]) (or H([gv, S])) computation for only implicitly known keyK = Su (orK = Sv)
that has been set beforehand to a uniformly random value, say, L (see the simulation of
oracle ODHu/ODHv). This can be checked again with the DDH oracle. If this is the case,
then the reduction answers the query consistently with value L. Otherwise, a response y
is drawn uniformly at random from {0, 1}c and returned.
At some point, A issues a challenge query x?. The reduction emulates the challenger by
replying with gv and some value y?, drawn uniformly at random from {0, 1}c. A can now query
ODHu and RO further, with the sole limitation that it may not query the pair (gv, x?) to ODHu.
Additionally, A acquires access to the ODHv oracle which is simulated analogously to the ODHu
oracle and may not be queried with (gu, x?). Eventually, A stops and outputs a guess bit b′. If
DDH(gu, gv, K˜) = 1 for some completed chain of RO queries with associated key K˜, B outputs
K˜ in the StDH game.
The rest of the proof is as before, given that the simulation of all oracle queries is sound.
That is, B outputs the correct value guv with high probability if A wins mmPRF-ODH with
non-negligible advantage. We show this by arguing that A can win the mmPRF-ODH game in
the random oracle model with non-negligible advantage if and only if guv is an input key of a
completed chain of RO queries with input (padded) label x?. To this end note that A expects
y? to be either y?0 ← HMAC(guv, x?) or y?1 $←− {0, 1}c. By the nature of random oracles, y?0 and
y?1 are indistinguishable for A since both are drawn uniformly at random from {0, 1}c. Even if
A can correctly determine the value guv, it cannot compute y?0 by itself to compare with the
received challenge. Thus, A must iteratively query RO on the full HMAC(guv, x?) computation,
including the key guv, in order to distinguish y?0 and y?1. Furthermore, B is efficient, since A is
efficient and asks at most polynomially many queries to each oracle.
7.5.2 Application to HKDF
As mentioned earlier, one specific use case of the PRF-ODH assumption arises in the setting of
TLS 1.3. Here, the HKDF scheme [Kra10, KE10] is adapted for key derivation. In particular,
the function HKDF.Extract is used to derive an internal key K ′ as
K ′ ← HKDF.Extract(x,K) := HMAC(x,K),
where an adversarially known value x is used as the HMAC key while the secret randomness
source in the form of a DH shared secret K = guv is used as the label. At a first glance, this
swapping of inputs may seem odd. However, the specified purpose of HKDF.Extract is to extract
uniform randomness from its second component.
One way to prove that K ′ is indeed a random key (as long as guv is not revealed to the
adversary) is to model HKDF.Extract(x, ·) as a random oracle. An alternative approach is pursued
in [DFGS15b, DFGS16, FG17] where the authors prove the statement under the assumption
that HKDF.Extract(XTS , IKM ) = HMAC(XTS , IKM ) is PRF-ODH secure when understood
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as a PRF keyed with IKM ∈ G (i.e., when the key is the second input). In this light, it is
beneficial to show that HMAC(x,K) remains PRF-ODH secure for key K ∈ G and x ∈ {0, 1}?.8
Fortunately, our general treatment of HMAC(K,x) in Theorem 7.19 with arbitrarily long keys
allows us to conclude the analogous result for HMAC(x,K) with swapped key and label.
Corollary 7.20. Let h : {0, 1}c × {0, 1}b → {0, 1}c be the underlying compression function of
HMAC. If h is modeled as a random oracle, then HMAC′(K,x) := HMAC(x,K) is mmPRF-ODH
secure under StDH.
Alternative approaches. Alternatively, one may wish to prove Theorem 7.19 along the
results established by Coron et al. [CDMP05], who showed that if the compression function
h is modeled as a random oracle then a variant of HMAC can be shown to be indifferentiable
from a random oracle in the sense of Maurer et al. [MRH04]. Krawczyk [Kra10] mentions
that the above result can also immediately be applied to the unmodified plain HMAC design.
However, we believe that providing a detailed proof of Theorem 7.19 is nevertheless beneficial
since it enables us to argue in a straightforward manner that the “reversed” result presented in
Corollary 7.20, i.e., HMAC(x,K) with swapped label and key as inputs, also holds. Else one
would need to check if HMAC with a hashed key would also be a random oracle.
In the NIST hash function competition it has been established that sponge-based construc-
tions can be used to build cryptographic hash functions. We are confident that the proof of
Theorem 7.19 can be adapted to achieve the same result for HMAC if the underlying crypto-
graphic hash function H is replaced by a sponge-based construction such as SHA3-256 with the
random permutation pi modeled as a random oracle.9 This proof can also be established along
the lines of Bertoni et al. [BDPV08] who provide results showing that the sponge construction
is indifferentiable from a random oracle when being used with a random transformation or a
random permutation.
7.6 Impossibility Result
To close the chapter, we will briefly state for completeness the impossibility result from [BFGJ17a],
which basically shows that it is implausible to assume that even the mild, one-sided variants of
lrPRF-ODH with only a single query can be instantiated in the standard model:
Theorem 7.21. Assume that there is an efficient algebraic black-box reduction R from the
snPRF-ODH (or nsPRF-ODH) assumption to a DDH-augmented problem. Then either the
DDH-augmented problem is not hard, or the decisional square DH problem is not hard.
The proof of Theorem 7.21 is conducted via a meta-reduction technique [GMR88, BV98,
PV05] and can be found in the paper [BFGJ17a]. The general proof idea is as follows.
Proof sketch. Assume that we have an algebraic reduction R from the snPRF-ODH assumption
which turns any black-box adversary into a solver for a DDH-augmented problem (a problem
from a class of hard cryptographic problems). Then we can in particular consider an inefficient
adversary A∞ which successfully breaks the snPRF-ODH assumption with constant probability.
The reduction, with black-box access to A∞, must then solve the DDH-augmented problem.
For this it can then either not take any advantage of the infinite power of A∞—in which case
we can already break the DDH-augmented problem—or it tries to elicit some useful information
8Though formally defined for arbitrary length, recall that the minimal recommended length is c bits.
9SHA3-256 is part of the Keccak sponge function family [BDPA11]. It has been standardized in the FIPS
Publication 202 [NIS15], wherein it is explicitly approved for usage in HMAC.
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from A∞. In the latter case we build our meta-reduction by simulating A∞ efficiently. This
is accomplished by exploiting the algebraic property of the reduction and “peeking” at the
internals of the reduction’s group element choices. Our meta-reduction will then solve the
decisional square DH problem, which says that (g, ga, ga2) is indistinguishable from (g, ga, gb)
for random a, b.
Our impossibility result works for pseudorandom functions F, which take as input arbitrary
bit strings {0, 1}? and map them to λ bits. We stick with this convention here, but remark
that our negative result also holds if the input length is 1 only, and the output length is
super-logarithmic in λ. Similarly, we assume that F is nnPRF-ODH secure, although it suffices
for our negative result that the function F for a random group element (and some fixed input,
say 1) is pseudorandom, i.e., that F(X, 1) is indistinguishable from random for a uniformly
chosen group element X $←− G (without giving any “Diffie–Hellman decomposition” of X).
We note that the impossibility result does not only apply to the schemes analyzed with
respect to the PRF-ODH assumption, but potentially also to other works where the general
Gap Diffie–Hellman GapDH or related assumptions in the random oracle have been used for
the analysis, yet where the PRF-ODH assumption is a promising alternative for carrying out a
proof. Examples include the QUIC protocol [FG14, LJBN15] and OPTLS [KW16] which forms
the base of TLS 1.3.
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Conclusion
The break of cryptographic hardness assumptions and primitives is probably as old of a
phenomenon as cryptography itself. These breaks occur mostly as a result of more sophisticated
cryptanalytic techniques and/or the steady increase in computational resources. However, more
often than not, we face the situation that broken algorithms are still widely deployed due
to traditionally slow adoption rates for new cryptographic algorithms and protocol versions.
Answers to the following question are thus needed - both in retrospect as well as in anticipation
of the break of cryptographic primitives: “Must one consider session keys (and thus the following
encrypted communication) as compromised if they were established in key exchanges that
employed a then unbroken, but now broken primitive X?”
With the notion of breakdown resilience we gave the first model for authenticated key
exchange that could answer this type of question for arbitrary cryptographic primitives and
hardness assumptions. An extension of the model also captures the security of ongoing and
future sessions, and is especially useful for analyzing generic hybrid constructions that utilize
built-in redundancies to ensure robustness in the case of failure of one of the algorithms.
We looked more specifically at such hybrid constructions for key exchange protocols that
aim for robustness against adversaries that may gain access to quantum computing power. We
presented a framework that is able to differentiate between varying levels of quantum adversaries
(e.g., between future-quantum and post-quantum adversaries) to analyze the security of hybrid
key encapsulation mechanisms and AKE protocols. We furthermore designed three novel,
provably-secure constructions for hybrid key encapsulation mechanisms that can withstand
post-quantum adversaries.
Future-proofing key exchanges does however not only encompass actively guarding against
future adversaries but also basing analyses on well-understood hardness assumptions. A
careful categorization of hardness assumptions minimizes the risk of security claims becoming
meaningless due to untenable or uninstantiable assumptions.
An example for a fairly new assumption in key exchange protocols is the PRF-ODH assump-
tion, which is commonly employed in security proofs of Diffie–Hellman-based key exchanges since
its introduction in 2012 by Jager et al. [JKSS12]. Despite its popularity, the various variants of
the PRF-ODH assumption had not received a unified formalization and in-depth analysis as to
their strength. We thus gave a unified definition encompassing (most) variants present in the
literature and systematically categorized it by firmly embedding it into the ecosystem of known
DH-type assumptions. Additionally, there was uncertainty as to whether the employment of
PRF-ODH allows to circumvent the random oracle methodology. We could show that this is
unfortunately implausible, even for the mildest one-sided notions.
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How to go on from here?
The need for cryptographic agility and modular approaches has become a key wish list item
for many new protocol designs. This hopefully supports a swifter replacement of broken
cryptographic primitives and protocol versions in the future. Especially the transition to
post-quantum secure algorithms (most likely via hybrid constructions) is a fruitful area for both
further “pen-and-paper” research as well as hands-on involvement by providing implementations
and benchmarks. It is imperative to further map out the concrete challenges that occur in
real-world deployment of cryptographic algorithms within protocols, as, e.g., the question of how
to deal with interoperability of hybrid-aware and non-hybrid systems, as well as the perpetual
issue of (un-updatable) legacy systems.
It is worth noting, that in order to transition to post-quantum algorithms we actually need
to migrate systems twice, first to hybrid designs and eventually back to single-algorithm designs
that are solely post-quantum. Cryptographic agility and the development of seamless migration
tools are therefore key. While major internet protocols such as TLS and SSH have already
begun to gain some attention with respect to these issues, eventually all of our protocols need
to make the shift. In particular it will be interesting to investigate the combination of hybrid
designs for key exchange and authentication.
Furthermore, one hybrid solution does not fit all. Hybrids necessarily introduce some
overhead—in computation, storage, and communication. So far, there is little consideration
on how we can build dedicated lightweight hybrid designs that can be supported by resource-
constrained devices, for example in the IoT setting.
With respect to the more foundational nature of security models and hardness assumptions
we note that the breakdown resilience framework may be added to different AKE model designs.
It is conceivable that the approach may even be beneficial in other types of protocol analyses
such as, e.g., for secure channel protocols. For PRF-ODH it would be nice to fill in the missing
separation results such that the hierarchy between the various notions is established completely.
For non-DH-based key exchanges it may be interesting to see whether analogues of the PRF-ODH
assumption are necessary and how these can be defined and instantiated.
On a more general note, the paradigm of provable security is a success story. However, the
story does not end there. Personally, I find it highly interesting how the different foundational
approaches within the paradigm (e.g., manual game-based proofs and automated formal analysis)
can be composed to achieve stronger security guarantees of the analysed protocol.
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